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ABSTRACT 
INDOCTRINATION IN EDUCATION: 
OFFERING AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION 
by 
Barbara A. Peterson 
University ot New Hampshire, May, 2008 
Peace Education courses, as well as others that teach marginalized 
values and beliets (e.g., race relations, queer studies, and feminist studies) 
are particularly vulnerable to the charge of indoctrination. This allegation is 
political rather than scholarly and it is not clear what precisely teachers of 
such subjects are being accused of doing or trying to do. However, the 
charge is powerful enough to prevent such courses from being offered at 
public schools and universities and to remove them when they are already 
part of the curriculum. To provide teachers and schools the confidence to 
take on these marginalized and controversial courses, we need a 
conception of indoctrination that meets the following purposes: (1) allows us 
to better understand and respond to the persistent pejorative connation of 
the word, (2) enables us to identify indoctrinary endeavors when they occur, 
and (3) guides us in developing educational programs that help avoid it. 
Existing conceptions of indoctrination are critically examined. It is 
argued that, while LA. Snook's intentional analysis is the most promising in 
meeting the purposes of this work as stated above, his analysis does not go 
far enough to encourage teachers to, not only reflect on what student 
outcomes they hope to achieve, but what outcomes they are likely to 
achieve given their efforts in class and the particular school context in which 
they work. Further, it is argued that none of the prior conceptions address 
the possibility that schools (i.e., the policies, practices, traditions, goals, 
curriculum, decision-making structures, etc.) as well as individual teachers 
may be agents of indoctrination. 
Cheryl Misak's pragmatic conception of truth is examined for its 
usefulness in providing a notion of indoctrination that prompts teachers and 
schools to seriously consider how their educational endeavors shape the 
manner in which students come to hold their beliefs. It is concluded that an 
intentional analysis of indoctrination, defined in terms of a Misakian notion of 
truth-seeking inquiry, allows us to adequately respond to charges of 
indoctrination and know what steps to take to diminish the likelihood of 




The Problem of Indoctrination 
My interest in indoctrination comes from my experiences as a 
peace educator. I developed a Peace Studies course and taught it for 
years at a local high school. At the beginning of my course and for each 
year thereafter, I encountered a great deal of criticism which generally 
took the form of a charge of indoctrination. I was not personally criticized; 
their indictment was against the assumed nature of the class. The 
disapproval was expressed by persons who knew nothing of the content 
of this class, my teaching methods, or my educational aims in general. 
The implication in their charge was that teaching peace is inherently 
indoctrinary. 
I found the charge intriguing and looked into it further. After a 
good deal of investigation, I found myself agreeing with a professor who 
encountered similar criticisms when he tried to institute a peace studies 
major at the university where he teaches. He claimed that the charge of 
indoctrination against peace education is "political" rather than scholarly 
(Ferber, 2003). Though I searched for a scholarly indictment against 
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peace education, the only things I was able to tind were newspaper 
reports about certain groups charging peace studies courses at local 
public schools with indoctrination. 
The charges of indoctrination reported in printed and on-line 
newspapers seem to be used more as an expression of condemnation 
against curricula one dislikes rather than as a specific criticism of any 
particular wrongdoing. For example, in an October 2001 edition of 
CNSNEWS.com, critics of the Center for Civic Education (CCE) in 
Minneapolis, MN, charged the curriculum advanced by the CCE as 
"taxpayer-funded 'indoctrination.'" One opponent was quoted saying: 
"In a nutshell, what this group [the CCE] has done is that it's redefined 
education so that it is no longer a system of information; it is now a system 
of persuasion ... [It is] no longer education; it's indoctrination." Their 
criticism stems from their concern that the curriculum of the CCE promotes 
a particular political agenda as it "emphasizes values like 
environmentalism and multiculturalism over national sovereignty, natural 
rights and the Second Amendment right to bear arms." In this case 
(assuming the article is fair and accurate), the criticism seems to come 
from an objection over the content being taught. The critics of the CCE 
sought to indict the curriculum because it taught subjects, ideas, and 
values that they did not agree with and therefore did not want taught in 
their schools. 
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A similar argument was made in a 1988 online article by Peace and 
Environmental News out of Ottawa, Canada. Parents Against 
Propaganda (PAP) tried to get the Ottawa Board of Education to prevent 
peace studies courses from being offered in the schools. One of the 
arguments expressed by members of PAP was that peace issues were 
indoctrinary as they promoted a particular political agenda. They 
claimed that schools ought to "keep politics out of the classroom ... [and] 
get 'back to basics.'" Such criticism implies, once again, that the 
presumed political nature of the course makes it indoctrinary. The 
assumption in both cases is that mainstream courses and curricula are a-
political and objective, and courses that teach ideas and values that lie 
outside the mainstream, such as peace studies, are by their very nature 
political and therefore indoctrinary. 
Adversaries of peace education, as shown in these two examples, 
use the word "indoctrination" as a way of attacking courses and criticizing 
teaching content that they find objectionable. As Gerald H. Paske states: 
"When a speaker refers to an activity as indoctrination ... he is not 
advancing an antecedently formulated concept which he claims 
matches the referent; he is rather making a value claim about the 
morality or propriety of some particular activity" (Paske, 1972: 93). The 
charges of indoctrination expressed by critics of the CCE and members of 
PAP do not clearly specify what is meant by indoctrination; rather they 
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take the form of condemning course material they do not like and 
supporting material they personally agree with. As Nancy Glock suggests 
in her dissertation, "The pejorative connotat ion of the term [indoctrination] 
thus lends itself to mere name-call ing, permitting the speaker to express his 
disapproval without having to be at all specific" (Glock, 1975: 4-5). 
Though PAP and critics of CCE are clearly against particular material 
being taught in schools, they are not at all clear about why such material 
is object ionable other than to say it is "polit ical." Yet, in these cases the 
word "poli t ical" is as vague as "indoctrination." Just what it is that makes 
peace studies or environmentalism political and "natural sovereignty" or 
the Second Amendment a-political is left unsaid. 
As the charge of indoctrination against peace educat ion is not laid 
out in any scholarly fashion, I looked to peace educators to see if they 
defend their curriculum against such indictments and if their defense 
helps give substance to them. Peace educators, such as Peter Dale Scott 
(1982) and Betty Reardon (1988), have responded to accusations of 
indoctrination. Yet their responses are too terse and vague to provide an 
understanding of what the charges entail. Furthermore, they themselves 
do not offer a clear argument for why peace educators do not 
indoctrinate. Scott, for example, claims that the allegation of 
indoctrination launched against the peace educat ion curriculum offered 
at his university is hypocrit ical. He contends that the critics who claim that 
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teaching peace is akin to promoting a particular political agenda, and is 
therefore indoctrinary, are the very same persons who support the current 
political agenda of increasing military spending and proliferation. He 
makes it clear that there is no way to avoid politics in education; to call 
one curriculum "indoctrinary" and not others is to ignore the inherent 
political nature of all curricula. 
Peace educator Betty Reardon also takes on the accusation of 
indoctrination. Unlike Scott, who defends peace education against 
allegations of political advocacy, Reardon defends it against charges of 
promoting a particular set of values. She writes: 
The values and action dimensions of peace education have 
been a significant source of controversy - controversy that 
needs to be confronted head-on by peace educators. When 
the purposes include persuasion, then the questions of 
indoctrination and bias must be addressed. Accusations of bias 
have been leveled at peace education and peace studies 
from many sides, by academics as well as by professional unions 
and school administrations. (Reardon, 1988: 22) 
She first defends peace education by contending that it promotes the 
same values all educators seek to teach, namely: "competence, 
empowerment, efficacy, fairness, nonjudgmentalism, inquiry, open-
mindedness [and] responsibility" (Reardon, 1988:81). She later admits, 
however, that peace educators promote different values as well, 
including those of cooperation rather than competition, and nurturance .. 
rather than dominance. Though Reardon admits that peace educators 
promote a particular set of values, some of which differ from those 
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advanced by mainstream courses, she defends the teaching of values by 
arguing that oil educators advance some set of values. Her argument 
here is similar to Scott's defense of promoting a particular political 
agenda by asserting that oil educators promote a particular political 
agenda. Thus, both Reardon and Scott defend peace education by 
arguing that peace educators do the same sorts of things that their critics 
do or support doing in more mainstream and accepted courses. 
If we agree with Scott and Reardon, the problem then is not 
whether one should promote values or a particular political ideology 
(because all education is inherently value-laden and political) but which 
values and ideology one ought to promote. Yet, neither Reardon nor 
Scott defends the particular values and ideology taught in peace 
education courses against the charge of indoctrination. Instead, they 
simply claim that a crucial feature of peace education is to promote and 
advocate for peace and to oppose violence. Indeed, Scott states that a 
fundamental part of peace education is to "advocate peace, and 
deplore war as a social evil to be brought increasingly under control by 
the proper application of our intelligence and human feelings" (Scott, 
1982: 13). Similarly, Reardon notes that the "primary value goals" 
(Reardon, 1988: 23) of peace education are to help reduce violence and 
oppose war. 
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From their arguments, it seems reasonable to suppose that both 
Reardon and Scott assume the charge of indoctrination stems from the 
act of advocating, promoting, and persuading any particular set of 
values and ideals. Thus, their defense against the charge of indoctrination 
lies in their argument that all education inherently promotes some set of 
values and ideals. Therefore, they argue that because peace educators 
do nothing different from educators of more mainstream courses (who 
are not targets of the charge of indoctrination), peace education is no 
more indoctrinary than other types of education. 
Yet, being "no more" indoctrinary does not, necessarily, mean that 
peace educators do not indoctrinate. It seems to imply that they do, but 
so do all educators. Reardon (1988), however, takes her defense of 
peace education one step further. She asserts that, though peace 
educators do, in fact, attempt to persuade students to accept certain 
values, they also seek to develop in their students the capacities of 
"critical consciousness." Similarly, Scott (1982) claims that one of the 
fundamental tasks of peace educators is to teach students to be 
"objective." For Reardon, "critical consciousness" seems to involve raising 
questions about the value of war and violence within a "critical context" 
(Reardon, 1988: 23), yet she gives no clear indication of what a "critical 
context" is. Scott is a bit clearer about the meaning of "objective." He 
states that it involves "striving to overcome the limitations of one's social 
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perspective and to present opposing arguments as fairly as possible" 
(Scott, 1982: 13). How one does this, however, while advocating for a 
particular political ideology (Scott, 1982: 12), and persuading students to 
adopt a certain set of values, (Reardon, 1988: 22) is not made clear. 
Scott and Reardon seem to ignore the tension that arises when one's 
educational goals are to advance, promote, persuade, and advocate a 
particular set of values and political beliefs while at the same time 
claiming to develop in students the capacities to critically examine their 
own as well as others' perspectives, assumptions, and beliefs. 
Although we can see that some peace educators do, in fact, 
respond to the charge of indoctrination, I have shown that their responses 
are far too brief to give an adequate account of what the charge entails 
and precisely how peace educators are to avoid indoctrination. While 
the charge can be referred to as "merely" political, it nevertheless carries 
with it the very real threat that peace studies courses, as well as other 
areas of study that appear to teach ideas, values and perspectives that 
run counter to mainstream ideology (such as queer studies, women's 
studies and environmental education), will be prevented from being 
offered at schools and universities or will be removed from the curriculum 
if they are already being offered. What is needed, therefore, is a more 
thorough and substantive account of the charge of indoctrination as well 
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as some further clarity as to how such a charge can be, at least in 
principle, successfully rebutted. 
Making the charge of "indoctrination" more than a vague political 
accusation or mere name-calling, and making clearer what is required to 
avoid indoctrination prompted me to take on the challenge of 
developing a conception of indoctrination that explains the persistent 
pejorative connotation of the word, allows educators to identify its 
occurrence with consistency and effectively avoid it, and enables 
educators to effectively respond to the charge of indoctrination." As Luise 
Prior McCarty and David Charles McCarty note, charges of indoctrination 
are serious but to know how to avoid it or effectively respond to charges 
of indoctrination we must "draw the face" (McCarty and McCarty, 1991: 
257) of indoctrination so we can better see what it looks like. A 
conception of indoctrination should aid educators as well as the general 
public in determining when indoctrination is taking place, not just in 
peace education course and curriculum but also in more mainstream 
and generally accepted courses. My purposes, then, in developing a 
conception of indoctrination are to: (1) assist educators and others to 
better understand the charge of indoctrination and know what can count 
as an appropriate response to such a charge, (2) help educators and 
others identify indoctrination in all educational settings with accuracy and 
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consistency, and (3) help teachers and schools know how to develop 
educational programs that avoid indoctrination. 
Definitional Criteria 
I propose a set of definitional criteria that must be met for a 
conception of indoctrination to meet these purposes. I first list these 
criteria then explain what each means and why each is important as a 
standard for a strong and useful conception of indoctrination. The criteria 
are as follows: 
1. The conception must not depart radically from ordinary usage of 
the term. 
2. It must not reduce "indoctrination" to something else. 
3. It must explain why we find indoctrination in education within a 
pluralistic democratic society objectionable even when it is used to 
pursue worthy goals. 
4. It must clearly characterize what it is for teachers (and possibly also 
schools) to indoctrinate and what it is required for them to avoid 
indoctrination. 
The first and second criteria are important as they permit us to exclude 
stipulative definitions and require a conception that has explicatory 
distinctiveness. As we have seen, often the "ordinary" usage of the term 
indoctrination is unclear or inconsistent as it is used in a variety of contexts. 
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At times its usage is political as when public groups seek to condemn 
particular educational curricula. At other times the term is used by 
educational theorists as a means ot criticizing either a particular style of 
teaching or the teaching of particular content. I will have more to say 
later about how the term is used, but for now it is important to understand 
that the first criterion guards against developing a purely stipulative 
definition and ensures that our discussion of indoctrination joins the 
ongoing conversation. 
The term "indoctrination" needs to be defined in a way that 
distinguishes it from similar notions that are sometimes conflated with 
"indoctrination," notions such as promoting or advocating, brainwashing, 
conditioning, and lazy or poor teaching. Developing a conception of 
indoctrination that explicates how it is distinct from other similar notions 
further refines our understanding of indoctrination. Generating a lucid 
account of a concept requires that we not only expound upon what sort 
of features characterize the concept; it also helps to draw as clear a 
border around the concept as possible by explicating what indoctrination 
is not. For example, demarcating indoctrination as distinct from poor 
teaching helps create a more defined picture of indoctrination by making 
plain what sort of features and characteristics distinguish it from merely 
poor teaching. Thus, the second criterion helps ensure that the 
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conception developed here will be distinct from other notions that are 
quite similar to indoctrination and are often erroneously conflated with it. 
The third criterion ensures that the definition developed in this 
dissertation explicates the pejorative nature of indoctrination. Because, 
as we have seen, critics of peace education use the term "indoctrination" 
in a strictly pejorative sense, and in the last fifty years educational theorists 
have used the term primarily as an indictment against a particular type of 
teaching, a definition that maintains this pejorative sense accomplishes 
three tasks. First, it helps give substance and clarity to the charge of 
indoctrination launched against innovative curricula such as queer 
studies, women's studies, and peace education, and a substantive claim 
is necessary if educators are to have an opportunity to adequately 
defend themselves against such a charge. Secondly, it provides a 
definition that does not radically depart from ordinary usage of the term 
by political action groups as well as by educators and educational 
philosophers. Finally, it provides a clearer understanding of what sort of 
harm we risk or incur with indoctrination. 
Criterion four - ensuring that the definition provides a lucid picture 
of what it looks like for teachers (and schools) to indoctrinate and what is 
required to avoid indoctrination - is necessary because we need to 
develop a conception of indoctrination that will be useful to us for: (a) 
making sense of the charge of indoctrination, (b) helping educators and 
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schools identify indoctrination where it occurs, and (c) developing 
educational programs that avoid it. Prior conceptions sought only to hold 
individual teachers accountable for indoctrination. It has, in my view, 
been a weakness of such conceptions that they have occluded much 
miseducation that deservedly belongs under the rubric of 
"indoctrination." In chapters six and seven I argue that there are times 
when the school context plays such a significant role in determining how 
students come to hold their beliefs that it is reasonable to hold schools as 
a whole responsible for indoctrination instead of, or in addition to, 
teachers. 
I offer an alternative conception of indoctrination that is better than 
prior analyses and conceptions at meeting the purposes laid out in this 
dissertation. In what follows, I illustrate the organization of my conceptual 
analysis by providing a brief overview of the chapters in this dissertation. 
In chapters two and three, I introduce and critique conceptions of 
indoctrination developed by prior analytic philosophers. In chapter four, I 
defend an intentional analysis of indoctrination, borrowing a good deal 
from LA. Snook (1972a, 1972b). Chapter analyzes the notion of "truth" 
offered by Cheryl Misak (2000, 2004) and argues that such a notion is 
useful in developing my conception of indoctrination. In chapters six and 
seven, I defend an alternative conception of indoctrination that can in 
principle be useful in the ways I have described above. Finally, in chapter 
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six I offer a demonstration of how in practice this alternative conception is 
useful. 
Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter II 
The central tasks I take on in chapter two are a detailed articulation 
and critique of the conceptions of indoctrination developed primarily by 
analytic philosophers in the 1970s and early 1980s. Although there has 
been a resurgence of interest in the topic in more recent years, much of 
that work uses a conception of indoctrination offered by earlier analytic 
philosophers to examine the educational value of teaching religion in 
schools. Thus, as most of the conceptual analytic work was done in the 
1970s and early 1980s, this chapter focuses primarily on the work of that 
time. 
I begin chapter two with a critical look at indoctrination defined in 
terms of content. Here I draw upon Tasos Kazepides (1982, 1982, 1987), 
Gregory and Woods (1972), Antony Flew (1972) and Barrow and Woods 
(1988), each of whom claim that indoctrination can not occur unless a 
particular content is taught, namely doctrines. Each of these theorists 
argues that indoctrination involves the inculcation of doctrines which 
leads to students holding doctrinal beliefs in a non-rational manner. A 
content analysis, then, differs from analyses of methods, intention, and 
consequences. Defining indoctrination in terms of content presupposes 
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that not just any sort of claim can be indoctrinated. According to those 
who define indoctrination in terms of content, claims such as "Langston 
Hughes was a prominent writer of the Harlem Renaissance" and "The U.S. 
Cuban Missile Crisis occurred during the Kennedy Administration" can not 
be indoctrinated. Only claims that are part of a larger ideological system 
of beliefs (that is, claims that are doctrinal) are able to be indoctrinated. 
Thus, according to a content analysis of indoctrination, tenets of the 
Catholic faith or Marxist ideology can be indoctrinated while true claims 
that are not seemingly part of an ideology cannot. 
Criticisms of a content analysis of indoctrination center on the 
contention that "doctrine" has not been adequately clarified. Although 
each of the theorists named above tries to define "doctrine," none 
provides a definition that clearly indicates what sorts of claims count as 
doctrines and what sorts do not. Because we can not be sure when a 
teacher is instructing her students in doctrines or other kinds of beliefs, I 
conclude that a content analysis of indoctrination fails to provide a 
sufficiently clear understanding of indoctrination. 
Following a critical examination of content analyses of 
indoctrination, I look at method analyses of indoctrination offered by Willis 
Moore (1972), John Wilson (1972), Gregory and Woods (1972), and James 
McClellan (1976). Those who define indoctrination in terms of method all 
agree that indoctrination occurs only when teachers employ non-rational 
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instructional methods. In other words, each of the theorists named above 
asserts that students come to hold beliefs in a non-rational or non-
evidential manner only when they are taught with non-rational 
instructional methods. 
Critics of methods analyses claim that it is sometimes unavoidable 
and even desirable to use non-rational teaching methods as in the case 
of rote memorization of math tables. Defining such teaching as 
indoctrination, they argue, risks losing the strictly pejorative sense of the 
concept. In addition, critics assert that the aforementioned conceptions 
have failed to provide a sufficiently clear understanding of what 
constitutes "non-rational teaching methods." Thus, defining indoctrination 
in terms of method, critics argue, does not enable educators to identify 
indoctrination with consistent accuracy. Analyses fail to make clear 
precisely what non-rational teaching methods look like. 
After developing a critical appraisal of the methods analyses, I 
examine conceptions of indoctrination defined in terms of a teacher's 
intentions. Here I look primarily at the account of I. A. Snook (1972a, 
1 972b) as his intentional analysis is the one most often referenced by 
others. Snook contends that if we want to hold teachers morally 
accountable for indoctrination we must show that indoctrination is an 
intentional act. For him, then, one indoctrinates when one intends to get 
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students to hold beliefs non-rationally or, as he puts it, "regardless of the 
evidence" (Snook, 1972a, 154). 
Critics of an intention analysis claim that such an account makes it 
too difficult to assign moral blame because we can not ever be sure what 
a teacher intends. Thus, if we can not know what it is that any given 
teacher intends, we can not know with any sort of assurance of accuracy 
whether she is indoctrinating. Also, critics point out that teachers can and 
do unintentionally get students to hold beliefs non-evidentially and this 
should also be of concern to us. 
After examining Snook's conception of indoctrination defined in 
terms of intent and the criticisms launched against his analysis, I examine 
definitions of indoctrination in terms of consequences. Those who 
develop a consequences analysis of indoctrination, such as Barrow and 
Woods (1988), assert that indoctrination only occurs when teachers have 
been successful at getting students to hold beliefs non-rationally. Such 
conceptions claim that indoctrination is best understood in both the task 
and achievement senses. In other words, one does not indoctrinate 
unless one both engages in certain activities and one achieves certain 
outcomes. Critics of a consequences analysis contend that one can 
never be sure whether the fact that students hold beliefs non-rationally is 
due to something their teacher did or due to something else entirely. They 
insist that simply because a teacher has students who end up holding 
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beliefs non-evidentially we cannot claim that the teacher caused beliefs 
to be held in this manner; thus, according to these critics a definition of 
indoctrination in terms of consequences is a non-starter. 
At the end of this chapter I conclude that analyses of indoctrination 
developed thus far in the literature offer valuable insight for educators to 
examine their practice, intentions, and educational responsibilities. 
However, each of these accounts fails to provide an account of 
indoctrination sufficiently lucid to enable educators to know when they 
are indoctrinating, how they can avoid doing it, and how they can 
effectively respond to accusations of doing it. 
Chapter III 
In chapter three I take a closer and more critical look at the 
conceptions discussed in chapter two. First I examine the various 
purposes that helped shape each of the accounts of indoctrination. Then 
I take Alfred Neiman's (1989) suggestion seriously that to further the 
debate on indoctrination one needs to offer an alternative reason for 
developing a conception of indoctrination. It is my contention that the 
definitional criteria outlined in the introduction are standards that must be 
met for a definition of indoctrination to fulfill the purposes I have set out. 
Thus, in chapter three, after laying out my own purposes, I reiterate my 
definitional criteria outlined earlier in the introduction and examine each 
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of the prior conceptions of indoctrination to determine the extent to 
which each of these accounts meets my criteria. In other words, I look at 
how well prior conceptions of indoctrination defined in terms of method, 
of content, of intent, and of consequences meet each of the four criteria I 
develop. 
I argue that prior accounts of indoctrination meet the first criterion; 
they do not depart radically from ordinary usage. They do not, however, 
meet the second criterion, that is, with the exception of intentional 
analyses, prior accounts of indoctrination reduce "indoctrination" to 
something else. In addition, although I show that prior conceptions are 
able to explain why indoctrination is objectionable, I argue that their 
conceptions show indoctrination to be objectionable only to persons who 
value rational autonomy over other educational goals, such as, for 
example, unquestioned acceptance of a particular faith or obedience to 
a particular set of tenets and beliefs. In other words, I argue that they are 
not able to show why indoctrination is or ought to be objectionable to 
some schools that exist within a pluralistic democratic society, schools that 
care more about their students being faithful followers than rationally 
autonomous individuals. 
In regards to criterion three, I contend that although some of these 
educational institutions, such as parochial schools, place importance on 
teaching their students a particular faith, they are nevertheless part of a 
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democratic society. Therefore, we expect them to develop in their 
students some of what we consider to be fundamental capacities of 
democratic citizenship: capacities which allow students to participate in 
the marketplace of ideas, seek the truth behind political rhetoric, gain 
access to important information relevant to decisions that affect their 
daily lives and the lives of others, and form their own notions of what 
constitutes the good life and the good society. In short, given that one of 
the basic rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship is 
independent critical deliberation in the pursuit of truth, there is an 
expectation that even parochial schools must not infringe on this right and 
can reasonably be expected to cultivate the capacity in their students to 
take on this responsibility. If this is undermined, students are at risk of being 
inadequately prepared for effective participation in a democratic 
society. Thus, a conception of indoctrination that appeals to the interests 
of parochial schools and articulates a sense of what is objectionable 
about indoctrination will have an advantage over other conceptions 
which such schools would find alienating. An advantage of my proposed 
conception of indoctrination, I argue, is that it can open up rather than 
prematurely foreclose conversations with the alternative schools a 
democratic society allows about what it means to pursue truth and what 
goals of education should be considered important. 
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Finally, in the last section of chapter three I argue that prior 
accounts of indoctrination fail to meet my fourth criterion of providing a 
sufficiently clear characterization of what it is for teachers (and schools) to 
indoctrinate and what is required to avoid it. I therefore conclude 
chapter three with the claim that previous accounts of indoctrination 
cannot meet the purposes of a conception of indoctrination set out in this 
introduction. 
Chapter IV 
Chapter four begins with an argument for defining indoctrination in 
terms of intention, an argument that builds on Snook's (1972a, 1972b) 
claim that indoctrination be defined in such a way that those responsible 
for indoctrination can be held morally accountable for it. I defend an 
intentional analysis by first summarizing the weaknesses of the content, 
method, and consequences' analyses I discussed in chapter three. 
In this chapter, I adopt much of Snook's intentional analysis of 
indoctrination, arguing that it best serves the purposes set forth in this 
work. However, there are some significant differences. First, I take issue 
with Snook's notion of "intent," claiming that it is unnecessarily narrow in its 
account of who can be charged appropriately with indoctrination. While 
Snook claims that an intentional outcome is characterized as either a 
desired outcome or a foreseen one, I expand on this notion to include in 
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the notion of intentional outcomes those that are foreseeable. Snook 
claims that including the foreseeable in the notion of "intention" will 
render all teachers as indoctrinators because it is foreseeable that, at 
some point, some students will inevitably come to hold beliefs taught 
them in a non-rational manner. I argue, on the other hand, that it is not 
foreseeable that students will come to hold a belief in a non-evidential 
manner as a result of what a teacher does or fails to do. If teachers 
understand the various factors that are likely to lead to students holding 
beliefs non-rationally and do what they can to avoid such endeavors, it is 
not foreseeable that their efforts in the classroom will result in students 
holding beliefs non-rationally. 
Chapter V 
In chapter five I, I draw upon Cheryl Misak (2000, 2004), a 
contemporary Peircian, to analyze key notions embedded in this 
alternative conception, notions which includes: truth, truth-seeking, and 
what it means to hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner. I argue that 
a pragmatic notion of "truth" provides a conception of indoctrination that 
assists us in identifying indoctrination, clarifies what is required to avoid it, 
and helps effectively respond to charges of indoctrination. 
Also in this chapter I alter Snook's definition of indoctrination as the 
intention to get students to hold beliefs regardless of the evidence to 
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intending to get students to hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner. 
Holding beliefs "regardless of the evidence," I argue, does not provide an 
adequately clear understanding of whether indoctrinated beliefs are held 
based on bad evidence, no evidence, or in spite of good counter-posing 
evidence. In addition, characterizing indoctrinated beliefs as those held 
"non-evidentially" or "non-rationally" does not clearly show how 
indoctrination jeopardizes students from continually being open to assess 
the epistemic worth of a belief, particularly in the face of opposing 
evidence and arguments. A feature, according to Elmer J. Thiessen 
(1993), Thomas Green (1972) and Harvey Siegel (1988, 1996), we typically 
regard as characteristic of indoctrination. Defining indoctrination in terms 
of truth as defined by Misak, I argue, makes lucid how indoctrination puts 
at risk students seeking the truth of a given belief because her notion of 
truth is defined by the method employed to arrive at truth. 
In this final section of this chapter, I analyze some important 
concepts that are integral to Misak's notion of truth. I look at what counts 
as "truth-apt" beliefs - beliefs for which we ought to inquire into their truth. 
In addition, I draw upon Maughn Rollins Gregory (2002), Harvey Siegel 
(1995, 1997), and Kathryn Pauly Morgan (1995) to help clarify who belongs 
in what Misak calls the "community of inquiry." Gregory claims that the 
community of inquiry includes those who are considered "experts" in a 
given field. Similarly, Siegel claims that we can justifiably, on epistemic 
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grounds, exclude some persons - those who cannot contribute 
meaningfully to a conversation - from participating in a particular 
discussion. Morgan questions Siegel's argument and claims that we must 
be wary of allowing bias into our understanding of any given topic by 
excluding persons who do not meet our particular epistemological 
framework. I argue that we are best served to not exclude any 
perspective from consideration until we have first given it a fair hearing. In 
short, I support Misak's Piercian dictum that we should "let nothing stand 
* in the way of inquiry." 
Chapter VI 
Chapter six looks at the role that the school context plays in shaping 
and influencing teachers' intentions and how students come to hold 
beliefs. I argue that for indoctrinary outcomes to be foreseeable, we must 
show how understanding the various contextual elements in a school 
affect teacher intentionality and student learning. In the first part of this 
chapter, I revisit the arguments made by those who define indoctrination 
in terms of method, in terms of content, and in terms of consequences. I 
claim that, while such definitions do not provide an adequate notion of 
indoctrination to serve our purposes here, each of these analyses helps us 
see that teachers ought to pay attention to and reflect on their methods, 
the content they teach, and the manner in which their students come to 
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hold their beliefs for them to best understand how they can effectively 
avoid indoctrination. 
In the next section of this chapter, I argue that, as education does 
not occur within a vacuum, outside influences such as the ideological 
beliefs taught and maintained in the school and the community, the 
expectations and demands of community members, the attitudes and 
dispositions of the students, and the pedagogical habits mandated by 
the school district play a significant role in what and how students learn in 
their classrooms and in the school as a whole. Teachers, then, ought to 
not only examine their own teaching methods, content, and student 
outcomes; they should also look closely at the context in which their 
teaching occurs. 
To support the claim that the school context significantly affects 
teacher intentionality, I first examine how we can understand the context. 
I describe it under three main headings: the pedagogical, the structural, 
and the ideological. I first explain what I mean by each context. I then 
support the claim that each one plays an important role in influencing 
teacher intentionality and student learning, I provide arguments from 
critical theorists. Primarily, I draw upon Scott Fletcher (2000), Paulo Friere 
(1970, 1973), Michael Apple (1996), and Ira Shor (1992) to show that the 
school context importantly shapes the goals teachers adopts and the 
manner in which students come to hold beliefs taught them. I conclude 
25 
that, by understanding how each type of context effects teachers' 
intentions and students' learning, we are in a good position to develop 
educational programs that avoid indoctrination. 
Chapter VII 
In chapter seven I open up my analysis of indoctrination to explore 
the possibility of including schools in our notion of it. Put another way, I 
examine whether it makes sense to define indoctrination as the intention 
of teachers and/or schools to get students to hold beliefs in a non-truth-
seeking manner. The idea that it is possible to hold institutions as well as 
teachers responsible for indoctrination requires a complex philosophical 
analysis. Chapter seven takes on such an analysis. 
In the first section of this chapter, I analyze the argument made by 
Larry May (1987) and Peter French (1991) that we can attribute 
intentionality to institutions. Both May and French claim that corporations 
act intentionally when the policies, rules, and expectations of the 
corporation significantly influence an employee's intentions. Their work 
highlights the important role that the school context plays in shaping 
teacher intentionality, yet I argue that while schools may influence 
teacher's intentions, it does not replace them with school intentionality. 
In the next section of this chapter, I look at Peter Velasquez's (1991) 
claim that attributing intentionality to corporations is merely an elliptical 
26 
way of assigning blame to persons. I argue that while he makes the 
important point that corporations - and schools - do not have minds or 
bodies to which we can ascribe intentionality as we do with persons, 
unlike corporations, sometimes there are no identifiable persons for whom 
we can ascribe responsibility for indoctrination. When the various factors 
of the school context, for example, encourage students to adopt beliefs 
in a non-truth-seeking fashion, it is quite difficult to determine who is 
responsible for such a context as there are so many contributing factors 
that continually mold and create such a context. Thus, as we cannot 
always find any person or group that is responsible for indoctrination that 
occurs due largely to the school's context, it makes sense to attribute the 
intentionality to the context, or the school, itself. 
Following this analysis, I look to provide an argument by analogy to 
attributing intentionality to schools. Here I look at some prominent legal 
cases involving Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment in which the courts 
hold the schools and not individual persons responsible for harassment. 
While I cannot offer an unambiguous theory of school intentionality, I 
argue that it is reasonable to characterize schools as intentional agents as 
it supports the legal practice of holding schools responsible, and it 
provides a conception of indoctrination that helps us identify and avoid 
indoctrination when it occurs because of factors that lie outside the 
control of any given teacher. 
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Chapter VIII 
Whereas chapters four and five examine how the alternative 
conception of indoctrination in principle allows us to identify 
indoctrination with consistency, respond appropriately to charges of 
indoctrination and know how to avoid indoctrination, the final chapter, 
chapter eight, considers how in practice my definition enables us to do all 
of this. In this chapter, I examine to what extent we can make sense of 
charges of indoctrination launched against peace educators and how 
peace educators can best respond to them. In short, the idea is to see 
how well my conception of indoctrination allows us to work with the 
charge of indoctrination and in particular, how such a definition can help 
us conceptualize what is needed to avoid having the study of a 
controversial topic in education fall prey to a reasonable, substantive 
charge of indoctrination. My hope is that this proposed alternative 
conception of indoctrination will enable educational administrators and 
teachers to be more confident in taking on the teaching of topics they 
know to be controversial. 
One of the goals of this chapter is to demonstrate how the 
alternative conception of indoctrination offered in this dissertation allows 
us to identify indoctrination or underwrite suspicion of indoctrination when 
we encounter (new) curricula; to know how to respond to charges of 
indoctrination when made to peace education in general; and to know 
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what a proposed curriculum needs to include to avoid indoctrination. 
More specifically, I look at what it would mean for peace educators to 
intend to get students to hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner as well 




EXAMINING CONTENT, METHOD, INTENT AND CONSEQUENCES AS FEATURES 
OF INDOCTRINATION 
In this chapter I present and critique the various arguments for 
defining indoctrination in terms of content, method, intention, and 
consequences. For each of these suggested criteria, I first present the 
contention that it alone is sufficient to define indoctrination. I then 
analyze the criticisms of these conceptions which are found in the 
literature and I conclude that none of the criteria listed above is sufficient 
in and of itself for characterizing a clear and useful definition of 
indoctrination. Following this discussion, for each criterion, I critically 
review the arguments offered in the literature that the criterion under 
discussion is one necessary feature of indoctrination. I consider the 
criticisms given of each of these arguments and offer a response to the 
criticisms. I conclude by suggesting that the conceptions of indoctrination 
found thus far in the literature are inadequate for the purposes set out in 
this dissertation: of providing a definition that (a) gives substance to the 
charge of indoctrination launched against peace education, (b) allows 
educators to clearly and accurately identify and address indoctrination 
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when it occurs, and (c) aids educators in developing educational 
endeavors that avoid indoctrination. 
Defining Indoctrination in Terms of Content 
In this section I discuss the claim proposed by Tasos Kazepides 
(1983b) that content alone is a sufficient criterion for defining 
indoctrination. I show that Kazepides' claim is weak as there are 
legitimate educational ways to teach what might be otherwise 
considered indoctrinary content. I proceed to lay out the arguments 
offered by Gregory and Woods (1972), Antony Flew (1972) and Barrow 
and Woods (1988) that content is but one feature of indoctrination. Here 
again I suggest that the claims offered are weak. I therefore propose an 
alternative way of looking at the role content plays in indoctrination. 
Tasos Kazepides argues that indoctrination ought to be defined 
primarily in terms of content. He does this by first discounting the 
usefulness of method and intent as criteria of indoctrination. So, for 
example, he states that "[n]one of the other criteria that have been 
proposed [i.e., intention and method] will allow us to talk of 
indoctrination" (Kazepides, 1983b: 337) at the level of teaching young 
students foundational or "river-bed" propositions. He claims that certain 
"river-bed" propositions, such as, "automobiles do not grow out of the 
earth, I have a father and a mother, and I am a human being" 
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(Kazepides, 1983b: 336-337), are inculcated, even in some cases 
intentionally inculcated, into the minds of young children without 
providing them any supporting evidence or reasons. Acceptance of 
these river-bed propositions, according to Kazepides, constitutes the 
necessary foundation for persons' later more rational beliefs. 
If we are to label this early inculcation as indoctrination, then we 
have broadened the definition of indoctrination to include the sort of 
teaching that virtually every parent and teacher of young students 
engages in and so risk losing the pejorative sense of the term. If, on the 
other hand, we limit indoctrination to the teaching of certain content, 
namely doctrines, then, according to Kazepides, we are able to 
distinguish the sort of teaching that leads persons to adopt these 
foundational beliefs as true from teaching that instructs students to hold 
particular doctrines as unquestionably true. 
Thus far, Kazepides (1983b) has argued for including content as a 
necessary feature of indoctrination. However, he does not stop with this 
claim that content is a necessary feature of indoctrination. Although it is 
not entirely clear, he seems to argue that indoctrination ought to be 
defined in terms of content alone. To begin with, Kazepides posits that 
those who teach doctrines limit their arguments against doctrinal 
propositions to claims and assertions that can be made within the 
doctrinal belief system itself. For example, if one teaches the proposition. 
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"The Pope is infallible," the only arguments against such a claim that will 
be allowed into the classroom discussion are those that fall within the 
Catholic system of beliefs. Kazepides claims that those who teach other 
sorts of content, such as scientific propositions, are required to hold 
themselves and their students to a generally accepted standard of 
rational inquiry and "must point out the possibilities as well as the 
limitations that exist within each inquiry" (Kazepides, 1983b: 338). Thus it 
seems that Kazepides contends that the teaching of doctrines, in and of 
itself, constitutes indoctrination as he claims that teaching doctrines puts 
constraints on what sorts of objections students can make about the truth 
of the propositions being offered in class. 
Although he does not state outright that content ought to be the 
sole criterion of indoctrination, he does assert that it ought to be the 
"central criterion of indoctrination" (Kazepides, 1983b: 337). In addition, in 
a later article he states that content is a "necessary and sufficient 
criterion" (Kazepides, 1987: 233) for determining whether one has been 
indoctrinated. This statement, more than any other he makes, indicates 
that he is, in fact, arguing that indoctrination ought to be defined in terms 
of content alone. Thus, according to Kazepides' statement, the only thing 
required for a student to be indoctrinated is that she be taught doctrines. 
Whether Kazepides does, in fact, posit that indoctrination is best 
defined in terms of content alone, we can proceed to examine such a 
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claim to determine its merits and weaknesses. Defining indoctrination in 
terms of content alone seems to deny that there are legitimate 
educational ways to teach doctrinal propositions. To illustrate, consider 
two different cases. In case one, teacher A teaches a certain doctrinal 
proposition (say, that the Pope is infallible) as if his proposition were 
unquestionably true, offers reasons for accepting the proposition as true, 
and allows students to question the proposition only if their questions stay 
within the confines of the doctrinal belief system (i.e., Roman Catholicism). 
In the second case, teacher B teaches students about this same 
proposition (i.e., the Pope is infallible) by explaining what this belief means 
to various persons inside and outside of the Catholic faith, discussing why 
persons may believe it and why they may not, and engaging in a class 
discussion about what believing this proposition may mean to some 
people, how it may affect their lives, their values, and their perspectives. 
In the second case, students of teacher B can not be said to have been 
indoctrinated as they were not being lead or even encouraged to 
believe or disbelieve that the Pope is infallible. In fact, they were 
instructed to look at this belief from different perspectives in order to 
understand it rather than accept it as either true or false. Thus, Kazepides' 
argument trades on the ambiguity associated with the phrase "teaching 
doctrines." In one sense, the phrase can mean teaching students to 
believe the doctrines; in another it can mean simply teaching students 
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about the doctrines. Thus, contrary to Kazepides, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the teaching of doctrines is not a sufficient criterion for 
determining the presence of indoctrination. 
Yet, what if we interpret Kazepides' argument to mean that 
teaching students to believe doctrines is inherently indoctrinary? If we 
accept this interpretation, we must then add intention as a feature of 
indoctrination. The mere presence of doctrines does not, in and of itself, 
indicate that doctrines are being taught for belief. Teaching students to 
believe doctrines implies that a teacher has a particular aim or intention in 
mind. In other words, teaching students to understand the belief that 
democracy helps create equality of opportunity is different than teaching 
them to believe such a claim. Teaching for belief means that one is not 
satisfied with merely providing students with information about 
democracy and equality so that they may arrive at their own conclusions. 
When one teaches for belief, one is concerned with getting students to 
accept that it is true that democracy promotes equality. This concern 
points to the intention of the teacher; she is concerned with, or has the 
aim of, getting students to believe what they are taught about 
democracy. Thus, teaching students to believe doctrines does not allow 
indoctrination to be defined in terms of content alone. 
Although indoctrination cannot be defined solely in terms of 
content, it remains to be seen whether content is an important and 
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necessary feature of indoctrination. One of the major claims made by 
proponents of a content analysis of indoctrination, as we saw with 
Kazepides, is that indoctrination can not occur without the teaching of • 
doctrines. Antony Flew, for example, contends that the "reiteration of the 
root word doctrine may suggest... the notion of a limitation on the 
possible content" (Flew, 1972: 70). For Flew, the etymological derivation of 
the word suggests how the term is ordinarily used. He argues that 
teaching the math tables or other such factual information, even if done 
via non-rationarmethods, does not constitute indoctrination because to 
accuse one of indoctrination who teaches such content violates ordinary 
usage of the term. One would not "naturally" call such teaching 
indoctrination, according to Flew, thus such teaching should be exempt 
definitionally from the charge of indoctrination. 
Here Flew relies upon the criterion that a definition of indoctrination 
must not violate ordinary usage. While I have no problem with this in the 
abstract, he does not make it clear just how we determine the ordinary 
usage of the term. He seems to argue that ordinary usage can be 
ascertained by how persons use the term "naturally." However, precisely 
what he means by a "natural" use of the term needs clarifying. As we 
have seen, "indoctrination" is sometimes used quite differently by lay 
persons than by educational theorists. Which use is more "natural" or, 
indeed, "ordinary" is difficult to determine. One interpretation of what 
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Flew may mean by the "natural" use of indoctrination is that which 
parallels the use in a paradigmatic case, that is, a case which "virtually 
everybody would concede is an example of indoctrination" (Barrow and 
Woods, 1988: 70). Looking at a paradigmatic case may provide some 
insight into the ordinary use of "indoctrination." 
If a paradigmatic case indicates that indoctrination necessarily 
involves the teaching of doctrines, Flew's contention that its natural use is 
limited to the inculcation of doctrines is well founded. Thus, I proceed to 
examine an often cited case of indoctrination"offered by Barrow and 
Woods. 
a Catholic school in which all the teachers are committed 
Catholics and where all the children come from Catholic homes 
and have parents who want them to be brought up as 
Catholics... Imagine also that the teachers... deliberately 
attempt to inculcate in their pupils an unshakable commitment 
to the truth of Catholicism and of the various claims or 
propositions associated with it. They thus bring up the pupils... 
to believe in these and similar propositions in such a way that 
the pupils come to regard those who do not accept them as 
true propositions as being simply mistaken. (Barrow and Woods, 
1988: 70) 
This indeed appears to be a paradigmatic case of indoctrination as it 
seems highly unlikely given such content, teaching methods, educational 
aims, and outcomes - as described in this example - that one would label 
such an endeavor anything but indoctrination. What needs to be 
determined, as Barrow and Woods suggest, is whether or not all the 
features described in the above case are necessary features of 
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indoctrination. As we are currently addressing the necessity of content, 
we need to determine whether the teaching of doctrines must be present 
for the above example to be a case of indoctrination. In other words, 
can indoctrination take place without the presence of doctrines? 
According to Barrow and Woods (1988), the teaching of doctrines is 
a necessary feature of their paradigmatic case of indoctrination. Their 
argument is similar to Flew's in that they appeal to ordinary usage. Yet, 
they differ from Flew (1972) in a subtle but important way. Flew refers to 
how persons ordinarily use the term - that is, he makes reference to 
etymology and to persons' language. Barrow and Woods, on the other 
hand, refer to the underlying concern persons seem to have about 
indoctrination which can be inferred from its use in ordinary language. 
Referring to persons' underlying concerns calls attention to 
indoctrination's pejorative connotation. Limiting the conception of 
indoctrination to the teaching of doctrines because that fits with its 
etymological derivation and its ordinary usage does not, by itself, 
necessarily imply that indoctrination is something widely considered an 
objectionable endeavor in education. However, when one argues, as do 
Barrow and Woods, that indoctrination involves the inculcation of 
doctrines because it is the non-rational holding of doctrinal beliefs that 
causes persons to be concerned, one is insisting on developing a 
conception that shows indoctrination to be something persons generally 
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object to, something that perhaps jeopardizes or violates an established 
and widely held ideal of education. Only this criterion gives us a 
conception of indoctrination that allows it to retain a pejorative meaning. 
Thus, Barrow and Woods' do a better job than Flew of developing a 
conception that maintains the pejorative sense of the term. 
Before we can accept this claim that indoctrination must involve 
the teaching of doctrines, however, we have to be clear about what 
constitutes a doctrine. As Gregory and Woods point out: "If the term 
'doctrine' does not delimit a particular range of content, then clearly 
indoctrination will be marked off from, say, teaching, by reference to the 
intention and method components" (Gregory and Woods, 1972: 166). 
Thus, the acceptance of Flew's or Gregory and Woods' claim that 
content is a necessary criterion of indoctrination rests on showing there is 
a plausible definition of doctrine which enables us to clearly demarcate it 
from other sorts of material. 
Antony Flew tries to pin point what sort of material counts as 
doctrines. He suggests that doctrines express an ideology. This does not 
do much to clarify, however, as Flew does not tell us what he means by 
ideology. As a further clarification, Flew claims that doctrines are "if not 
false, at least not by any ordinary standards known to be true" (Flew, 1972, 
75). Religious doctrines serve as the best examples of doctrines, asserts 
Flew, and the fact that such doctrines are characterized by many 
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religious teachers as "articles of faith" supports the contention that they 
are taken to be neither false nor known to be true. Yet, he is far from 
making it clear what demarcates certain propositions as doctrines from 
those that are not. It is not enough to define doctrines as merely 
statements not known to be true or false. To use J. P. White's example, the 
statement that "Mr. Gladstone sneezed ten times on 10th August, 1886" 
(White, 1972: 193) can not be shown to be true or false. And, as White 
points out, there is nothing particularly doctrinal about it. Thus Flew fails to 
provide a clear definition of "doctrine." In fact, he admits: "I have not 
been able to offer any satisfactory specification of the sort of belief which 
has to be involved" (Flew, 1972:85) in making a belief doctrinal. 
Barrow and Woods offer an alternative definition which is better 
able to handle the sort of claim White provides above. They assert that 
doctrines are not simply propositions not known to be true or false. Rather, 
doctrines are statements for which "there is no disagreement as to the sort 
of evidence that would count to show whether they were true or false" 
(Barrow and Woods, 1988: 71). Looking at the statement, "Mr. Gladstone 
sneezed ten times on 10th August," Barrow and Woods do not have the 
difficulty that Flew does as they do not rest their identification of doctrines 
on knowing whether such a statement is true or false. Whether he did or 
did not sneeze ten times on that day is not at issue with Barrow and 
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Woods' definition. What is at issue is that there is no dispute about what 
sort of evidence is required to show such a statement to be true or false. 
To clarify further, Barrow and Woods assert that doctrines outline a 
particular world view and way of living one's life. Like Flew, they believe 
that religious decrees are an excellent example of doctrine as they 
prescribe a very particular way of seeing the world and living one's life, 
and there is significant disagreement about what ought to count as 
evidence to the truth or falseness of the decrees. Scientific claims, on the 
other hand, if they are made as a result of scientific methods, are not 
doctrinal because, according to Barrow and Woods, the scientific 
method by its very nature "precludes the possibility of indoctrination" 
(Barrow and Woods, 1988: 76). They contend that experimentation tests 
hypothesis and, if future alterations are warranted because of new 
evidence, such alterations will be made. If alterations are not made 
when necessary, that is, if one refuses to consider opposing evidence, 
then one is not doing science. For Barrow and Woods, then, scientific 
claims are not doctrines as their truth is shown by uncontested types of 
evidence. In contrast, religious, political and moral propositions, 
according to Barrow and Woods, are doctrinal because there are "no 
generally agreed criteria for establishing ... [their] truth or falsity" (Barrow 
and Woods, 1988:72). 
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The problem with arguing that the sort of evidence which supports 
scientific claims as true or false is uncontested is that it does not take into 
account the strong influence scientific paradigms have on scientists' 
willingness to openly consider alternative evidence to firmly established 
scientific theories. Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) asserts that scientists typically 
conduct inquiry within a specified set of beliefs and assumptions about 
what is real. These "paradigms" limit what the scientist looks for, sees, and 
how s/he interprets the findings. He states: 
No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of 
phenomena; indeed those that will not fit the box are often not 
seen at all. Nor do scientists normally aim to invent new 
theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by 
others. Instead, normal-scientific research is directed to the 
articulation of those phenomena and theories that the 
paradigm already supplies. (Kuhn, 1962: 24) 
Scientific inquiry, according to Kuhn, is not an open-minded search for the 
nature of reality. It is rather the seeking of a more detailed understanding 
of some particular part of reality, a part largely defined by the paradigm 
within which one is operating. 
Karen Warren (1994) supports Kuhn's (1962) assertions. Though she 
uses the words "conceptual framework" instead of "paradigm," like Kuhn 
she contends that our beliefs, even those that are scientific, are formed 
within a particular way of looking at the world. Conceptual frameworks, 
she claims, shape and limit the views, assumptions and perspectives one 
adopts, openly considers, or even notices. To illustrate her point, she 
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discusses an example of how a "patriarchal conceptual framework" 
prevents primatologists from seeing any counter evidence to their 
assumption that primates are socially organized in male-dominated 
hierarchies. Evidence, for example, that it is typically the female that 
selects her partner and that there exists some primate species which are 
matrilineal rather than patrilineal is overlooked or ignored because it does 
not fit within the firmly held beliefs of the patriarchal worldview. She states 
that what a scientist "notices or fails to notice, what she takes as 'given' in 
what she observes, or what she considers relevant or credible or a reason 
is ultimately affected by the conceptual framework through which she 
does the observing and assessing" (Warren, 1994:164). Thus, a scientific 
"conceptual framework" or "paradigm" shapes one's understanding of 
not only what is true but of what counts as supporting evidence. 
The important point for the purposes of this dissertation is not to 
determine whether or not science is or can be doctrinal but to notice the 
difficulty in making any definite judgments about what counts as a 
doctrine. Barrow and Woods admit that one can be completely rational 
when operating within a system of beliefs. That is, within the Catholic 
doctrinal system, "an adherent of that doctrine may behave, argue and 
generally proceed in an entirely rational manner" (Barrow and Woods, 
1988: 72). It is when persons outside the system raise objections to claims 
made within the system that a sort of closed-minded, perhaps irrational 
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response is made from one who is a strong adherent to Catholic beliefs. 
Such responses, argue Barrow and Woods, characterize indoctrinated 
views. Yet the same sort of response, according to Kuhn and Warren, can 
be made by strong adherents to a particular scientific paradigm or 
conceptual framework. Hence, on Barrow and Woods' own criterion, 
scientific claims could count as doctrinal, the very beliefs they explicitly 
mean to rule out. Thus it is fair to say, despite their efforts, it is still not 
sufficiently clear what demarcates doctrinal beliefs from other sorts of 
beliefs. Gregory and Woods (1972), however, may offer some 
clarification. 
Gregory and Woods present four defining characteristics of 
doctrines in their attempt to make a clear distinction between doctrines 
and other types of beliefs. These four characteristics are as follows. (1) 
Doctrines have a wide scope of influence in that they shape how we live 
our lives; they influence how we educate our children, what kinds of work 
artists, musicians and writers will produce, and how to structure our 
industry and agriculture. (2) They can not be proven true or false as they 
stand as something "against which nothing can count" (Gregory and 
Woods, 1972: 168). (3) Doctrines are "intimately related to ... purposive 
activity in a way in which other beliefs are not" (Gregory and Woods, 
1972: 168). (4) Finally, doctrines are the type of beliefs that prompt 
believers to convince others of their "truth." 
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Believing the milkman will deliver our milk the next morning 
influences our actions by prompting us to put out the bottles the previous 
night. Yet, this example offered by Gregory and Woods is not, they argue, 
an example of doctrine because of its limited scope of influence. 
Believing one's milk will be delivered only influences our beliefs and 
actions in regards to the delivery of that milk. It has no effect on one's 
general world view. The belief that persons ought to seek nonviolent 
solutions to unjust acts, on the other hand, would seem to be a doctrine 
according to Gregory and Woods' definition. Unlike the belief about the 
milk delivery, it has a wide scope of influence. In addition, it has a very 
definite connection to action (it prompts believers to nonviolent action, 
oppose violence, etc.), and it urges believers to convince others of its 
truth (as we see in the case of peace rallies, vigils, etc.). Yet, whether 
such a claim can be demonstrated as either true or false is debatable. To 
say that it can not is to argue that moral claims can not be proven either 
true or false. In fact, because moral claims seem to fit all of the other 
defining characteristics of doctrine, we would have to conclude, if we 
agree with Barrow and Woods, that all moral utterances are doctrinal. 
It seems odd, however, to say that the truth of a moral claim is 
something "against which nothing can count," or if we borrow from 
Barrow and Woods (1988), against which nothing that is generally agreed 
upon can count. It seems safe to say that sometimes persons make errors 
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in their reasoning. At the very least, persons can support a moral claim by 
factual claims which are false. For example, one can argue that the 
death penalty is economically advantageous as it virtually always saves 
the taxpayers money on housing and feeding them after they have 
deceased. If this sort of reasoning occurs, it is generally agreed that the 
moral reasoning ought to be reconsidered. In addition, there is 
agreement among moral philosophers that moral propositions can be 
supported by reasons. If the supporting reasons are shown to be faulty or 
better reasons are provided for an alternative proposition, they would 
agree that the original moral proposition ought to be altered or at least 
seriously questioned. Moral claims, it seems, are of the type against which 
something can stand both within the field of moral philosophy and outside 
of it. 
To further refine our understanding of doctrine, in particular, to 
understand how doctrines are distinct from moral or scientific claims, 
Gregory and Woods (1972) compare it with the notion of "theory," a 
notion they claim to be quite similar to doctrine and yet distinct from it. 
Take, for example, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. It has 
a wide scope of influence; many believe this theory to be true, and it 
shapes our schools' science curriculum and our perception of humans' 
place in the world. In addition, it is intimately related to action in that our 
values and academic inquiry are heavily influenced by it. Finally, people 
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are moved to convince others of its truth. It differs from doctrines, argue 
Gregory and Woods, in that its truth or falseness is known. They write: 
The logical status of such theories is not on a par with that of 
facts, for they are not simply seen to be the case. But nor are 
they simply not known to be true in the way in which doctrines 
are not known to be true. For they function as part of a very 
complex theoretical system designed to explain facts of a 
certain kind and their success to this end gives them a kind of 
guarantee that is something more than a grudgingly conceded, 
'There may be something in this.' (Gregory and Woods, 1972: 
172) 
Unlike doctrines, according to Gregory and Woods, many scientific 
theories, such as the quantum theories of radiation, can be known and 
are therefore rightly called theories and not doctrines. The line between 
theory and doctrine begins to blur, argue Gregory and Woods, when the 
theory contains conjecture and speculation. They claim that this type of 
theory can be found in the human sciences and is therefore not what 
they would call "pure theory" or "pure doctrine." 
Gregory and Woods see the distinction between theory and 
doctrine as lying on a continuum. Pure doctrine is on one end where 
religion is; pure theory is on the other end where physics and other so 
called "hard" sciences are; in the middle lies questionable material in 
which the only way to determine whether or not it is doctrinal or 
theoretical is to examine it on a case by case basis. Gregory and Woods 
contend that the "concept of doctrine may be fuzzy round the edges but 
it is not so fuzzy as to render impossible the demarcation of a limited 
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content with respect to which the notion of indoctrination alone makes 
sense" (Gregory and Woods, 1972: 173). If we accept Gregory and 
Woods' notion of doctrine, the job of educators who seek to avoid 
indoctrination, presumably, is to look at their content and determine 
whether or not it is doctrinal by examining its scope of influence, its 
relation to action, its propensity to induce believers to convince others, 
and its epistemological status, that is, whether or not it is known what 
would show the claim to be true or false. If the content being taught 
contains doctrines, then the teaching of it raises the possibility of 
indoctrination. If, on the other hand, the content does not contain 
doctrines, then, according to Gregory and Woods, it can not be 
indoctrinated. 
Though Gregory and Woods claim this "fuzzy" notion of doctrine 
can still be identified on a case by case basis, they have not adequately 
addressed the distinction between scientific theories and moral 
propositions. While they make a good point that scientific claims can be 
supported by an entire theoretical system, it is not clear that moral 
propositions are not in the same position. Immanuel Kant's ([1785J/1949) 
claim, for example, that a person should not be used as a means only can 
be supported by a complex system of philosophical reasoning. To assert 
that moral theories are more doctrinal than scientific theories is to assert 
that philosophical reasoning is somehow less credible than scientific 
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inquiry; it is to contend that while science can lead to truth, moral 
philosophy cannot. However, it is philosophy itself which deals with the 
questions of the adequacy of claims and to what can determine the truth 
or falsity of scientific claims, indeed what it means to say any claims are 
true (or false) at all. 
Although the scope of this dissertation does not allow for a thorough 
analysis of the epistemological status of scientific and philosophical 
claims, it is important to point out that the debate over what qualifies as 
doctrine and what does not is still very much alive. Tasos Kazepides (1987) 
does not see the lack of clarity over the notion of doctrine as a problem, 
however. He claims that, even if it were true that the "word doctrine is 
vague then that makes 'indoctrination' a vague concept - it does not 
constitute a good reason for abandoning the criterion" (Kazepides, 1987: 
234). Yet, Kazepides himself belies this claim in his argument against 
defining indoctrination in terms of intention. He states that an intentional 
analysis of indoctrination "is of little use for educational planning" 
(Kazepides, 1987: 232) as it is nearly impossible to control a teacher's 
intentions. What he seems to be claiming here is that a notion of 
indoctrination must be useful by providing educators with a clear 
direction for opposing it or addressing it where it occurs. Leaving aside for 
the moment the dubious nature of Kazepides' claim that we can not 
influence a teacher's intentions, he argues that because educators can 
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not alter a teacher's intention (assuming we can even know what they 
are), defining indoctrination in terms of intention does not afford 
educators a useful tool for abolishing it in their schools. However, if the 
term "doctrine" is vague, and thus the term "indoctrination" is vague, it 
would seem that defining indoctrination as teaching doctrines does not 
provide any clearer a picture of indoctrination than Kazepides' claims an 
intention account does. Thus far, then, a content analysis does not allow 
educators to recognize, address, and attempt to abolish indoctrination. 
One other way of handling the definitional problem of "doctrine" is 
to call it a "world-view." Brian S. Crittenden (1968), who also argues for 
the necessity of a content condition in defining indoctrination, avoids the 
difficulty of having to define "doctrine" by using the term "world-view" 
(Crittenden, 1968: 249). He argues that there are not any particular types 
of belief that "intrinsically belong to, or are excluded from, the activity of 
indoctrinating. The crucial condition ... is that they be part of a world-
view or comprehensive 'philosophy' of life" (Crittenden, 1968:249). 
According to Crittenden, the teaching of science is not exempt from the 
charge of indoctrination if it is done, for example, "in the context of 
Comte's positivism" (Crittenden, 1968: 249) as this way of thinking 
constitutes a worldview or a general philosophical way of seeing the 
world. 
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Although the word "world-view" is not as heavily disputed as is 
"doctrine," it is still not entirely clear what constitutes a worldview. For 
example, does the claim, "The US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is 
justified because it ended the war quickly and thus saved lives in the long 
run" qualify as part of a "comprehensive philosophy of life"? Such a view 
is commonly taught in our nation's schools; it is a view generally accepted 
as true in our society, and it is typically a claim that goes unchallenged in 
our schools as alternative views are often not taught. Yet, it may or may 
not be part of a comprehensive philosophy of life. Some teachers, for 
instance, may teach and believe such a claim because it supports their 
philosophical view that the US government always acts with moral 
integrity and therefore the US would never cause the deaths of non-
combatant civilians unless absolutely necessary. In this case, it seems, the 
claim, "The US bombing in Japan is justified," qualifies as being part of a 
comprehensive philosophy of life. Yet, another teacher may teach such 
a claim simply because he is completely unaware that alternative and 
opposing views exist. He holds no particular beliefs about the morality of 
US policies; his belief, then, about the US bombings in Japan is not part of 
any comprehensive philosophical view. 
We may be able to determine if a teacher is teaching a worldview 
if we ask her why she holds such a view as true. However, not all teachers 
(or any other person for that matter) recognize where their beliefs come 
51 
from, nor do they always know why they hold their beliefs as true. Thus, 
asking teachers about their beliefs may not tell us whether they are 
teaching claims that are part of a comprehensive philosophical outlook. 
As the notion "worldview" does not seem to be much clearer than 
"doctrine" - that is, we can not be sure in any given situation whether one 
is teaching doctrines, worldviews, or other sorts of content - defining 
indoctrination in terms of worldviews does not adequately indicate when 
one is and is not indoctrinating. Thus, I conclude that, given the lack of a 
sufficiently clear account of the notion of doctrines, we should reject the 
claims of Kazepides (1983b) that we can define indoctrination solely in 
terms of content. 
We may, at this point, also be tempted to drop content as a 
necessary feature of indoctrination as it is not clear how we can 
distinguish indoctrinary content from non-indoctrinary content. Yet, 
Crittenden's claim that indoctrination occurs when one teaches a view 
that mirrors the ideology held in society deserves further examination. He 
writes: "When the world-view being represented in the school is, in fact, 
the official ideology of the social order to which both teacher and student 
belong I think we have the paradigm situation for the use of 
indoctrination" (Crittenden, 1968:249). It is worth noting that his claim 
supports the paradigm case Barrow and Woods (1988) use to illustrate 
indoctrination. Their example does not just talk about students being 
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inculcated in Catholic doctrines, it also states that these students are 
taught in a Catholic school where commitment to these doctrines is 
nurtured and repeated throughout the school. In addition, the students 
live in a community whose members are strong adherents of Catholicism 
and wish to have the students join them in their commitment to their 
system of beliefs. What Barrow and Woods are describing is a situation in 
which students are not only being inculcated in these beliefs - or 
worldview - they are being inculcated in these beliefs within a context 
that supports the very same beliefs. This "content-in-context" (Crittenden, 
1968: 249), Crittenden suggests, is an important feature of indoctrination 
and it will be more closely examined in chapters six and seven of this 
dissertation. For now, I suggest that content, despite the arguments I have 
just reviewed, may play an important role in determining when 
indoctrination occurs. More specifically, I agree with Crittenden that 
when students are taught to accept the official ideology of their society in 
an unquestioning and uncritical manner, we do have a paradigm case of 
indoctrination. But more of this later. 
What needs to be examined now is whether method, intent, and 
consequences play a role in indoctrination and if so, what role. What 
follows immediately is a critical analysis and discussion of the major 
arguments put forth by those who define indoctrination in terms of 
method. I then examine the arguments made for an intentional analysis 
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and a consequences analysis. Finally, I conclude by suggesting an 
alternative way in which to view the role that content, method, intention 
and consequences play in indoctrination. 
Defining Indoctrination in Terms of Method 
In this section, I analyze the arguments of those who claim that 
method alone is a sufficient criterion for defining indoctrination and 
consider the criticisms given in the literature to such arguments, 
concluding that definitions of indoctrinatfon in terms of method alone are 
inadequate for the purpose set forth in this dissertation. Following this, I 
examine the claim that method is needed as one criterion of 
indoctrination and weigh the arguments against this assertion. Finally, I 
suggest that, although method is an important feature of indoctrination 
and content is also a relevant consideration, the conceptions offered thus 
far in the literature fail to meet the criteria for an adequate conception of 
indoctrination established in the introduction. 
Willis Moore (1972) argues that indoctrination is best defined in terms 
of method alone. He offers two reasons in support of his claim. First, he 
asserts that Dewey's influence on American educational philosophy in 
regards to espousing liberal democratic teaching practices has "so 
permeated American educational thinking that we automatically deal 
with this concept in terms of method only" (Moore, 1972: 95). Yet, he 
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admits that this usage, though prevalent in US educational circles, does 
not by its mere popularity make it more plausible than, say, a content or 
intention usage. Thus he offers his second reason for a methods only 
definition. He writes: 
Since modes or techniques of teaching are a central concern 
of the profession of education key terms so defined as to call 
attention to real differences in the area have great instrumental 
value for philosophers of education. Moreover, since the two 
modes thus singled out for contrast may be shown to have 
evolved from and to reflect the nature of two sharply conflicting 
political philosophies, one of which British and Americans join in 
supporting and one of which they abhor, the current American 
usage would seem to have much in its favor. (Moore, 1972: 95) 
For Moore, then, defining indoctrination in terms of method provides the 
most useful definition in focusing educators' attention on creating better 
teaching practices. The type of methods Moore claims are indoctrinary 
are non-rational methods. In other words, he contends that indoctrination 
necessarily occurs when teachers employ non-rational teaching methods. 
John Wilson (1972) also asserts that indoctrination involves the 
employment of non-rational teaching methods. He, along with Gregory 
and Woods (1972), argues that method is logically necessary to the 
concept of indoctrination. Wilson states that it is "logically necessary to 
the concept of indoctrination that the indoctrinated person arrives at the 
belief by non-rational methods ... The indoctrinator must be using such a 
method, thereby implanting a belief which is causally motivated (by a 
desire to obey authority for instance) rather than rationally motivated" 
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(Wilson, 1972: 19). According to Wilson, indoctrinated beliefs are not 
believed because of any supporting evidence or reasons. He 
acknowledges that a student who has been indoctrinated may be able 
to provide reasons for her beliefs but he claims she does not hold these 
beliefs because of the reasons. Rather, she holds them for considerations 
other than the supporting reasons or evidence. She may, for example, 
hold such beliefs because of her conviction that her teacher is always 
correct and because she likes and wants to please her teacher. Thus, if 
the teacher were to change his mind and espouse an alternative belief, 
the student would also change her mind to align her beliefs with those of 
her teacher. 
To hold a belief rationally, according to Wilson, is to hold it in such a 
way that when the evidence changes or the supporting reasons are 
found to be in error, the belief will alter. Non-rationally held beliefs, on the 
other hand, are those which are unaffected by any change in the 
evidence or reasons. Wilson asserts that "part of what we mean by a 
rationally-held belief is that it is causally based on the real world, and will 
change only if the world changes (as opposed to if some authority 
changes its mind, or if the believer's inner feelings change)" (Wilson, 1972: 
20). Thus, for Wilson, beliefs held non-rationally are those held for 
considerations other than supporting reasons or evidence. 
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The problem with defining indoctrination in terms of method alone is 
that it casts too wide a net on what constitutes indoctrination. If all 
instances of non-rational teaching are instances of indoctrination, then it 
must always be indoctrination when one teaches very young children to 
accept that certain beliefs are true before they are able to understand 
the rational merits of such beliefs. Both Moore (1972) and Wilson (1972) 
admit that all teaching inevitably involves the passing on of some 
information without providing reasons. In fact, they even admit that such 
teaching constitutes indoctrination. Wilson and Moore assert that 
indoctrination is in some cases unavoidable and even desirable. 
According to Moore, when teaching very young children to adopt 
certain values and standards of behavior we as a society deem 
appropriate and even necessary for the promotion of proper and decent 
conduct, non-rational methods are employed because young children 
are not mature enough for teachers to engage their reasoning capacities 
in justifying or understanding why certain norms and behavior are 
desirable. He claims that: 
we frankly admit that learning necessarily begins with an 
authoritative and indoctrinative situation, and that for lack of 
time, native capacity or the requisite training to think everything 
out for oneself, learning even for the rationally mature individual 
must continue to include an ingredient of the unreasoned, the 
merely accepted. (Moore, 1972:97) 
Indoctrination, according to Moore, is necessary for inculcating very 
young children, too young to be "motivated by reason" (Moore, 1972: 96), 
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to adopt values and "behavior patterns presumably tested and adopted 
by more mature persons" (Moore, 1972: 97). In addition, he claims that 
indoctrination is also sometimes necessary for mature, rational persons. 
This is not to say, however, that Moore is a proponent of authoritarian 
methods of education. He is careful to point out that, although 
indoctrination is sometimes necessary, it is not ideal. The job of teachers 
should always be to strive toward the ideal which is to engage students' 
rational capacities in formulating their own beliefs, values, and attitudes. 
Those teachers who employ indoctrinary practices in situations 
where rational methods are warranted, argues Moore (1972), ought to be 
criticized for such practices. He rejects the view that indoctrination can 
be justified by an argument that certain values or beliefs are too 
important to be left to the individual to choose to adopt. Moore claims 
that indoctrination is only justifiable in those classroom situations where 
students' lack the ability or teachers truly lack the time to reason through 
the supporting evidence. Even when certain values and attitudes are 
seen as extremely important by the teacher or society, when teaching 
those to persons capable of rationally considering their merits, educators 
are obligated to employ rational rather than indoctrinary methods. 
Wilson (1972) too asserts that indoctrination is not always wrong. As 
an example, he states that when our children believe they are safe 
because we have said that we will always protect them, we are 
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inculcating this belief non-rationally. Yet, this is hardly immoral, according 
to Wilson, because this is what is required for them to have a sense of 
security and it is morally right to make children feel safe and secure. Like 
Moore, Wilson argues that indoctrination is certainly not a method to be 
employed in any case or situation where it can be avoided. He points out 
that while indoctrination is sometimes necessary, it runs the risk of 
impeding students' capacities for rationality. It is his contention that, while 
it is important to tell a child she will be protected so she will feel safe, to 
maintain this belief'puts the child at risk. 
For here we have taken over, or put to sleep, a central part of 
the child's personality - his ability to think rationally in a certain 
area. To put it dramatically: there is always hope so long as the 
mind remains free, however much our behaviour may be forced 
or our feeling conditioned. But if we occupy the inner citadel of 
thought and language, then it is difficult to see how a person 
can develop or regain rationality except by a very lengthy and 
arduous course of treatment. To indoctrinate is to take over his 
personality in a much more radical way than anything we do by 
way of force or conditioning: it is, in effect, to take over his 
consciousness. (Wilson, 1972:22) 
Wilson claims that indoctrination, while it may sometimes appear to be 
necessary, can take away a students' ability to formulate their own views 
and decide for themselves which values to adopt and which beliefs to 
accept. The very way they perceive ideas and think about issues will be 
largely dictated by others. This, according to Wilson (1972) and Moore 
(1972), is the reason indoctrination should be avoided in all cases except 
when absolutely necessary. 
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Both Wilson's and Moore's arguments are problematic, even if we 
ignore the ambiguity of the notions associated with the phrases, "thinking 
rationally" and "providing reasons." If we accept Wilson's and Moore's 
analyses, we must concede that all instances of teaching young children 
to accept certain beliefs without the proper reasons for them, beliefs that 
are taught for their well-being, are instances of indoctrination. We are 
thus compelled to agree that indoctrination is acceptable in many 
teaching situations, especially when teaching very young children. This, it 
seems, puts us in the awkward position when we are charged with 
indoctrination of having to not only admit that we are indoctrinating, but 
demonstrate that we are indoctrinating under acceptable 
~ circumstances. New arguments will be needed about what determines 
acceptable and unacceptable circumstances. It seems far easier to not 
label as indoctrination teaching persons to hold beliefs non-rationally in 
circumstances where persons are unable to rationally understand the 
reason for the beliefs. 
Harvey Siegel (1988) does just this. He contends that "we may grant 
the unavoidability of early inculcation of beliefs and habits in the absence 
of rational justification" (Siegel, 1988: 87) without calling such inculcation 
"indoctrination." According to Siegel, one indoctrinates when one 
teaches students to hold a belief in such a way that evidence and 
reasons will have no power to influence students holding the belief. Thus, 
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indoctrination is not simply inculcating unjustified beliefs; rather, it is the 
inculcation of beliefs in such a way that they can not be (or w/7/ not be, 
Siegel is not clear on this point) justified later by reasons and evidence. 
If we accept a methods analysis of indoctrination as discussed by 
Moore (1972), Wilson (1972) and others, and we agree with Siegel (1988) 
that the inculcation of unjustified beliefs does not necessarily count as 
indoctrination, then it seems we must define indoctrination as the 
teaching of certain beliefs to students in such a way that the students 
hold these beliefs in a manner that will not allow them to reconsider the 
beliefs in the face of evidence and reasons. While this definition 
addresses the concern that it is impractical to insist that teachers always 
avoid non-rational teaching methods, it does not clearly show what type 
of methods are indoctrinary. In other words, there does not seem to be 
any particular type of method that necessarily gets students to hold 
beliefs in a way that evidence and reasons have no power to influence. 
Thus, defining indoctrination in terms solely of method does not provide us 
an adequately clear notion of what precisely constitutes indoctrination. 
Although indoctrination may not be defined best in terms of 
method alone, we have yet to determine whether method is a useful or 
perhaps even necessary feature of indoctrination. Gregory and Woods 
(1972) assert that indoctrination is best defined in terms of method and 
content. As we have already considered the arguments for a content 
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analysis, I only examine here their arguments for including method as a 
criterion of indoctrination. 
According to Gregory and Woods, there is a logical necessity of 
defining indoctrination in terms of method. They state: "Somewhere 
along the line non-rational methods must, logically, have been employed, 
even though they cannot be specified. It is in this sense that we hold that 
method is logically necessary to the concept of indoctrination" (Gregory 
and Woods, 1972: 171). For Gregory and Woods, an indoctrinated belief 
is one that rational processes would not have led one to accept. Thus, 
non-rational methods, according to Gregory and Woods, are a necessary 
component of indoctrination because of the nature of the indoctrinated 
beliefs. In other words, their contention that there is a conceptual tie 
between indoctrination and non-rational teaching methods hinges upon 
their characterization of indoctrinated beliefs - that they, by definition, are 
non-rational. This is an interesting claim and one that is linked with their 
argument laid out earlier in this chapter that only doctrines can be 
indoctrinated because they claim that doctrines are beliefs which can 
not be shown to be either true or false. To accept any doctrine as true, 
they posit, one must have been taught in a manner where one's 
rationality was ignored or avoided. The assumption here seems to be that 
rationality requires acceptance of beliefs based on some sort of critical 
deliberation of supporting reasons and evidence. If there can be no 
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reasons or evidence to "prove" a belief, then one's accep tance of such 
a belief as true is necessarily non-rational, that is, one has a c c e p t e d it for 
considerations other than those associated with a rational assessment of 
supporting evidence or reasons. 
It seems, then, for Wilson (1972) as well as Gregory and Woods 
(1972), the worry over indoctrination is that it leads to students holding 
beliefs in a non-rational manner. According to them, the only way 
students c o m e to hold beliefs in such a manner as a direct result of their 
instructor's teaching is if their instructor uses non-rational methods. Put 
another way, they argue that only non-rational teaching methods lead to 
students holding beliefs in a non-rational manner. 
James E. McClellan (1976) also claims that indoctr inated beliefs 
require the employment of non-rational teaching methods, although he 
does not go so far as to assert that method is logically necessary to the 
concep t of indoctrination. He argues that a good indoctrinator is one 
who teaches students to hold their beliefs 
with great flexibility and apparent (only) openness to criticism 
and refutation. The believer has been taught to defend his 
doctrines in depth [in] a world in which his beliefs are always 
threatened, in which contrary beliefs are seen not as possible 
truths to enlarge and enrich the mental life but as dangers to be 
overcome. (McClellan, 1976: 141) 
According to McClellan, such efforts require that the beliefs be 
" implanted." Though he does not state outright that implanting is 
necessarily a non-rational process, he does imply it. He claims that to 
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implant a belief is akin to planting a seed in the ground. When we implant 
beliefs, we plant the seed of a belief into the mind of a student. For such 
a belief to grow into a healthy and strong "organic structure," as 
McClellan puts it, the belief must be nurtured with supporting claims, with 
statements that make it clear that to believe otherwise is to be foolish or 
unreasonable. (Religious beliefs, for example, may be nurtured by 
statements that to believe otherwise is to be unfaithful. Similarly, beliefs 
about one's government or nation may be supported by statements that 
to believe otherwise is to be unpatriotic.) For such beliefs to grow, in other 
words, they must be taught and supported using methods that side-step 
the students' rational processes. 
To review: Both Moore (1972) and Wilson (1972) claim that an 
indoctrinated belief is one which is held for considerations other than 
good reasons or evidence. Gregory and Woods (1972) contend that an 
indoctrinated belief is one held non-rationally as it is the sort of belief that 
rational processes would not allow one to either support or reject. Finally, 
McClellan (1976) argues that an indoctrinated belief is one held as 
unquestionably true because to question it is to risk feeling unreasonable 
or foolish. Though they all have slightly different claims about why certain 
beliefs are held non-rationally, they all agree that an indoctrinated belief 
is one held apart from considerations of relevant reasons and/or 
evidence. In addition, they all agree that indoctrinated beliefs are the 
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result of non-rational teaching methods. In other words, they all argue 
that in order for students to hold beliefs as true apart from good reasons or 
evidence they must have been taught in a manner that side-stepped 
their rational processes. 
It is important to point out here that in all these cases, the notion of 
indoctrinated beliefs is one that implies the beliefs are held as a result of 
teaching. In other words, the fact that a group of students holds non-
rational beliefs from a desire to please others does not mean necessarily 
that they were indoctrinated into those beliefs. On the other hand, if the 
students hold non-rational beliefs as a result of the non-rational 
instructional methods employed in teaching them, then according to 
Wilson, McClellan, and Gregory and Woods, they were indoctrinated. 
Thus, while other factors may cause students to hold non-rational beliefs, if 
the cause of these beliefs is non-rational teaching methods, then 
indoctrination has taken place. 
One argument that has been raised against the method's analysis is 
that the notion of "non-rational teaching methods" is unclear. Both Wilson 
(1972) and Moore (1972) define such methods as the inculcation of beliefs 
without providing reasons. According to Moore, non-rational methods are 
believed, not because of supporting reasons, but because of an 
"authoritative pronouncement" (Moore, 1972: 97) from one whom we 
consider to be an expert. This raises the question of what Moore would 
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count as "reasons." For surely, even as Moore admits, we must all depend 
to some extent upon the pronouncements of experts. Yet, he seems to 
contend that such pronouncements can never be considered "reasons." 
Wilson (1972) claims that a rationally held belief is one based on the 
"real world" so that if the world changes, the belief will change with it 
(Wilson, 1972: 20). Thus, for Wilson, reasons derive from the world. What 
Wilson appears to assume here is that "reasons" come from some sort of 
neutral, entirely objective perspective on the world or from reality itself. 
Some theorists, such as Elmer J. Thiessen (1993), argue that our 
understanding of the world develops from persons with a particular 
psychology and history who live in a particular time and place. In short, 
there is no entirely objective perspective in the world, a "view from 
nowhere" as it is sometimes called. Nor do we have independent access 
to reality - that is, no access without a situated perspective. 
My point is that it is not adequately clear what sorts of reasons 
rationally held beliefs are based on. Can any reason count, so long as it 
derives from the real world? For example, do I hold the belief rationally 
that the world is flat if it is based on my experiences and others? My 
reasons come from the real world but they are, of course, inadequate as 
there is considerable evidence and good reasons which exist to serve as 
counter evidence to my reasons. Must we insist, then, that rationally held 
beliefs be beliefs based on all relevant reasons? If so, then do teachers 
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employ non-rational teaching methods if they do not provide all the 
relevant reasons for the claims they make in class? 
As teachers cannot be expected to always provide all relevant 
reasons for believing the propositions they teach in their classrooms due to 
practical considerations such as time, insisting on such an account of a 
rationally held belief to avoid indoctrination would encompass much too 
much teaching within the definition of indoctrination. We can well ask, 
are non-rational methods, for example, beliefs taught with no supporting 
reasons, an inadequate number of reasons, or as Barbara Houston puts it, 
"the wrong sorts of reasons" (Houston, 1977: 61), that is, reasons that are 
perhaps irrelevant, false or illogical. Moore (1972), Gregory and Woods 
(1972), and Wilson (1972) all claim that non-rationally held beliefs are 
those held for considerations other than good reasons, and that beliefs 
held in this manner are the result of non-rational teaching methods. What 
they do not say, however, is what sort or amount of reasons teachers must 
supply to avoid teaching non-rationally. 
According to Thiessen, the notion of rationality which underlies prior 
analytic conceptions of indoctrination "is fundamentally concerned with 
providing reasons and evidence for beliefs" (Thiessen, 1993: 105). 
Mavrodes, who claims that this notion of rationality falls into the "proved-
premise principle" (Malvrodes, 1970: 26; Thiessen, 1993: 105) argues that it 
is highly problematic. Thiessen points out that, in justifying a belief, 
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Mavrodes claims that there is an inherent difficulty in providing enough 
reasons to prove a belief true or false, as each belief "demands the 
construction of an infinite series of arguments, each one of which 
embodies a proof of the premises of the succeeding argument" (Thiessen, 
1993: 106). This account of rationality would make virtually all teachers 
indoctrinators as it is impossible in any one, or indeed even in countless 
teaching episodes, to fulfill the infinite regression of reasons needed to 
prove each succeeding premise upon which a belief is based. 
Thiessen's answer to this difficulty is to make a distinction between 
the sort of rationality defined above and what he calls "normal rationality" 
(Thiessen, 1993: 106). He argues that normal rationality recognizes the 
natural and inherent limitations in persons' ability to be completely 
unbiased and objective. He states: 
Normal rationality recognizes that the justification of beliefs is an 
ongoing process conducted by human beings who have a 
psychology and a history and are part of a larger society with 
traditions ... Normal rationality, while very conscious of its 
subjectivity and fallibility, nevertheless seeks to be as objective 
as is possible, always being open to reassessing what is presently 
claimed to be the "truth," and always searching for more 
adequate expressions of truth. (Thiessen, 1993: 110) 
To be rational, then, is to base beliefs on reasons and evidence from as 
unbiased and objective a stance as possible. Certain beliefs must be 
taken as true if we are ever to justify beliefs and get on with the business of 
the day. These certain beliefs are those that are generally agreed upon 
within our community or society, according to Thiessen. Thus, we can 
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presume that a claim such as "It is good to try and be kind" can be taken 
as true in our society. Yet, if we agree with Thiessen's account of 
rationality, even this belief must be open to reassessment should new 
evidence become available. 
Even if we were able to determine when teaching is non-rational, 
Thiessen asks how often one must teach in such a manner before we 
consider them to be indoctrinating. He also suggests "that all teaching 
contains elements of emotional appeal, rhetoric, and force of personality 
... When these elements dominate the teaching situation, it might be 
possible to say that indoctrination is occurring" (Thiessen, 1988: 102). But, 
as he points out, it is too difficult to determine at what point we call such 
teaching indoctrination. Thus, a conception of indoctrination that defines 
it as the employment of non-rational teaching methods does not allow us 
to have a sufficiently clear guide for identifying when indoctrination is 
taking place. 
A methods analysis, then, seems inadequate. Yet, as Moore (1972) 
points out, much of the work done to improve teaching is aimed at 
improving how one teaches rather than what one teaches or even what 
one's educational aims are. In short, determining the quality of one's 
teaching is often based in large part by looking at the methods one 
employs. If we agree that indoctrination is a form of miseducation, and 
we agree that one of our tasks as educators is to improve the quality of 
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our teaching, then defining indoctrination in terms of method will help 
focus educators' attention on teacher practice in watching out for and 
addressing occurrences of indoctrination. The problem, as we have seen, 
is that there is no identifiable type of method that we can claim are 
indoctrinary; that is, there is no type of practice that has been shown to 
necessarily lead students to hold beliefs non-rationally. 
It seems it would be useful if we could define indoctrination in terms 
of method for it would allow us to improve teacher practice. Thus, I return 
to this question in chapter six of this dissertation where I suggest that those 
methods which one could foresee would lead to indoctrinary outcomes 
constitutes indoctrination. Whether such a claim would constitute a 
methods analysis or an intentional analysis will be discussed later. For now, 
I proceed to present an intentional analysis of indoctrination to determine 
whether a teacher's intentions are a possible defining feature of 
indoctrination. 
Defining Indoctrination in Terms of Intention 
Those who argue that indoctrination ought to be defined in terms of 
intention alone claim that if one intends to hold beliefs in a non-rational 
and uncritical manner and one acts with that intent, then one 
indoctrinates. To understand this sort of conception of indoctrination I 
draw primarily upon I. A. Snook (1972a, 1972b) as his writings on the 
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subject are well cited and to my knowledge he provides the strongest 
argument for this type of analysis. Following my discussion of Snook's 
claim that intention is the sole criterion of indoctrination, I consider the 
claim that intention is but one necessary feature of indoctrination, that is, 
the claim that indoctrination cannot occur unless a teacher intends to 
indoctrinate her students. In appraising the arguments for and the 
criticisms of an intentional analysis of indoctrination, I also discuss Snook's 
response to such criticisms. I conclude this section with the argument that 
intention is indeed a very important "feature of indoctrination as it is the 
only criterion discussed thus far that allows us to hold teachers morally 
culpable for indoctrination and encourages teachers to reflect on their 
desired outcomes as well as the likely outcomes of their educational 
efforts. 
Snook's argument that indoctrination is best defined in terms of 
intention alone rests on two premises. First, he asserts that none of the 
usually considered criteria (i.e., method, content, and consequences) are 
necessary features of indoctrination. His arguments against defining 
indoctrination in terms of method and in terms of content are similar to the 
criticisms of such accounts set out earlier in this chapter. That is, Snook 
argues that it is unclear what constitutes a rational and non-rational 
teaching method. Furthermore, he asserts that one can teach doctrines 
without indoctrinating and that the notion of doctrine has not been 
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clearly defined. The second premise upon which Snook's argument rests 
is that if we agree that indoctrination causes harm to students, and we 
therefore agree that indoctrinators ought to be held morally accountable 
for causing such harm, then we must include an intentional criterion in the 
definition of indoctrination because, morally speaking, we can not hold 
persons accountable for something they did not intend to do. 
According to Snook, "indoctrination" belongs to a family of words 
which describe acts for which we assign moral criticism. He uses 
"murdering, lying, stealing, wasting time, [and] being unfaithful" (Shook, 
1972a: 157) as examples of other terms that belong in this word family. To 
hold one morally accountable for an act, Snook reminds us, we must first 
show intent. For example, if A says to B, "My mother is not home" when, in 
fact, A's mother is home, we would only call such an utterance "lying" if A 
intends to deceive B. If A tells B his mother isn't home because A honestly 
believes his mother to be away, it is more accurate to describe A's 
utterance as a "mistake" rather than a lie. Similarly, if A kills B, we would 
only call it "murder" if A acted with the intention of ending B's life. 
Otherwise, we would call it an accident, manslaughter, or by the more 
generic term "killing." For something to be "murder," there must be at 
least an intention to kill an innocent person (as well as other things such as 
malice). 
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The words in this family also share another feature in common, 
according to Snook. They are all both task and achievement words but 
the task sense is more important. For example, if A sets out to murder B 
but fails in his attempts, it is true that A has not, in fact, murdered B. 
However, we would still want to hold A morally culpable for attempting to 
murder B. Also, if A fails to be unfaithful to B, we would still want to assign 
moral blame for A's efforts to be unfaithful (Snook, 1972b). 
Let me now relate this to the notion of indoctrination. We could 
argue that if A intends to indoctrinate B, makes every effort to do so, but 
fails at it, then A has not indoctrinated B. Thus, we might be tempted to 
claim that such a failed effort should not be called indoctrination as it did 
not manage to achieve the goal of indoctrinating B. Yet, as Snook points 
out, there are some acts for which we find persons morally blame worthy 
that are such that when a person even attempts to engage in such acts, 
we want to be able to hold them morally accountable. We morally 
criticize persons who intentionally attempt to murder someone, steal 
something, lie, or are unfaithful, even if such attempts fail to meet their 
intended outcomes. The same should hold true for indoctrination, 
according to Snook, because the outcome of indoctrination can cause 
persons serious harm. 
If we agree that we ought to be concerned about students who 
are being inculcated into certain beliefs such that they hold the beliefs 
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non-evidentially, then we also ought to be concerned about teachers 
trying to get students to hold beliefs in such a manner. Michael Hand and 
Harvey Siegel assert that "teaching which would constitute indoctrination 
if successful is objectionable whether it is successful or not" (Hand, 2003: 
96; Siegel, 2004:80). Or, to put a finer point on it, Siegel states: "It is better 
to highlight rather than downplay the basic point that if indoctrinating is 
wrong, so is trying to indoctrinate" (Siegel, 2004: 81). Thus, according to 
Snook, Siegel, and Hand, we ought to hold persons morally accountable 
for even attempting to indoctrinate, regardless of whether they succeed 
or fail. 
One's intention, then, if we accept Snook's line of reasoning, is a 
necessary feature of indoctrination. Yet, Snook's conception has its critics. 
In what follows, I first lay out what I consider to be the strongest objections 
to an intentional analysis of indoctrination and I then show how one can 
satisfactorily respond to them using Snook's arguments and line of 
reasoning. 
Kazepides (1987) disputes the analysis of indoctrination defined in 
terms of intention. He asserts that a notion of indoctrination ought to be 
useful in helping educators identify and abolish indoctrination when it 
occurs. While it is fairly easy for educators to control the sort of content 
taught in a school, he states that "no policy maker can control the 
intentions of teachers" (Kazepides, 1987: 232). Community members who 
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object to the indoctrination of certain doctrines, according to Kazepides, 
must have recourse to stop this. If indoctrination is defined solely in terms 
of intentions, members of the community would be unable to put an end 
to the indoctrination unless they forbid the inclusion of the doctrines in the 
curriculum. Going after the teachers' intentions would be fruitless as one 
can not control what another intends. 
It seems odd to assert that one's intentions can not be controlled or 
influenced. While it is probably true that one's intentions can never be 
under the complete control of another, it is reasonable to assume that 
persons have influence over another's intentions. Educators can, for 
example, counsel a teacher on his intentions, ask him to pay closer 
attention to them, and even ask him to alter them if it is seen that such 
intentions will lead to harmful consequences. However, Kazepides' 
criticism that a conception of indoctrination in terms of intent is not helpful 
in identifying indoctrination is still valid because it cannot be ascertained 
with any degree of certainty what a teacher intends. 
Snook answers Kazepides' criticism by arguing that those accused 
of indoctrination are typically not the finest authority on their own 
behavior. He asserts that, generally, persons who commit acts which are 
open to moral criticism are not in the best position to judge their 
intentions. For example, he claims that one who lied may say he "gave 
an excuse," or one who was unfaithful may say he "had a fling" (Snook, 
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1972b: 54). While indoctrinators certainly act intentionally, Snook informs 
us, they often do not say that their intention is to indoctrinate. He posits 
that by looking at their teaching methods and possibly also the content, 
outside agents may be able to determine their intentions. Snook is careful 
to point out that this does not mean that method or content are 
necessary criteria of indoctrination. Rather, he insists that method and 
content are only possible indicators of intention. Thus, according to 
Snook, a teacher's intentions can be known. 
Another problem Kazepides has with Snook's intentional analysis is 
that it only allows us to hold persons responsible for harm they caused 
intentionally; we can not object to those acts which lead to unintended, 
but harmful outcomes. He posits that words like "insult, embarrass, 
infuriate, or intimidate" (Kazepides, 1987: 232) serve as examples for how 
persons often behave in ways that lead to unintended harmful 
consequences. Persons often say things to others and insult, embarrass, 
infuriate, or intimidate them without ever having any intention of doing so. 
If such persons' intentions are pure, and yet they cause others to be 
embarrassed, insulted, and so on, according to Kazepides, we could not 
hold them accountable for such acts if we must judge them solely on their 
intentions. It would follow from what Kazepides is saying here that if a 
teacher unintentionally causes students to be indoctrinated, we can not 
hold that teacher accountable because her intentions were pure. 
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Snook's (1972b) response to this criticism is to agree that we should 
not hold teachers morally responsible for outcomes they caused 
unintentionally. He asserts that holding a teacher accountable for an 
unintentional act is akin to holding one morally responsible for lying when 
one had no intent to deceive. Or, to use Kazepides' group of words, it 
would seem that Snook would argue that we should not hold a person 
morally responsible for saying something that inadvertently embarrasses 
her listener because it was said with the intention of being friendly. Here, it 
seems, Snook is correct. We have all been in the unfortunate situation of 
saying something that embarrassed or insulted or even infuriated 
someone when we had no intention of causing such a reaction. People 
make mistakes and cause others harm as a result of such mistakes. To 
hold them morally accountable for making such mistakes, when the harm 
is relatively minor in degree, seems unjustifiably harsh. Thus, Snook's 
answer to Kazepides is to agree with Kazepides and assert that defining 
indoctrination in terms of intention alone does not allow us to hold 
teachers accountable for mistakes, and that is, as Snook says, how it 
should be. 
Another criticism against defining indoctrination in terms of intention 
is offered by Walter Feinberg (1975). He argues that, "given two teachers 
using essentially the same methods, teaching the same content and 
achieving essentially the same results, that one could rightly be accused 
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of indoctrination and the other not depending only upon their aims" 
(Feinberg, 1975: 214) seems unreasonable. This criticism, I argue, gets at 
the fundamental problem of defining indoctrination in terms of intention. 
It seems unfair to hold only one of the teachers in the above example 
morally accountable for the harm she caused her students. For Snook, our 
responsibility as educators would be to inform the teacher that her actions 
lead to indoctrinary consequences and she should, therefore, alter her 
teaching methods. If she does not do so, according to Snook, although 
she may claim that she does not intend to get students to hold beliefs 
non-rationally, we can observe by her methods and consequences that, 
in fact, it is her intention to effect such consequences and therefore we 
ought to hold her morally accountable. Snook's intentional analysis still 
needs work in clarifying how we can accurately and consistently identify 
and therefore hold teachers morally accountable for indoctrination. 
Defining Indoctrination in Terms of Consequences 
In the last section of this chapter I critically examine accounts of 
indoctrination defined in terms of consequences. No one suggests that 
indoctrination be defined solely in terms of consequences; there seems to 
be a general recognition that many things other than one's teaching may 
cause students to hold beliefs non-rationally. So, I consider only the claim 
that consequence is a necessary feature of indoctrination; that is, I 
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examine the contention that if a student or students have not been 
successfully indoctrinated, then indoctrination did not take place. 
Earlier in this chapter, I showed that although we do not call an act 
"murder" unless someone has been successfully murdered, we do want to 
hold persons morally accountable (as we do hold them legally 
accountable) for attempting to murder someone. Similarly, Snook (1972a, 
1972b) argues that we also want to hold persons morally accountable for 
attempting to indoctrinate. Yet, trying to murder someone and failing to 
do so is called "attempted murder," not "murder." Why not, then, call 
failed efforts to indoctrinate "attempted indoctrination" and keep the 
term "indoctrination" solely for those efforts that succeed? 
Barrow and Woods (1988) agree that indoctrination ought to be 
reserved for those cases in which students have been successfully 
indoctrinated. They claim that if teachers attempt to indoctrinate but fail, 
"they manifestly have not indoctrinated" (Barrow and Woods, 1988: 74). 
Barrow and Woods take consequences to be a necessary criterion of 
indoctrination. Michael Hand (2003), who uses Barrow and Woods' notion 
of indoctrination, agrees that indoctrination only occurs when students 
have successfully been indoctrinated. In his article, he takes on the 
question of whether or not faith schools indoctrinate. He concludes that 
they do not because religious educators too often fail to induce their 
students to accept uncritically the beliefs taught them. If the religious 
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educators were successful, according to Hand, then such teaching would 
indeed constitute indoctrination. 
One possible response to this argument is that "indoctrination" is a 
word similar to "education" in that both words have both a task and 
achievement sense. But, as Snook (1972b) asserts, rightly I think, for the 
term "indoctrination," the task sense ought to take precedence. Just as 
we want to morally censure persons who attempt but fail to cheat or 
steal, we ought to hold accountable those persons who attempt but fail 
to indoctrinate. The consequences of indoctrination, just as the 
consequences of cheating and stealing, are morally reprehensible. Thus 
the risk of harm associated with attempting to get students to hold beliefs 
non-rationally, to use one description, is dire enough to assign moral 
blame to persons making such an attempt. Although at this point it has 
not been clearly demonstrated what it means to indoctrinate and 
precisely what harm indoctrination incurs, we can argue that if 
indoctrination causes students serious harm, then the risk in merely 
attempting it ought to be morally censured. 
Another problem with a consequences analysis is that it puts 
educators in the position of having to determine whether a student's 
indoctrinated beliefs were caused by a particular teacher, a notoriously 
difficult causal claim to establish. In other words, even if we determine 
that students from a particular class hold the beliefs non-rationally that 
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were taught in that class, we can not be sure that they hold the beliefs in 
this manner due to any particular actions taken by the teacher. They 
may, for example, hold such beliefs as true because such beliefs are 
generally accepted as true in society; or they hold the beliefs this way 
because they were inattentive or lazy students. 
The teacher may have an influence on her students' beliefs, but we 
cannot know to what degree the teacher's influence shaped the 
students' beliefs and to what degree outside influences shaped their 
beliefs. Even if we were able to determine this, it is not clear at what point 
we hold the teacher accountable for indoctrination. We can not pinpoint 
the degree to which a teacher's influence shaped her students' beliefs, 
thus it seems we can not define indoctrination in terms of consequences 
as it is unreasonable to expect that anyone can know whether a student 
holding beliefs non-rationally is due to the actions taken by any particular 
teacher. 
Summary 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the conceptions we have 
thus far considered have failed to develop a sufficiently clear account of 
what constitutes indoctrination. The conceptions considered do not 
enable educators to identify indoctrination with consistency, know how to 
appropriately answer a charge of indoctrination, or know how to develop 
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curricula that avoids it. The content analysis falls short because of the 
vagueness and ambiguity in the terms "doctrine" and "worldview." 
Defining indoctrination in terms of method is not satisfactory because 
there is no particular set of methods that have been adequately 
identified as being indoctrinary. The intentional analysis forces us to guess 
what a teacher desires or foresees. Finally, the consequences criterion 
places an unreasonable requirement on persons to determine whether or 
not or to what degree students hold beliefs non-rationally due to the 
actions of their teacher. 
In the following chapter I adopt a more detailed lens in examining 
the conceptions of indoctrination we have considered here. More 
specifically, I look at how well each of them is able to meet the purposes 
set earlier by analyzing the extent to which they satisfy my four definitional 
criteria presented in the introduction. Thus far, the reader will have 
detected, my sympathies lie with an intentional account of indoctrination. 
However, it is only after a more detailed consideration of our purposes 
that it will be ascertainable whether some intentional analysis will remain 
the most promising. 
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CHAPTER III 
ADOPTING A MORE CRITICAL LENS: EXAMINING THE EXTENT TO WHICH 
PRIOR CONCEPTIONS OF INDOCTRINATION MEET THE NEW PURPOSES 
The preceding chapter critically reviews prior conceptual analyses 
of "indoctrination." In this chapter I adopt a more detailed critical lens in 
examining these prior conceptions. Specifically, I adopt Alven M. 
Neiman's (1989) suggestion that to further the debate on indoctrination, 
we ought to proffer an alternative purpose or purposes for our conception 
as a way to further the discussion and understanding of indoctrination. 
Taking Neiman's proposal seriously, I offer as alternative purposes or 
objectives for an analysis of indoctrination the following: Develop a clear 
conception of indoctrination that will allow us to better understand the 
charge of indoctrination and one that enable teachers to improve their 
educational endeavors and avoid indoctrination. 
What follows is an examination of the extent to which prior 
conceptions of indoctrination meet my purposes. As I argued in my 
introduction, my definitional criteria explicate four different standards 
which a conception of indoctrination must satisfy for it to be useful to 
educators in the ways I suggest above. Thus, I reiterate my definitional 
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criteria below and proceed to examine how well prior conceptions meet 
each of the criteria. 
The criteria I suggest for defining "indoctrination" are as follows: 
1. The conception must not depart radically from ordinary usage of 
the term. 
2. It must not reduce "indoctrination" to something else. 
3. It must explain why we find indoctrination in education within 
pluralistic democratic societies so objectionable even in pursuit of 
worthy goals. 
4. It must clearly characterize what it is for teachers (and, we may 
possibly add, schools) to indoctrinate and what it is for them to 
avoid indoctrination. 
The First Definitional Criterion 
As stated above, I believe that the content, method, and 
intentional analyses meet the first criterion. That is to say, they do not 
depart radically from ordinary usage. Snook (1972a, 1972b), for example, 
adopts a sort of topographical method in developing his definition. He 
lays out a series of cases, some of which he claims most persons would 
label as indoctrinary, others most persons would claim are not 
indoctrinary, and still others for which it is unclear as to whether they are or 
are not indoctrinary. For example, he argues that teaching an ideology 
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as if it were indisputably true is a clear case of indoctrination, and 
teaching very young students to behave in a socially acceptable manner 
is clearly not a case of indoctrination. A good definition of indoctrination, 
according to Snook, is one that adequately deals with these cases which 
he posits reflect ordinary usage of the term. Furthermore, he claims a 
good definition must help educators determine whether some more 
dubious cases, such as, teaching any subject in an authoritarian manner, 
constitute indoctrination. 
Willis Moore (1972) and John Wilson (1972) also rely on ordinary 
usage in crafting their methods analyses of indoctrination. As stated 
earlier, Moore claims that defining indoctrination in terms of method best 
coincides with how the term is used, particularly in the United States. 
Wilson develops his methods analysis by examining what he calls the 
"logical geography" (Moore, 1972: 105) of the term. He seeks to map out 
the various uses of the word to determine commonly agreed upon 
features of indoctrination. He then develops his definition based on these 
common features. 
Antony Flew (1972), who offers a content and intentional analysis, 
criticizes Wilson for his attempts to map out this term claiming that Wilson 
moves from merely describing various meanings and uses of 
"indoctrination" to prescribing how it ought to be used. Flew admits, 
however, that some level of prescription is necessary to "straighten out" 
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(Flew, 1972: 72) the multiple and even conflicting meanings of the term. 
Thus, both Wilson and Flew seek to develop a conception of 
indoctrination that does not violate ordinary usage of the term even as 
they recognize that ordinary usage may entail inconsistent or 
contradictory usage. 
Barrow and Woods (1988) also rely on ordinary usage in developing 
their definition. They provide what they claim is a paradigmatic case of 
indoctrination: A case in which students are inculcated in Catholic 
doctrines at a Catholic school situated within a Catholic community. 
They argue that those features present in the case (namely, method, 
content, intention and consequences) are necessary features of 
indoctrination. 
The conceptions of indoctrination considered here are quite 
different; yet they share one very important feature. All accounts of 
indoctrination in the literature assert that indoctrination gets or attempts to 
get students to hold taught beliefs in a non-rational manner. This shared 
belief is a fundamental and commonly held notion about indoctrination. 
Thus, although each one of the conceptions are distinct from the others, 
none violate ordinary usage as they all agree that the worry over 
indoctrination is that it leads (or is quite likely to lead) to students holding 
beliefs in a non-rational, non-evidential manner. Because these disparate 
accounts all agree about how indoctrinated beliefs are held, they are 
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similar enough to one another for all of them to meet the first definitional 
criterion of not radically departing from ordinary usage. 
The Second Definitional Criterion 
Cheshire Calhoun (1995), in her article "Standing for Something," 
provides an excellent example of the importance of developing 
conceptions that do not reduce the concept to anything else. In her 
analysis, she shows how prior conceptions of "integrity" conflate it with the 
similar notions of: "unified agency," "continuing as the same-self" 
(Calhoun, 1995: 252) and "weakness of will" (Calhoun, 1995: 250). Her 
work develops an analysis that achieves explicatory distinctiveness; that is, 
her definition clearly explicates how the notion "integrity" is conceptually 
distinct from the similar notions named above. By distinguishing "integrity" 
from similar notions, Calhoun provides a clearly defined depiction of 
integrity. In a manner of speaking, she sketches a picture with clearly 
defined lines that depict what belongs inside the picture and what 
belongs outside of it. Put another way, by explicating what integrity is not, 
Calhoun helps us to see what it is. 
Following Calhoun's example, in examining prior accounts of 
indoctrination, it is important to determine whether any of these accounts 
reduce "indoctrination" to similar notions such as: promoting or 
advocating for, brainwashing, conditioning, and lazy, ineffectual 
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teaching. In what immediately follows, I show that conceptions of 
indoctrination discussed in the literature do not conflate indoctrination 
with promoting, advocating and brainwashing. Furthermore, I argue that 
the notion of conditioning as defined by B. F. Skinner (1965) is so broad 
that comparing it with the notion of indoctrination does nothing to further 
and better refine our understanding of indoctrination. Finally, I argue that, 
with the exception of the intentional analyses, all prior accounts reduce 
indoctrination to poor teaching. 
To advocate for or promote a particular belief means to try and 
convince others of the truth of that belief. This can be accomplished 
through either rational or non-rational methods. Thus, advocating and 
promoting are different from indoctrination as defined in terms of method 
because one can use rational methods to advocate for and promote a 
particular idea. For example, I can promote the idea that the death 
penalty ought to be repealed in New Hampshire by providing a rational 
argument based on honest and open-minded critical assessment of all 
available and relevant evidence. Whereas a methods analysis defines 
indoctrination strictly in terms of non-rational teaching methods, 
promoting and advocating allow that rational and non-rational methods 
can be used. 
Accounts of indoctrination defined in terms of content also 
distinguish indoctrination from promoting and advocating. One can 
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advocate for and promote ideas that are not generally considered to be 
doctrines. For example, I can advocate for and promote the belief that 
air fresheners in all our school's bathrooms would improve the air quality in 
those rooms. Such a belief is not typically viewed as doctrinary. Thus, 
according to a content analysis of indoctrination, this sort of belief cannot 
be indoctrinated. Yet, it can be promoted and advocated for. Thus, 
because indoctrination, according to a content analysis, can only 
advance doctrinary claims, it is distinct from advocating and promoting 
which can advance both doctrinary and non-doctrinary claims. 
Intentional and consequences analyses also succeed in 
distinguishing indoctrination from promoting and advocating. One can 
advocate for the belief that the death penalty is wrong without intending 
to or succeeding in getting students to hold these beliefs non-rationally. I 
can, for example, intend to get students to hold rationally the belief that 
the death penalty ought to be repealed when I advocate and promote 
such a belief. To indoctrinate such a belief, on the other hand, according 
to an intentional analysis, I must intend to get students to hold such a 
belief non-rationally. Also, according to a consequences analysis of 
indoctrination, one does not indoctrinate if one has failed to get students 
to hold the belief non-rationally whereas one can advocate for and 
promote such a belief regardless of the outcomes. 
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Brainwashing, too, is distinct from all considered accounts of 
indoctrination if we accept J. P. White's definition of brainwashing. White 
defines brainwashing as an "all-out assault of one's beliefs" (White, 1972: 
127). Methods, intention, content, and consequences analyses all define 
indoctrination in terms of getting students to hold a particular belief or set 
of beliefs non-rationally. The notion of brainwashing, unlike these 
accounts of indoctrination which focus only on a particular set of beliefs, 
connotes an attempt to wash one's brain, as it were, or cleanse one of 
existing beliefs and replace them with others that the brainwasher seeks to 
inculcate. 
Considered accounts of indoctrination, then, have succeeded in 
drawing clear distinctions between "indoctrination" and the notions of 
"promoting," "advocating," and "brainwashing." Drawing a distinction 
between "conditioning" and "indoctrination," however, is a bit trickier. 
Noted behaviorist B. F. Skinner (1965) defines conditioning as the 
implementation of rewards and punishments to influence future behavior. 
Moreover, he puts all actions, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs under the 
rubric of "behavior." For Skinner, observable actions are called "public 
behavior" and thoughts, feelings, and beliefs are called "private 
behavior." Thus, John Wilson's (1972) attempt to distinguish indoctrination 
from conditioning by claiming that indoctrination is the manipulation of 
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beliefs whereas conditioning is the manipulation of behavior is 
unsuccessful as Skinner considers beliefs a type of behavior. 
The problem with Skinner's notion of conditioning is that it renders all 
teaching as conditioning. In fact, according to Skinner, all "learned" 
behavior (including all beliefs we have) is the result of conditioning or 
"learning." For Skinner, learned behavior is that which occurs as result of a 
series of punishments and rewards. It is different from instinct, or behavior 
that results from natural or inherent reactions to certain environmental 
stimuli. If we accept this notion of conditioning, then indoctrination is one 
form of conditioning, educative teaching another, compliments a third, 
and even accidental incidents such as car accidents a fourth form of 
conditioning. Any time rewards and punishments are issued (intentionally 
or unintentionally) and they influence future behavior, according to 
Skinner, it is considered conditioning. 
With such a notion of conditioning, it is not helpful to distinguish it 
from indoctrination except to note that indoctrination is only one small 
subset of conditioning. In other words, if conditioning constitutes all forms 
of education - good, bad, or otherwise - distinguishing it from 
indoctrination does not help differentiate indoctrination from other forms 
of miseducation or even from other forms of educative teaching. Thus, I 
leave the notion of conditioning as it does not further our understanding 
of indoctrination. 
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Poor and lazy teaching is a form of miseducation where we do not 
typically assign moral blame. Although such teachers fail to provide their 
students with a socially agreed upon acceptable level of education, their 
failure is attributed primarily to mistakes, lack of effort or inability. An 
ineffective teacher is not accused of committing a moral wrong. 
Indoctrination, on the other hand, at least taken in its strictly pejorative 
sense, is characterized by most concepts of indoctrination discussed thus 
far as an endeavor that warrants moral censure as the harm it causes is of 
moral concern. Thus, the distinction between poor teaching and 
indoctrination as defined in terms of intention is clear as an intentional 
analysis attributes a specific intention to those who indoctrinate, an 
intention for which one can be accountable. In addition, one can be a 
poor and lazy teacher without intending to be so. In fact, one can 
imagine that poor teachers usually intend to be good teachers. There is, 
then, a clear distinction between inept teaching and indoctrination 
defined in terms of intention. The distinction between poor teaching and 
indoctrination as defined in terms of method, content, or consequences, 
however, is not so clear. 
Lazy and poor teaching is not limited to any one type of teaching. 
Although a methods analysis does not specify which particular methods 
are indoctrinary, it does state that indoctrination occurs only with the 
employment of non-rational teaching methods. The problem in 
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distinguishing poor or lackadaisical teaching and indoctrination defined in 
terms of method is that it is not clear that, when a teacher uses non-
rational methods, she does so out of laziness or because of some intention 
to get her students to hold beliefs in a non-rational manner. For example, 
it would seem odd to label as an indoctrinator a teacher who, because 
she does not want to spend the time required to teach them about 
historical information, uses rote memorization techniques to get her 
students to commit to memory the information written in the text book. 
Such a teacher is lazy or has a poor grasp of what is involved in good 
teaching. Being ineffective or making mistakes does not always warrant 
moral censure; we do not typically hold teachers morally accountable for 
making mistakes of this nature. We would not want to label as 
indoctrination, in other words, all instances of non-rational teaching. 
Without bringing in the qualification of intention in a methods 
analysis, there is nothing to demarcate indoctrination from lazy teaching. 
That is, unless we claim that indoctrination only occurs when teachers 
employ non-rational methods with the intention to get students to hold 
beliefs non-rationally, we cannot know when one's non-rational teaching 
methods are better characterized as indoctrination or ineptitude. 
A consequences analysis of indoctrination also fails to make clear 
whether students come to hold beliefs non-rationally as a result of 
indoctrination or poor teaching (or, for that matter, as a result of other 
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reasons entirely). Even if we argue that indoctrination occurs when 
students hold beliefs non-evidentially as a result of something their teacher 
did, we cannot determine whether that something was indoctrination or 
inept teaching. Consider the inept history teacher from the prior 
example. Just as it would seem odd to claim that her methods were 
necessarily indoctrinary, it would also seem odd, based simply on 
consequences, to say that she indoctrinates because we cannot know 
why her students hold beliefs non-rationally. 
A content analysis of indoctrination fairs no better. Ineffective 
teachers as well as indoctrinators can inculcate doctrines. There is no 
way on a content analysis to ascertain whether a teacher who is 
teaching dubious claims as if they were unquestionably true is attempting 
to inculcate such claims or is exhibiting poor teaching skills. 
Laziness and ineptitude should not be conflated with indoctrination. 
The history teacher in our example is best characterized as a poor teacher 
not an indoctrinator. Defining indoctrination, then, in terms of either 
method, content, or consequences, or even any combination of these 
three does not provide any clear indication of how to distinguish 
indoctrination from low quality (but not necessarily immoral) teaching. 
Only an intentional analysis provides a sufficiently clear distinction 
between poor teaching and indoctrination. 
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In sum, conceptions of indoctrination defined in terms of method, 
content, intention or consequences all succeed in demarcating 
indoctrination from promoting, advocating, and brainwashing. The notion 
of conditioning, as defined by Skinner (1965), is too broadly construed to 
further our understanding of precisely what distinguishes indoctrination -
regardless of how it's defined - from any other form of teaching. Finally, 
methods, content, and consequences analyses of indoctrination fail to 
provide an adequate distinction between indoctrination and poor quality 
or incompetent teaching. Only when indoctrination is defined in terms of 
intention can we see the distinction between indoctrination and inept 
teaching. Thus, with the exception of an intentional analysis, prior 
accounts of indoctrination fail to fully meet the second definitional 
criterion of providing a conception that does not reduce indoctrination to 
anything else. 
The Third Definitional Criterion 
My third criterion, that a definition of indoctrination should show why 
indoctrination is objectionable even when the goals in whose service it is 
enjoined are considered worthy, is met by prior conceptions to a certain 
degree. The competing analyses of indoctrination discussed earlier in this 
dissertation all presuppose that indoctrination causes a specific harm; 
more specifically, they all claim indoctrination diminishes students' rational 
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capacities. However, as I argued in chapter two, the notion of rationality 
they employ, or the ideas they advance of holding beliefs in a rational 
manner are too vague and ambiguous. In other words, none of them 
make it sufficiently clear what it means to hold beliefs rationally. 
In this chapter, I take another look at notions of rationality in regards 
to why impeding rational capacities constitutes a significant moral harm. 
Jeopardizing the search for truth is of central concern here. I argue that 
prior analyses of indoctrination do not make it adequately clear how 
indoctrination significantly risks the likelihood that students will arrive at 
true beliefs or will have the capacities to search for true beliefs. 
Moreover, I claim that while rationality is a primary goal of education for 
many educators, particularly those who uphold the ideology of pluralistic 
democratic societies, it is not held by all educators. Thus, it is not wholly 
clear that the accounts of indoctrination we have considered thus far do 
meet the third criterion: they do not make clear why indoctrination is 
objectionable even when used in pursuit of admirable ends. 
Before determining how prior analyses argue that impeding 
rationality impairs one's ability to seek for and arrive at true beliefs, we 
must first show that considered analyses do, in fact, contend that the 
harm of indoctrination is that it puts at risk students' rational capacities. 
According to Thiessen (1993), those who define indoctrination in terms of 
content assert that certain content - i.e., doctrines - are a necessary 
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feature of indoctrination because doctrines can not be held rationally. 
Gregory and Woods (1972), too, posit that doctrinal beliefs are those for 
which there is no general agreement about what can prove or disprove 
them, thus they rationally cannot be accepted as true. 
Thiessen goes on to assert that those who define indoctrination in 
terms of intention claim that one indoctrinates when one intends that her 
students hold beliefs non-rationally. We see this with Snook (1972a, 
1972b), for example, who asserts that indoctrination occurs when a 
teacher intends to get students to hold a belief "regardless of the 
evidence." In other words, according to Snook, one indoctrinates when 
one teaches with the intention that one's students will come to hold a 
particular belief in such a way that evidence has no power to shake that 
belief. 
For those who define indoctrination in terms of method, Thiessen 
contends, the methods which ignore, disregard or side-step students' 
rationality are indoctrinary. John Wilson, who advances a methods 
analysis of indoctrination, states: "The important point here, in my view, is 
not so much whether we call something 'indoctrination' or not, but 
whether a particular process increases or diminishes rationality" (Wilson, 
1972: 21). Willis Moore agrees with Wilson that the harm of indoctrination is 
that it impairs persons' rationality. The distinction between teaching that 
is educative and teaching that is indoctrinary, according to Wilson, is that 
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educative teaching helps students "behave rationally" (Moore, 1972: 20) 
whereas indoctrination encourages students to hold beliefs non-rationally. 
Barrow and Woods mirror Wilson's contention when they claim 
indoctrination occurs when "rationality never supersedes authority" 
(Barrow and Woods, 1988: 78). They assert, in other words, that if a 
teacher always uses her authority to impose her beliefs and such 
authoritarian engagements never allow students to rationally consider the 
epistemological merits of such beliefs, that teacher indoctrinates. 
Thus, it seems, Thiessen rightly surmises that the worry over 
indoctrination derives from a liberal educational ideal where rationality is 
held as an important educational goal. In support of this assertion, 
Thiessen recounts that R.S. Peters' notion of education centers around 
developing a "rational mind" (Thiessen, 1993: 105) and Hollins "suggests 
that each of the contributors to his Aims of Education 'puts forward as his 
chief aim of education the development of rationality" (Thiessen, 1993: 
105). It is apparent, then, that rationality is a widely held goal of 
education among liberal educationists and educational philosophers. 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable, on the surface, to define indoctrination 
in terms of rationality - or, more specifically, as a process which impedes 
students' rational capacities. The problem is, however, as Thiessen points 
out and as we saw in the previous chapter, it is not clear what "rationality" 
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means. A further problem is that it has not been made sufficiently clear 
how impairing one's rationality jeopardizes one's ability to find truth. 
The defining characteristic of Thiessen's account of rationality (both 
the more traditional notions of rationality and his normal rationality) is that 
rationality uses the best available evidence to determine truth. Indeed, 
Thiessen states that "[i]n seeking to be rational, our aim is, of course, to 
arrive at the truth" (Thiessen, 1993: 106). The problem Thiessen points out in 
defining rationality as a means of determining truth is that we do not know 
what the truth will look like when we see it. According to Thiessen, we 
cannot know when we arrive at truth and thus it is not helpful to define 
rationality in terms of truth. For Thiessen, the most we can hope for with 
rationality is our very finest efforts to develop and maintain beliefs based 
on the best reasons and evidence available. 
Francis Shrag (2003), who agrees with Thiessen in his contention that 
the aim of rationality is truth, points out the difficulties in determining 
whether or not a belief is held rationally. In his article, Shrag provides 
hypothetical examples of students discussing the usefulness of rationality 
with their professors. His examples are instructive here as they highlight the 
important distinction between having rational beliefs versus holding true 
beliefs. 'Thomas,' Shrag's hypothetical student, chooses to believe in the 
existence of God even though he admits that he cannot support such a 
belief rationally. Thomas' professor concludes that, for Thomas, "the costs 
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of an incoherent set of beliefs are outweighed by the benefits of 
participation in religious life" (Shrag, 2003: 181). Shrag asserts that Thomas' 
belief is rational because it is based on an analysis of the costs and 
benefits of holding such a belief and a judgment that the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Thomas' belief, then, according to Shrag, is based on 
a rational consideration of reasons. 
Does Shrag let Thomas off too easily here? Suppose Thomas' belief 
was in white supremacy instead of God, and suppose he wished to 
continue to participate in the Ku Klux Klan instead of his religious 
practices? If we agree with Shrag and Thiessen that the aim of rationality 
is truth, we can not be satisfied to believe that Thomas' conviction in 
white supremacy is rational unless we are ready to say (as I expect most 
educators are not) that such a belief is true or could ever be 
demonstrated to be true after examining all available evidence, 
arguments and reasons. Yet Shrag argues that we can not require or 
expect persons to always take the time necessary to "get all our beliefs in 
order and to hold only beliefs we can fully justify" (Shrag, 2003: 181). Thus, 
it's unclear, at least on Shrag's account of rationality (and many of these 
conceptions of indoctrination), whether we can expect the call for 
rationality to require or prompt Thomas to reconsider his views. 
The problem, it seems, with determining whether one's beliefs are 
held rationally is that there are different views regarding what sort of 
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reasons or evidence ought to count as rational justification. I agree with 
Shrag that we would want to call Thomas' belief in God reasonable as 
Thomas did base his belief on a thoughtful consideration of the relevant 
reasons available to him. On the other hand, it would be difficult to make 
the case that the aim of rationality is truth if we allow such reasons to 
count as rational justification because such reasons do little to further 
Thomas' inquiry about the existence of God. Rather they only support his 
choice to hold the "non-rational" belief in God. Rationality, on this 
analysis, seems to promote reason seeking rather than truth seeking. 
Let's look at another hypothetical example. Susan believes that the 
US bombing in Japan during WWII was justified and she believes this 
because of the reasons given to her by her teacher - that the bombing 
ended the war early thereby saving lives in the long run. Because Susan's 
belief is based on reasons, we would call such a belief rational. But what if 
such a belief is not true? Does the call for rationality require that Susan 
question the worth of the supporting reasons? If so, to what extent must 
Susan question the reasons? Thiessen (1993) reminds us that to not fall into 
what Mavrodes (1970) calls the "proved-premise principle" we must 
accept those claims as true that society generally agrees upon. Yet, 
what if some of these claims that society generally agrees upon are false 
and ought to be questioned? While Thiessen points out that even well 
accepted beliefs ought to be questioned if new evidence arises, he does 
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not discuss what students should do if they are taught widely accepted 
claims and are never exposed to any counter evidence because such 
evidence is rarely expressed in mainstream society. 
Let us assume, for example, that Susan was made aware of the 
claim that the US bombings were not necessary to end the war because 
Japan would have surrendered prior to the bombings, and as a result of 
this new evidence she altered or even just questioned her prior belief. In 
this case we would want to say she holds her belief about the bombing 
rationally. But what if Susan never encounters any opposing claims to her 
initial belief? This is not merely a theoretical supposition; it occurs quite 
often that students accept views taught them in school which they never 
question because such views are repeated, maintained and supported 
by mainstream ideology. So many of the beliefs we have remain 
unquestioned because it never occurs to us that such beliefs ought to be 
or con be questioned. Crittenden (1968), for example, asserts that the 
paradigmatic case of indoctrination involves the teaching of beliefs that 
are part of the accepted cultural ideology and held as true by 
mainstream society. He seems to recognize that mainstream notions 
often go unquestioned thereby making better fodder for indoctrination 
than, perhaps, beliefs that run counter to generally accepted views. 
There are often ample reasons given in society for accepting mainstream 
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beliefs and it is not uncommon that counter evidence remains 
marginalized, hidden and unheard by a large portion of the populace. 
Rationality, in and of itself, does not seem a stringent enough 
criterion to encourage students into critically deliberating on the 
epistemic worth of beliefs that are taught them in schools, particularly if 
the beliefs taught fit with (some) mainstream thought. In other words, 
believing the US was justified in bombing Japan, if believed by students 
because of the reasons given them, is a rational belief. Yet, it is not a 
belief held in a way that encourages students to discover whether or not it 
is supported by all available and relevant evidence. Rationality, as thus 
far defined in these accounts, requires students to have good reasons for 
their beliefs. It does not require that they search for opposing reasons or 
counter views in order that they may adequately test the epistemological 
merits of their beliefs against those that oppose it or in light of all 
reasonably available evidence. 
If we accept prior conceptions of indoctrination, we accept the 
concern that prompted them, that indoctrination undermines rationality, 
that is, it undermines students forming evidential beliefs. This is, indeed, a 
bad thing, at least to those committed to liberal pluralistic ideals 
governing public education. However, with Thiessen's concept of 
rationality, avoiding indoctrination as defined in this way, as we have 
seen, does not mean that we will have discouraged students from forming 
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false beliefs based on faulty or inadequate reasons. Nor will it discourage 
students from holding beliefs as incontestably true when, in fact, such 
beliefs are highly contested. 
If rationality can not be justified by claiming that it is the best 
avenue to truth, what is the justification for rationality? Harvey Siegel 
(2003) would say that the very question itself speaks to the importance of 
rationality - that is, by asking "Why rationality?" we are asking for reasons 
and evidence that would support an answer. Even to argue against 
rationality requires rational deliberation as one would give reasons in 
support of her claim against the importance of rationality. But is rationality 
good for its own sake, or is it good, as Thiessen (1993) and Shrag (2003) 
contend, because it is the way to achieve truth? If we accept the latter 
view, then we must have some account of "truth" to make a case for the 
necessity of rational processes to reach it. In other words, how can we be 
sure that rationality is the best way to truth if we can not be sure what we 
mean by "truth"? 
Shrag (2003) very well may have an account of truth. In fact, prior 
conceptions of indoctrination may also assume a particular notion of 
truth. It seems that considered accounts of indoctrination hold a 
correspondence theory of truth. Simply put, correspondence theories 
characterize "true" statements as statements which correspond to facts 
about the world. Thus, the claim "The U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and 
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Nagasaki ended WWII early" would be true if and only if the war would 
have continued longer in the absence of the bombing. To prove such a 
claim is difficult. We could, however, point to evidence that shows 
projected life loss would be greater if the U.S. did not bomb Japan. 
I do not wish to argue against or defend the correspondence 
theory of truth. However, it is worth noting one concern that arises with 
this theory: If truth is that which accurately describes something in the 
world or a particular state of affairs, how can we be sure that rationality is 
the best way to find truth? If we hold a correspondence theory of truth, 
we need a separate argument to establish the plausibility of the claim 
that rationality is the best means to discover truth. It may be, for example, 
that spiritual meditation is the best way of perceiving and knowing reality. 
The simple point I wish to make here is that, without a clearly explicated 
notion of truth, we cannot make sense of rationality, but more importantly, 
even with some conceptions of truth, we still need an argument to show 
that rationality is the best route to truth. 
I will have much more to say about truth and its role in 
understanding indoctrination in the next chapter when I offer the 
alternative goal of education. This alternative goal, I argue, is one that is 
equally undermined by indoctrination but better explains why we find 
indoctrination objectionable even when used in the service of (other) 
admirable goals. For now, however, it is enough to conclude that 
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defining indoctrination as the inculcation of non-rationally held beliefs 
leaves too many questions unanswered about what precisely it means to 
hold a belief non-rationally and how we can justify the importance of 
rationality without a clearly defined notion of "truth." 
Even if we were clear about what it means to hold a belief non-
rationally, there is another problem with defining indoctrination in terms of 
rationality. If indoctrination is defined as something that impedes 
rationality, it fails to maintain its strictly pejorative connotation for persons 
who do not hold rationality as a primary goal of education. Some 
sectarian schools as well as some non-sectarian schools do not subscribe 
to the ideology of education that insists that education's central task is to 
produce rationally autonomous persons. The Amish (2005), for example, 
believe that it is more important students learn to comply with the Amish 
ideology and traditions than learn to be rationally deliberative and 
critically appraising persons. Similarly, some more traditional Christian 
schools see strong adherence to Christian teachings as more important 
than rational autonomy. To persons who hold to more authoritarian 
models of education, indoctrination would fail to concern them if it is 
defined as that which jeopardizes students' rational autonomy. While it is 
true that rationality is an ideal of education for many persons, particularly 
those living in and subscribing to a liberal pluralistic democratic society, it 
is not an ideal shared by all educators living in a pluralistic democracy. 
106 
Thus, although defining indoctrination in terms of rationality does provide 
a concept ion that violates an important goal of educat ion for many, w e 
could perhaps do better by developing a concept ion of indoctrination 
that holds a strictly pejorative meaning for far more persons. 
To sum up this section, we c a n note that my third definitional 
criterion is met to a certain extent, that is, the considered conceptions of 
indoctrination explain for some why indoctrination is object ionable even 
when it is used to pursue worthy goals. However, we have also seen that 
it is a valuable endeavor to develop a concept ion of indoctrination that 
will be of interest to and useable for those sectors of a pluralistic 
democrat ic society which have decidedly minority views about 
educat ion, both public and private educat ion, and its purposes. 
The Fourth Definitional Criterion 
The fourth definitional criterion of indoctrination which calls for a 
lucid illustration of what characterizes indoctrination and what is required 
to teach without indoctrinating is not met by any of the considered 
accounts. Indoctrination defined in terms of teaching methods, for 
example, does not clearly explain what constitutes non-rational teaching 
methods; that is, there are no identifiable methods that, by their nature, 
cause students to hold beliefs non-rationally. Education is a complex and 
multilayered interaction between the students and the multiplicity of 
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persons, policies and structures by which they are influenced. As I show in 
chapters six and seven, to determine where indoctrination occurs, we 
must consider the context in which teaching takes place. Students are 
greatly affected by the beliefs accepted as true by persons in their school 
community, the pedagogical philosophy adopted by the school, the 
methods employed by their teachers, and the hidden as well as the 
explicit curriculum. 
In addition, students do not come into school as blank slates, 
waiting to be acted upon rather than interacted with. Students bring to 
the teaching interaction certain attitudes, dispositions, habits of mind, 
beliefs, and values. All of this effects how vulnerable they are to 
indoctrination. Some students will be more prone to holding beliefs non-
rationally than others and different students will respond differently to a 
given teaching method. Considering the complexity involved in teaching 
endeavors, we can not identify any particular method or set of methods 
that run a serious and substantial risk of getting students to hold beliefs in 
an unquestioning and non-deliberative manner. Therefore, defining 
indoctrination in terms of method does not afford us a sufficiently lucid 
portrayal of indoctrination to allow us to identify it with consistency. 
Similarly, content analyses do not provide a lucid portrayal of 
indoctrination because such analyses rest on the vague and ambiguous 
notion of doctrine. Even if we could know what demarcates "doctrines" 
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from other sorts of material, however, defining indoctrination in terms of 
content leaves us with an analysis that does not take into account certain 
educational endeavors that ought to be construed as indoctrination. Let 
us return to the example of the teacher who told her students that Betsy 
Ross sewed the first U.S. flag. As this claim is patently false and it does not 
have a wide scope of influence on our perspectives or our actions, it 
would not be considered a doctrine by any ordinary usage of the term. If 
a teacher intentionally got her students to hold this belief non-rationally, 
we could not call such teaching indoctrination if we insist that content be 
a required criterion of indoctrination. However, such teaching ought to 
be characterized as indoctrination because it is harmful to teach students 
demonstrably false claims as if they are unquestionably true even when 
they are not obviously "doctrines." The reasons for this follow. 
What we learn shapes the type of beliefs we hold, how we perceive 
the world around us, and influences the sort of ideology we maintain and 
thus the type of person we become. Furthermore, although the erroneous 
statement about Betsy Ross may not be considered a doctrine, it could 
be adopted into one's worldview about their country. For example, when 
I use Betsy Ross as an example to my students of how a story repeated -
often enough can come to be seen as "fact," many of my students get 
very upset with me for even suggesting that Betsy Ross did not sew the first 
U.S. flag. These students respond as if I killed an American hero or 
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dispelled a cherished childhood belief. Other students grow angry that 
they had been "lied to," and they wonder what other false beliefs they 
hold as a result of their schooling. 
Getting students to hold non-doctrinal beliefs in a non-rational 
manner runs the substantial risk of getting them to hold as unquestionably 
true beliefs that ought to be questioned. To make the best possible 
choices in our lives, we need to have as accurate and reliable 
information as it is reasonably possible to attain. Holding on to incorrect or 
dubious claims as if they were true undermines our ability to make the 
most informed decisions possible. Indoctrinating students into non-
doctrinal claims, then, causes harm to students by jeopardizing their ability 
to make the best possible decisions for themselves and others. In 
addition, indoctrination jeopardizes some basic educational tenets of a 
pluralistic democratic society - that of educating students to participate 
meaningfully and effectively in the marketplace of ideas, questioning their 
own views and those of others, assessing the worth of beliefs based on a 
wide range of perspectives, and holding beliefs based on a careful 
consideration of all the available and relevant evidence. 
Thus far I have argued that indoctrinating students into doctrinary 
and non-doctrinary but false claims is harmful. But what about getting 
students to hold demonstrably true claims non-rationally? Those who 
advocate for a content analysis of indoctrination assert that, by including 
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the teaching of doctrines as a necessary feature of indoctrination, we 
exclude from the notion "indoctrination" the teaching of such things as 
the math tables and French vocabulary, even when taught using such 
methods as rote memorization. Snook contends that these examples do 
not count as indoctrination because they are unavoidable, and if we are 
to hold persons morally accountable for indoctrination, we can not 
include actions which are unavoidable. (Snook, 1972a: 152). Thus there is 
general agreement among educational philosophers that teaching things 
such as the math tables and vocabulary does not constitute 
indoctrination. I argue, however, that students can, in fact, be 
indoctrinated by such teaching. 
Consider a student who goes home and accurately recites her 
addition tables. At first she delights her parents, but when she shows that 
she has no concept of what it means to add two numbers together, her 
parents are no longer as delighted. Their daughter has learned to recite 
the addition tables but has not learned how to add. If she does not learn 
the concept of addition -that is, if she does not learn that addition means 
putting two or more quantities together and totaling their quantity -she 
will be hampered in her ability to learn subtraction, multiplication, and 
other more complex mathematical principles and endeavors. I suggest 
that we do not typically worry about teaching students their math facts 
via rote memorization because it is quite rare that teachers do not 
111 
correspondingly teach their students the concept of addition. In other 
words, teachers rarely get students to hold math facts, so to speak, non-
rationally. Students are most often cognizant of why, for instance, two 
threes are six. 
Now consider the student who is asked to memorize a list of French 
words and their English translations. Even if this is done (as it 
characteristically is done) using rote memorization techniques, we do not 
typically refer to this as indoctrination. Here, I warrant, we do not 
generally label such teaching as indoctrination because it is rare that 
students hold beliefs about French vocabulary non-rationally. Language 
acquisition is a very rational process. Children learn in one situation that 
"yes" means that they have agreed to a particular proposal. When they 
use the word "yes" in another instance and find it does not mean what 
they thought it did, then they refine their understanding of "yes." Similarly, 
when students learn a second language, they memorize vocabulary, use 
the words they have memorized and, in using the words, continue to 
refine their understanding of how the word is used and what meanings it 
takes on in different contexts. A student, then, who is taught to hold the 
belief that the French word for "pretty" is "jolie" in a rigid and uncritical 
manner will be less likely to openly consider that "pretty" in French is 
"belle." The student who adopts a more rational stance will more likely 
ask his teacher about this apparent disparity and learn that, just as there is 
112 
more than one word for "pretty" in English, there too is more than one 
word for it in French. By adopting a non-rational manner of holding 
beliefs, students of French will be hindered in their ability to develop an 
understanding of the language through continual usage and reflection of 
their experiences. 
My point here is that students can be taught even such things as 
math facts and French vocabulary in an indoctrinary manner. Yet, most 
of us do not ordinarily concern ourselves with students being taught to 
memorize such material in a rote fashion. I argue, on the other hand, that 
such a teaching method is not unavoidable, regardless of what it is we 
are teaching, that it is harmful, and that we can provide meaningful proof 
to young students. 
Ellen J. Longer (1997) provides a thorough and detailed explication 
of what she terms "mindful learning." She argues that when we are 
taught information in a mindless manner, that is, when we are taught to 
mindlessly memorize a given set of facts, we tend to hold these facts as 
true regardless of time, place or context. Additionally, she claims that 
learning "in a rote, unthinking manner almost ensures mediocrity" (Longer, 
1997: 14) as it does not enable us to shift what we learn in the least bit to 
adopt a more advantageous perspective or understanding in a different 
context. Memorizing vocabulary words, then, apart from understanding 
how the words are to be used in conversations and writing does not 
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adequately prepare students to use the words correctly or effectively in 
varying contexts and situations. 
In her book The Power of Mindful Learning (1997), Longer explains 
that teaching for mindful learning involves: making the information taught 
relevant to students' lives; teaching them to look for and find distinctive 
details about what they're taught; teaching them to examine the 
information from multiple perspectives; creating games and other ways of 
making the learning more like play than work; and finally it involves 
introducing novelty into what is taught, into the teaching methods, and 
into the assessment methods. She provides her readers with the results of 
several experiments to demonstrate that when students are asked to learn 
a body of information mindfully, they are more successful in remembering 
the information and are much better at developing new understandings 
of what they learned when placed in novel circumstances. 
Adopting Langer's theories and conclusions about mindful learning, 
let us consider how students taught mindfully to learn French vocabulary 
would fair against students taught the same information mindlessly. 
Students who are taught mindlessly to memorize the vocabulary words will 
not remember the information as well as those who were taught mindfully 
and they will be less successful in using the words in a variety of contexts. 
Thus, while Snook (1972a, 1972b) claims that rote memorization in 
teaching such material is unavoidable, Longer provides numerous 
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examples of alternative teaching methods available to teach such 
content thus showing we can, in fact, avoid such methods. Furthermore, 
she shows that more creative and "mindful" learning approaches results in 
better learning outcomes. 
If we accept Langer's notions about the superiority of mindful 
learning over mindless learning, we may conclude that rote memorization 
is avoidable. Yet, claiming that rote learning is avoidable, or not 
unavoidable, does not yet show that it is indoctrinary. To demonstrate 
that a given teaching practice is indoctrinary, we must first show that it 
causes harm to students. I contend that we can show that teaching 
students to adopt math facts and to learn French vocabulary translations 
in a non-critical, non-deliberatory manner does cause students significant 
harm. True, not being open to learning that there are various French 
words for "pretty" does not appear to constitute harm. But, my point is 
that learning habits are generalized and to learn anything by rote, and to 
learn it only by rote, entrenches the habit of doing so and thus when 
generalized, puts at risk students' ability to acquire the best information 
and understandings available in order to make optimal choices in one's 
life, choices that have the most potential for improving one's life and the 
lives of others. 
There is another argument in favor of labeling such seemingly trivial 
rote learning as indoctrination. If we decide that developing non-critically 
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held beliefs for some material is acceptable but not for others, we must be 
very clear about what sorts of material we can develop non-deliberative 
beliefs for. In looking at the examples of math facts and French 
vocabulary, we might be inclined to characterize such material as that 
which is factual or indisputably true. If we do that, however, we run the 
risk of having teachers defend their harmful teaching by claiming that 
they are teaching indisputably true facts. In short, we must be able to 
agree on what counts as unquestionably true, and as we know, this is 
unlikely. In sum, it is misleading to think that it is unavoidable that some 
rote learning occurs and that our account of indoctrination must allow for 
it, not include it in its purview if the term is to retain its pejorative 
connotation. Such teaching and such learning undermines students' 
ability to learn as much as they could if they had been taught to hold 
beliefs in a more "mindful" or critically deliberative manner. Moreover, 
claiming that it is acceptable to teach students some but not other sorts 
of material in this manner puts us in the unenviable position of having to 
decide and agree upon what counts as unquestionably and indisputably 
true. Content analyses of indoctrination then, are not as useful as they 
might first appear. 
Consequences analyses also fail to illustrate indoctrination in a 
patent way because we can not know whether students holding beliefs 
non-rationally (presuming we can even know what it means to hold 
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beliefs in such a way) is due to something their teacher did or due to 
some other reason entirely. Finally, because we can not know with any 
degree of certainty what a teacher intends, an intentional analysis of 
indoctrination, at least as put forth by Snook (1972a, 1972b), does not 
provide us with a picture of what indoctrination looks like. 
Thus, I contend that none of the accounts offered in the literature 
clearly indicate what it looks like to indoctrinate nor do they offer a clear 
account of how we can avoid indoctrination. Moreover, none of the 
conceptions developed thus far allow us to hold schools accountable for 
indoctrination which, I argue, is necessary. In this next section I show that 
prior conceptions of indoctrination enable us to hold only individual 
teachers accountable and that such conceptions fail to account for 
some endeavors that we would want to call indoctrination. 
Prior work on indoctrination has focused exclusively on the 
individual teacher. This is true of both the analytic work done primarily in 
the 1970s and early 1980s as well as of more recent work such as that of 
Michael Hand (2003) and Michael S. Merry (2005). Each conception 
developed thus far attempts to show how the particular teaching 
methods, content offered, intentions, and instructional consequences of 
an individual teacher are indoctrinary. What a teacher does or intends to 
do, in other words, is the focus of inquiry about indoctrination. There 
appears to be an assumption here that an individual teacher is entirely 
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responsible for what she does in her classroom and the school bears no 
responsibility for what she does. This seems an odd position to take, 
particularly in this era of increasing standardization where teachers have 
diminishing opportunities to exercise agency. In fact, even back in 1973, 
Kazepides asserted that "teachers who work in an indoctrinary education 
system cannot avoid indoctrinating their students" (Kazepides, 1973: 279). 
Although Kazepides does not explain what he means by an "indoctrinary 
educational system," he seems to presume that if a school's objectives 
are the "training of workers in Socialist consciousness and culture" 
(Kazepides, 1973: 279), for example, teachers of that school cannot help 
but indoctrinate. 
It is not at all certain that teachers who work in a school that has as 
its stated objective the indoctrination of standards have no choice but to 
indoctrinate. We do generally allow that, even within a fairly strict system, 
there is room for individual agency with respect to one's own teaching. 
Yet, the nature of schooling is such that it is a complex, multilayer 
institution and there are many influential factors that affect instructional 
goals and achievements. It seems reasonable to hold teachers in more 
strictly controlled educational institutions less accountable than teachers 
in more liberal, progressive schools. Teaching, after all, does not occur in 
a vacuum. The policies and procedures enacted by the school, the 
ideology held by the community and the larger society, the curriculum 
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decided upon by the school district, and the pedagogical philosophy of 
other teachers in the district all influence what goes on inside individual 
classrooms. If, for example, students are trained to sit in rows, speak only 
when spoken to, and uncritically accept as true all that their teachers 
profess in class, it would be unreasonable to expect that an individual 
teacher within that school will have students who are active and 
energetic participants in the learning process, committed to and adept at 
critically deliberating over the epistemological worth of the beliefs 
discussed in class. Conversely, it would be difficult for a more 
authoritarian teacher to get her students to accept all that she teaches 
as unquestionably true if she is in a school dedicated to developing 
critically minded autonomous thinkers. The context, in other words, in 
which a teacher operates, plays a significant role in the sort of learning 
environment a teacher can create in her classroom. 
Additionally, a school as a whole can promote a particular 
ideology or worldview. Antony Flew, for example, asserts that 
indoctrination occurs when libraries and classrooms are inspected to 
"ensure the removal of all publications which do not reflect the ideology" 
(Flew, 1972: 71) adopted by the school. We could add here that when an 
entire school, including the administration, faculty and staff, and the 
structures, policies and procedures that result from their efforts, all work to 
inculcate a particular ideology, it seems reasonable to hold the entire 
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school accountable for indoctrination rather than any given individual 
teacher. 
When I speak of holding schools accountable, I do not mean 
holding all individual persons who work in schools accountable. Rather, I 
am speaking of holding the school as an institution accountable. There 
are some obvious difficulties and complexities involved in attempting to 
hold institutions morally accountable, and these will be addressed in 
detail in chapter seven. For now, it is sufficient to raise the question of 
whether a definition of indoctrination that holds only individual teachers 
accountable for indoctrinating students adequately covers all instances 
that the term "indoctrination" typically covers, or that we need it to 
usefully cover. Because there are times when a teacher's agency is 
restricted by the policies and structural elements of the school, it seems 
reasonable to look at the school rather than any given teacher as the 
indoctrinator. 
To summarize, I have argued that prior conceptions of 
indoctrination meet the first definitional criterion of developing 
conceptions that do not radically alter from ordinary usage. In addition, I 
show that, with the exception of intentional analyses of indoctrination, 
considered accounts do not meet the second criterion of developing a 
conception that does not reduce "indoctrination" to something else. The 
third criterion -that indoctrination in education within pluralistic 
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democratic societies is shown to be objectionable even when it occurs in 
pursuit of admirable ends -is met to a certain extent inasmuch as many of 
the analyses, if not all of them, construe indoctrination as jeopardizing 
students' ability to reason and take this to be a harm not easily overridden 
by other "worthy" goals we might use indoctrination to pursue. However, I 
have argued that definitions of indoctrination characterized in terms of 
rationality leave unanswered too many questions about what it means to 
hold beliefs rationally, but more significantly, such definitions also fail to 
maintain a strictly pejorative sense of "indoctrination" for persons who do 
not subscribe to a pluralistic, liberal democratic ideology. The fourth 
criterion is not met because the definitions offered fail to provide a clear 
characterization of indoctrination and an explanation of how we can 
avoid it. Moreover, prior conceptions focus exclusively on holding 
individual teachers accountable and do not seem to seriously consider 
the possibility of assigning responsibility for indoctrination to schools. Thus, I 
conclude that previous analyses of indoctrination are inadequate to the 
task of providing us with a sufficiently clear conception of indoctrination 
to assist us in understanding and assessing the charge of indoctrination 
raised to innovative curricular proposals and in particular to proposals for 
peace education. A new definition of indoctrination is needed if we are 
to meet the objective of developing a conception that enables us to 
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better identify indoctrination with consistency and address charges of 
indoctrination as well as develop educational programs that avoid it. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEFENDING AN INTENTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INDOCTRINATION 
In this chapter I argue for an intentional analysis of indoctrination. 
The argument for an intentional analysis primarily rests on three assertions: 
(1) Indoctrination is something which causes significant harm to students 
which makes it morally suspect and therefore should be of moral concern; 
(2) To hold one morally accountable for indoctrination it must be the 
case that the indoctrination occurred intentionally; (3) There are serious 
problems with defining indoctrination in terms of method, content, and 
consequences and, therefore, conceptions that rely on such criteria are 
inadequate to the purposes set out in this dissertation. These assertions 
are thoroughly addressed in chapters two and three where it was argued 
that analyses of indoctrination in terms of methods, content, and 
consequences failed to provide a conception of indoctrination that 
meets the described purposes of identifying and leveling the charge of 
indoctrination, making clear what can count as an appropriate response 
to the charge, and what is required to avoid indoctrination in teaching. 
What follows is a critical look at Snook's (1972) intentional analysis as 
it offers the most promising conception of indoctrination in meeting the 
described purposes. In particular, I examine his notion of "intent" and 
argue that by expanding on this notion, we can develop an intentional 
analysis that provides a clearer characterization of indoctrination. In 
short, I argue that the alternative intentional analysis is better able to meet 
the purposes set forth in this work. 
Snook's Notion of Intent 
According to Snook (1972a, b), a teacher intends to get students to 
hold beliefs regardless of the evidence if either one of the two following 
conditions are met: (1) one desires that students hold propositions 
regardless of the evidence, or (2) one foresees that as a result of his or her 
teaching, students will hold beliefs regardless of the evidence. While we 
often think of an intended outcome as that which one desires or 
consciously hopes will occur, Snook argues that a desired outcome is only 
one of two ways that a person can intend something to occur. He 
suggests that in some circumstances, notably ones in which we are 
concerned with moral or legal accountability, even if one does not desire 
a particular outcome but does foresee that it will occur as a result of one's 
actions, we can say that the outcomes were intended. 
Snook (1972a) argues that there is legal precedence for including 
the foreseen as well as the desired in defining intent. If a prisoner blasts 
down a wall with the desire to escape, for example, but foresees that as a 
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result of blasting down the wall a guard will die, that prisoner will be found 
guilty of murdering the guard. Snook notes that on the legal definition of 
murder, one cannot be found guilty of murder unless it is shown that one 
acted with criminal intent or the intention to unjustifiably take another's 
life. The prisoner, in this example, is guilty of murder, according to Snook, 
because he foresaw that his actions would result in the guard's death; 
therefore the prisoner intended the guard's death. 
One problem with this example is that the prisoner is guilty of murder 
regardless of his intentions. When one causes the death of another while 
committing a felony, one can legally be charged with murder. This 
prisoner would be guilty of murder even if he did not foresee (that is, 
intend) the death of the guard, because blasting down the wall of a 
prison is a felony. While this particular example is not the best to 
demonstrate that the law makes no distinctions between the foreseen 
and the desired in establishing intent, Snook's claim that one's intention is 
determined by either what one desires or foresees is still valid for the 
contexts we have in mind, namely, contexts in which we want to hold 
someone morally accountable for what we regard as morally dubious 
activity or morally bad outcomes. 
According to Revised Statute 626:2 General Requirements of 
Culpability (1986), criminal law no longer uses the word "intent" to 
determine a criminal's guilt. Current legal practice is to use the notion 
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"culpable mental states." To accurately determine whether or not one 
has committed a crime, juries are given instructions about what 
constitutes a culpable mental state as outlined by the aforementioned 
statute. Juries are told that a person ought to be held criminally culpable 
if one or more of the following conditions are met. 
1. "Purposely." A person engages in an act with the purpose or desire to 
produce a particular criminal outcome. 
2. "Knowingly." A person engages in an act knowing or having foreseen 
what the particular criminal outcome will be. 
3. "Recklessly." A person engages in an act knowing and disregarding 
what the particular criminal outcome will be. 
4. "Negligently." A person engages in an act and fails to be aware of the 
substantial risk that the act will produce a particular criminal outcome 
when a reasonable person would have foreseen such an outcome. 
According to the statute, Snook's contention appears to be 
validated that the law includes both the foreseen and the desired in the 
notion of intent. Although the word "intent" is no longer used, it is 
reasonable to assume that a "culpable mental state" is akin to intent. 
Similarly, the condition of acting "purposely" is akin to acting with a 
certain desired outcome. And, acting "knowingly" is akin to acting with a 
particular foreseen outcome. 
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The statute indicates that a person is not guilty of committing a 
crime unless he or she physically engages in a criminal act and either 
desires the criminal outcome, foresees the outcome, or fails to see the 
outcome that a reasonable person would have foreseen. According to 
the law then, the desired, the foreseen, and the foreseeable all play a 
vital role in determining intent or a "culpable state of mind." Before 
examining the role of the foreseeable however, I wish to stay with Snook's 
notion and look at the role that the desired and the foreseen play in more 
ordinary, everyday instances, as well as cases of moral concern, rather 
than just cases of a primarily legal or criminal nature. Once Snook's notion 
of "intent" is clarified, I bring in examples from education to illustrate how 
we can understand the role of intent in indoctrination. 
In his discussion of the role of the foreseen in determining intent. 
Snook (1972a) describes an example of a man who uses an International 
Business Machines (IBM) typewriter. The man's desire is to type, yet he 
does foresee that his typing will help IBM's profits. Snook claims that it 
would seem "odd" to say that the man intends to increase IBM's profit. I 
agree. However, Snook points out that when the act being committed 
has results that are of moral concern, we do talk of one intending such 
results if they are foreseen. He offers an example of a pacifist who 
foresees that her support of a particular company will aid in the 
manufacturing of weapons. Although she may only desire to buy 
127 
products that are affordable and convenient, we would typically hold her 
morally accountable (at least to some degree) for contributing to the 
manufacturing of weaponry. 
Perhaps it would be helpful at this point to look more closely at an 
example where moral culpability is of primary concern. Snook asks if there 
is a moral rather than merely a legal distinction between what is desired 
and what is foreseen. Let us look at an example of a person who shoots 
and kills someone but neither desires nor foresees that someone will be 
shot as a result (perhaps he or she is cleaning a gun alone in the room 
and someone sneaks in). Snook, it would seem, would not find the person 
morally blameworthy because that person did not intend such an 
outcome. Here, I think, Snook's claim that intention be defined in terms of 
the desired and the foreseen is justified. If the person did foresee that the 
actions would result in killing someone (perhaps he or she saw the person 
entering the room but did not care) then it seems reasonable to say that 
the outcome was intended and that blame may be assigned. This 
example supports Snook's contention that we define "intent" as that 
which is either desired or foreseen as it allows us to hold the person in the 
above example morally accountable for the death of the person shot 
because the other's death could be foreseen as an outcome of cleaning 
the gun. 
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For Snook, then, one intends certain outcomes when one either 
desires them or foresees that they will occur as a result of one's actions. 
Because I view indoctrination as a morally suspect activity and its 
outcomes as morally bad, I am interested (as is Snook) in defining 
indoctrination in a way that we can hold persons morally accountable for 
indoctrination. Thus, adopting an intentional analysis makes sense. It is not 
reasonable to hold persons accountable for morally suspect activities and 
results that they did not intend. Snook, however, also asserts that, while 
we should include the foreseen consequences as part of our notion of 
intent, we should not include consequences that are merely foreseeab/e. 
He argues that defining "intent" as outcomes that are not foreseen but 
only foreseeable would be to render teachers' jobs impossible. Because it 
is virtually always foreseeable that some students will come to hold beliefs 
one teaches as true regardless of the evidence, according to Snook all 
teaching would be indoctrination if we insist that intent be defined by 
what is foreseeable. Thus, Snook argues that intent should only be defined 
in terms of the desired and the foreseen but not the foreseeable. 
The distinction Snook makes between the foreseen and the 
foreseeable, I argue, is problematic. Granted there is a distinction, but it is 
far less significant than Snook would have us believe. The foreseen is 
something accomplished whereas the foreseeable expresses a potential, 
not necessarily something someone has done. While all things foreseen 
129 
are by definition foreseeable, not all things foreseeable are foreseen — 
hence the distinction. However, all it would take to make the foreseeable 
into the foreseen is to simply make teachers aware that their teaching will 
inevitably result in some students holding taught beliefs as true regardless 
of the evidence. This foreseeable consequence then becomes foreseen. 
And, if it is foreseen, Snook would have such a consequence be 
considered intentional, rendering all teaching (from those teachers who 
have been made aware) indoctrination. Yet Snook does not consider all 
foreseen outcomes as outcomes that were intended. Rather he states 
that intended outcomes are those that one foresees "as a result of... 
[one's] teaching" (Snook, 1972a: 155) yet he drops this very critical phrase 
when discussing the foreseeable. 
An Alternative Notion of Intent Offered and Defended 
I argue that we ought to include the foreseeable in the notion of 
intent. Although Snook claims that it would render all teaching 
indoctrination, I disagree. I do not see that students will inevitably accept 
some beliefs they are taught as unquestionably true as a result of the 
teaching. While I agree with Snook that some students will inevitably 
accept some taught beliefs as true regardless of the evidence, I do not 
agree that they will do so because of something their teacher did or said. 
Students hold non-rational beliefs for a whole variety of reasons (for 
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instance, it is part ot a religious belief system, because they want to fit in 
with peers, and so on). We ought only to hold teachers accountable for 
indoctrination if it is foreseeable that students would hold beliefs in a non-
rational manner as a result of their teacher's actions. 
This notion of intent seems in keeping with how the word is typically 
used. For example, if person A cleans a loaded gun in a crowded cafe 
and the gun goes off and shoots someone, we would ordinarily hold A 
morally responsible for the shooting even if the shooter did not desire that 
anyone get shot and did not foresee that anyone would get shot. We 
would hold that person accountable because he or she ought to have 
foreseen that the gun would go off and hit someone. In fact, as stated 
above in the legal statute, person A would be held legally accountable 
by virtue of the "negligent" condition of a culpable state of mind. Person 
A would have failed to recognize foreseeable risk. 
A similar standard should be applied to the moral culpability of 
teachers. Let us say, for example, that a particular teacher did not 
foresee that, as a result of insisting to his or her seven year-old students 
that Betsy Ross sewed the first U.S. flag, the students would uncritically 
accept such a claim as true. We hold the teacher accountable for 
indoctrination because that teacher ought to have known that the 
students would respond in such a way. Teachers should know that their 
students will accept what they teach them as true; it is part of students' 
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training in schools to believe what they are told by their teachers 
(particularly young students). Thus, to avoid indoctrination, teachers 
should be careful to explain to their students that historical stories such as 
that about Betsy Ross are not always true and therefore students should 
not hold such a belief as a certainty (or, in the case with older students, 
instruct them to critically assess the relevant and available evidence and 
reasons of the beliefs discussed in class as far as they are capable of 
doing). If teachers take these steps to avoid indoctrination, then it seems 
reasonable to assume that students will not accept taught beliefs as true 
uncritically because of something their teacher did. In other words, if a 
teacher takes all reasonably possible measures to avoid indoctrination, it 
is not foreseeable that students will hold taught beliefs non-rationally as a 
result of something the teacher did. Some students, of course, will likely 
hold some taught beliefs in a non-rational, non-deliberative manner. 
However, knowing that some of one's students will hold beliefs non-
rationally is not the same thing as knowing they will do so because of 
one's teaching. If we include foreseeable outcomes as part of what we 
mean by intent we do not, as Snook suggests, render all teaching 
indoctrination. Rather, we insist that teachers take reasonable steps to 
ensure that their students will hold beliefs in an open-minded or critically 
deliberative manner. If teachers act in such a way, then a reasonable 
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person could not foresee that students will come to hold beliefs non-
rationally as a result of their teacher's actions. 
Thus far I have tried to show that Snook's objection to including 
foreseeable consequences as part of the definition of intent is 
unwarranted. Furthermore, I have attempted to show that we typically 
hold persons morally accountable for outcomes they ought to have 
foreseen. Finally, I have argued that there is legal precedent in defining 
indoctrination in terms of desired, foreseen, or foreseeable outcomes. I 
contend that this alternative conception of "intent," unlike Snook's, 
provides a definition of indoctrination that allows persons to effectively 
identify and avoid indoctrination and to accurately level and respond to 
charges of indoctrination. 
Defining indoctrination as Snook does, in terms of outcomes which 
are either desired or foreseen but not foreseeable, does not allow us to 
accurately identify indoctrination. We cannot know with any degree of 
certainty what another person desires or foresees. Although one could 
ask a teacher what he or she desired or foresaw, he or she could lie to us 
or deceive him or herself and be unable to give a truthful reply. Snook 
admits that it may, in fact, be quite difficult to accurately judge another's 
intention. Yet he claims that such a difficulty should not affect our 
conception. He states: "It is one thing to determine what constitutes ... 
[indoctrination], another to show that a certain person committed it" 
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(Snook, 1972a: 159-160). For my purposes, however, a definition of 
indoctrination must enable persons to show precisely when and where 
indoctrination occurs and who should be held accountable. Snook 
himself claims that the key reason for defining indoctrination in terms of 
intention is to allow persons to be held morally accountable for 
indoctrination. He does not indicate, however, how we can hold 
someone accountable if we cannot accurately identify who 
indoctrinates. 
We can determine who indoctrinates if we include the foreseeable 
as part of the notion of "intent." While we cannot know what another 
desires or foresees, we can know what is foreseeable. To illustrate, I refer 
again to the example of the teacher insisting to first grade students that 
Betsy Ross sewed the first American flag. A teacher may not desire or 
even foresee that students will hold this belief non-rationally (this 
information may be a required element of the curriculum). However, 
because students, particularly very young ones, are likely to accept as 
unquestionably true what their teacher tells them, it is foreseeable that the 
students will hold the belief non-rationally. Thus, we can accurately 
identify this as a case of indoctrination. We may not be able to identify 
this as a case of indoctrination, however, if "intent" was only defined in 
terms of the desired or foreseen, because we cannot accurately judge 
whether the teacher desired or foresaw that her teaching would lead to 
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her students accepting unquestionably that Ross sewed the first American 
flag. Defining "intent" in terms of not only the desired and the foreseen 
but also the foreseeable allows us to identify with consistency when 
indoctrination occurs. 
Adding the foreseeable to the notion of intent, then, meets my 
purpose of developing a definition of indoctrination that allows: (1) 
persons to accurately identify indoctrination when it occurs, (2) persons to 
respond effectively to a charge of indoctrination, and (3) educators to 
develop programs that avoid indoctrination. Thus, peace educators and 
educators of other marginalized curricula (such as queer studies and 
women's studies), as well as educators of mainstream curriculum, can be 
judged more accurately about whether they do or do not indoctrinate. 
In addition, all educators can respond to a charge of indoctrination more 
effectively. I therefore conclude that this expanded notion of intent is an 
improvement upon Snook's notion as it provides us with a more useful tool 
in accurately judging when indoctrination does and does not occur. My 
hope is that this alternative notion of intent will provide an understanding 
of indoctrination that will allow educational administrators and teachers 
to be more confident in taking on the teaching of topics they know to be 
controversial. 
My intentional conception of indoctrination also differs from Snook's 
in another very important way. Snook (1972a, 1972b) claims that 
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indoctrination is a matter of intending to get students to hold beliefs 
regardless of the evidence. The problem with this definition is that it is not 
clear what it means to hold beliefs in such a manner. In other words. 
Snook's "regardless of the evidence" is fraught with as many problems 
and ambiguities as the notion of holding beliefs "non-rationally." Paul T. 
O'Leary (1979) points out that it is unclear what "regardless of the 
evidence" means as it can be understood in either of two ways: "(1) 
believing or doubting without evidence, or (2) believing or doubting 
despite the evidence" (O'Leary, 1972: 297). He goes on to say that each 
of these interpretations can be understood in either of two ways. He 
explains as follows: 
(1) S believes or doubts that p without evidence 
(a)S believes or doubts that p for no reasons at all 
(b)S believes or doubts that p for certain reasons although 
there are no good reasons for believing or doubting that 
P 
(2) S believes or doubts that p despite the evidence 
(a)There are good reasons for doubting whatS believes 
and believing what S doubts 
(b)S believes or doubts that p for bad reasons although 
there are good reasons for believing or doubting that p. 
(O'Leary, 1972:297) 
To say that indoctrination consists of intending to teach students to hold 
beliefs "regardless of the evidence" does not clearly indicate how 
educators expect or should expect students to hold the beliefs they are 
taught in schools. It is not clear on Snook's analysis whether one 
indoctrinates if she intends to get students to hold p based on insufficient 
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reasons, on irrelevant or bad reasons, or on considerations other than 
reasons even when there are good reasons for believing p. 
A useful conception of indoctrination needs to better address this 
ambiguity about what precisely it is that we are trying to avoid with 
indoctrination. Put another way, a useful account of indoctrination must 
clearly indicate what the outcome of indoctrination is or what, exactly, its 
intended effects are on students. In the next chapter I offer an alternative 
analysis of indoctrination that addresses this ambiguity and, I believe, 
provides us with a more practically useful conception of indoctrination. 
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CHAPTER V 
AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF INDOCTRINATION OFFERED 
My conception of indoctrination, as indicated in the previous 
chapter, is defined in terms of intention. Although it borrows a good deal 
from Snook's (1972a, 1972b) language, the conception I offer has some 
important and significant differences from that analysis. Snook claims that 
indoctrination is best defined in the following way: "A person indoctrinates 
P (a proposition or set of propositions) if he teaches with the intention that 
the pupil or pupils believe P regardless of the evidence" (Snook, 1972a: 
154). I adopt his general way of wording the definition but make some 
significant alterations. 
My definition of indoctrination is as follows: A teacher indoctrinates 
p (where p is a belief or set of beliefs) when s/he intends to get students to 
hold p in a non-truth-seeking manner. Embedded in this definition are two 
key concepts. The first concept, a teacher's intention, has already been 
examined in the previous chapter. The second concept, the idea of 
holding a belief in a "non-truth-seeking" manner, which replaces Snook's 
phrase "regardless of the evidence," also requires explication. In the 
section that immediately follows, therefore, I discuss this alternative 
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wording. I proceed by first defending the use of Cheryl Misak's pragmatic 
epistemological framework which underwrites the notion of truth-seeking 
employed here. I then raise and address some of the perceived issues 
that need further analysis to meet the purposes given in this work. I end 
this section by clearly stating what it means to hold beliefs in a truth-
seeking manner. 
Rationale for Adopting a Misakian Pragmatic Framework 
One of our primary concerns with indoctrination, I contend, is that 
when students are indoctrinated they will come to hold p (a belief or set 
of beliefs) in such a way that they are unwilling or perhaps, in varying 
degrees, even unable to engage in any future inquiry with respect to p. 
When new evidence arises, for example, or recalcitrant experiences 
come about, students who have been indoctrinated into believing p are 
not likely to be moved to question or doubt p because of this new 
evidence or these contrary experiences. What we want, that is, those of 
us who engage in public education within a pluralistic democratic 
society, that is, an education which is designed to produce citizens who 
can adopt the political responsibilities of life in such a society, is for 
students to hold p in a manner where they will be ever willing and able to 
critically assess its epistemic worth by scrutinizing all available evidence. 
We don't simply want students to believe p because of what we can all 
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agree at the time are relevant reasons. We also want students to 
question p, and perhaps also its supporting reasons, when new evidence 
and arguments arise. 
On Misak's (2000, 2004) analysis, p does not refer to all beliefs. 
Rather, they only refer to what Misak calls "truth-apt" beliefs. According 
to Misak (2000,2004) "truth-apt" beliefs are those which are "constitutively 
responsive to experience;" (Misak, 2000: 51), i.e. the beliefs are such that 
experience and evidence can speak to their truth. I will have more to say 
about this at the end of the chapter when I provide further clarifications of 
my analysis. For now, however, it is enough to note that truth-apt beliefs 
exclude those for which no relevant evidence exists. Inquiry into such 
assertions would not move us any closer to understanding their epistemic 
worth and thus, according to Misak, they are not truth-apt. 
Prior accounts of indoctrination assume that students who hold p in 
a manner where they are not open to future inquiry regarding p must be 
holding p "non-rationally." Harvey Siegel (1988) and Thomas F. Green 
(1972), for example, each contend that an indoctrinated belief p is one 
held in a manner where it is resistant to change or reconsideration in the 
face of any future counter-evidence. Green, for example, asserts that an 
indoctrinator aims to get students to hold p in such a way that it is "secure 
against the threat of change by the later introduction of conflicting 
reasons or conflicting evidence" (Green, 1972: 35). He points out that 
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indoctrinators try to lead students to hold p as if evidentially - that is, 
indoctrinators provide reasons for p yet they also aim to get students to 
disregard any opposing evidence to p or be incapable of engaging in 
any future inquiry regarding the truth of p. 
Siegel argues that one indoctrinates when she intends to get 
students to hold p in a manner where it is "impervious to negative or 
contrary evidence" and where students have no "regard to ... [the] truth 
or justifiability" of p (Siegel, 1988:80). A belief held "non-rationally" or 
"non-evidentially," according to these accounts, is not just one held for no 
reasons or for irrelevant reasons; it is also one held for insufficient reasons. 
Indoctrination, then, according to Siegel and Green, aims to get students 
to foreclose on any future inquiry regarding the truth of p. 
I agree with these accounts of indoctrination - that it is best defined 
as the intention to get students to hold p in a manner where they are 
either incapable of or resistant to engaging in any future inquiry regarding 
the truth of p. Yet, I am not satisfied with calling this way of holding beliefs 
"non-evidential" or "non-rational." I object to these terms when used in 
regards to indoctrination for two reasons. 
The first reason is that there can be some confusion over what it 
means to hold a belief non-rationally or non-evidentially. For example, as 
discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation, Francis Shrag (2003) argued that 
the hypothetical student Thomas' belief in God is rational because it is 
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held for relevant reasons although it is not based on all available 
evidence. Similarly, in another example Shrag discusses, "Jack" decides 
that he will only apply to MIT and Harvard although he as been advised to • 
also apply to BU because his GPA may not be high enough to get into his 
first two choices. He does not agree to apply to BU and figures that he will 
pursue other paths if MIT or Harvard does not accept him. If he can't get 
into the top, most selective schools, he reasons, then it's not worth going 
for his advanced degree. According to Shrag, Jack's decision may be 
foolish, but it is, nevertheless, rational because "he has and can give 
reasons for what he is doing" (Shrag, 2003: 180). 
Both Thomas' and Jack's beliefs are rational according to Shrag 
because they are supported by reasons that each can provide. Shrag 
admits that he is not an epistemologist, and thus perhaps we cannot 
count on him for the best understanding of Siegel's and Green's notion of 
non-rationally held beliefs. On the other hand, modesty aside, he is an 
able and distinguished philosopher. Thus, given his view of what it means 
to hold beliefs rationally, it's not unreasonable to note that the notion of 
holding beliefs rationally can be understood to mean holding beliefs 
based on relevant but not necessarily sufficient reasons. Shrag does not 
say that these reasons must be relevant, true, or sufficient although his 
examples imply that they must be at least relevant but not necessarily 
sufficient. Neither Thomas nor Jack bases his views on a close and 
142 
thorough analysis of oil the relevant and available evidence and 
arguments. For Shrag, few students will spend the time necessary to 
examine all their beliefs so thoroughly and "failing to do so does not make 
students irrational" (Shrag, 2003: 181). Nor, we might add, does it make 
them non-rational. 
Shrag's examples do not in principle show Siegel's and Greens' 
analyses to be problematic. Yet, they do provide at least one example of 
how, in practice, the notion of holding beliefs non-evidentially or non-
rationally can be understood to mean beliefs held for relevant but not 
necessarily for sufficient reasons. It is not, therefore, that either Siegel or 
Green provide us with a notion of indoctrination that fails to address an 
important concern of indoctrination - that is, that it gets students to hold 
beliefs in a manner whereby they are unwilling or incapable of engaging 
in future inquiry regarding the truth of such beliefs. Rather, my concern 
with the use of the terms "non-rational" and "non-evidential" is that they 
do not make clear what our central concern is with indoctrination, 
namely, that indoctrination makes it far too unlikely that students will be 
ever open to inquiring into the truth of p. 
Although Shrag's notion of rationally held beliefs differs from 
Siegel's, he agrees with Siegel's as well as other considered accounts of 
indoctrination that the justification for rationality is that "beliefs formed 
rationally have the best chance of being true" (Shrag, 2003: 180). Green, 
143 
too, claims that indoctrination aims to get students to hold beliefs without 
"due regard for truth" (Green, 1972:34). Similarly, Thiessen (1993), as 
noted in chapter three, argues that the aim of rationality is to arrive at 
truth and indoctrination seeks to block this aim. Additionally, Glock 
contends that indoctrination jeopardizes students' ability to find truth 
(Glock, 1975: 156). Finally, as noted earlier, Siegel asserts that 
indoctrination involves getting students to hold beliefs in a way that they 
do not have any regard for their truth (Siegel, 1988: 80). Considering that 
one of the primary uses of rationality, according to these analyses, is to 
arrive at truth, and remembering that our concern with indoctrination is 
that students are rendered unwilling, reluctant or unable to engage in 
future inquiry regarding the truth of their beliefs, a more straightforward 
way to characterize indoctrination is as an endeavor that seeks to get 
students to hold truth-apt beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner. In short, 
describing indoctrinated beliefs as those held in a non-truth-seeking 
fashion makes clearer that such beliefs are held without regard to their 
truth. 
While considered analyses agree that the aim of rationality is to 
arrive at truth, my second objection to defining indoctrinated beliefs as 
those held "non-rationally" is that none of these accounts provide an 
adequately clear notion of "truth." It is not clear that getting students to 
hold beliefs non-rationally jeopardizes them from formulating true beliefs if 
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we do not first have a good understanding of just what true beliefs are 
and therefore how to arrive at or formulate them. Thiessen (1993), in fact, 
claims that we cannot know what truth is. He argues that the best we 
can hope to achieve is "normal rationality," or holding beliefs based on 
the best available evidence at the time and with the openness to always 
reconsider our beliefs in the face of new and opposing reasons and 
evidence. However, we need some account of why "normal rationality" 
should be a valued concept. Thiessen (along with other considered 
accounts) has a couple of options. He can argue that rationality is good 
in and of itself, which seems difficult to do - why, we continue to ask, 
should we be rational? Alternatively, Thiessen could argue that rationality 
is good because it is the best and most efficient method to get at the 
truth (which is precisely what is being argued). But then we need some 
reason for thinking so, and we need some account of the truth. So, for 
example, if Thiessen holds a correspondence notion of truth, he must show 
that rationality is the most promising avenue to achieving truth rather 
than, say, meditation, prayer or intuition. However, in his account, we see 
no such justification. 
Misak's epistemological framework offers us such a justification. She 
defines truth in terms of inquiry, in terms of the method employed to reach 
truth. Her notion of truth provides the justification for rationality because, 
on Misak's account, there is no gap between the method used to employ 
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truth and truth itself. Employing her theoretical framework allows us to 
develop an analysis of indoctrination that is intimately connected to truth-
seeking. Adopting herepistemology, then, allows us to define 
indoctrination in terms of truth-seeking because she provides a lucid and 
useful notion of truth. 
Additionally, and very much to the point, Misak (2000, 2004) offers 
an account of truth-seeking that can provide practical guidance for 
teachers who aim to get students to hold beliefs in a truth-seeking 
manner. More specifically, I argue that Misak's pragmatic analysis of truth 
provides a reasonable and useful framework in which to effectively guide 
teachers in avoiding indoctrination and in helping educators and others 
engage in fruitful and generative discussions about when and where 
indoctrination may be occurring. In the section that follows, I provide an 
analysis of Misak's account of truth and truth-seeking inquiry. My aim here 
is to illustrate that her analysis is promising with respect to the very 
practical thing we are seeking, viz helping educators and others identify 
and eliminate indoctrination in our schools. 
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Misak's Notion of Truth and Truth-Seeking Inquiry 
According to Cheryl Misak, a true belief is one "that could not be 
improved upon, a belief that would forever meet the challenges of 
reasons, argument, and evidence" (Misak, 2000:49). Misak is careful to 
point out the use of the subjunctive conditional in her pragmatic notion of 
truth. She states that truth is a belief that would forever fit with all 
experiences and arguments rather than one that will fit will all experiences 
and arguments. The use of the word "would" is important because it 
indicates that truth is conditional or contingent upon inquiry. Put another 
way, if inquiry about a belief p were to be pursued as far as it could 
usefully go, p would be true if it is sensitive to experience and is supported 
by all available arguments and evidence. The use of the conditional 
indicates that truth arrives at the hypothetical end of inquiry. Her notion 
of truth, we see, underscores Peirce's dictum: "Let nothing stand in the 
way of inquiry." In other words, all "truth-apt" beliefs (i.e., those which are 
inherently responsive to experience) on this account are required to be 
forever subject to questioning, re-examination and alteration in the face 
of new evidence and recalcitrant experience. Defining truth in the 
subjunctive conditional means that true beliefs are those that, by their 
definition, are ever open to inquiry. 
Because on this account we cannot ever know if our beliefs would 
meet with all evidence at the hypothetical end of the day, Misak argues 
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that we should not tocus on whether "this or that belief is true but focus 
[instead] on inquiry" (Misak, 2000: 53). For Misak, truth is "internally related 
to inquiry" such that "when I assert p, I undertake commitments regarding 
inquiry" (Misak, 2000: 73). This link between truth and inquiry is critical. To 
claim that the truth of an assertion cannot exist without inquiry is to make 
very specific demands on, not only the manner in which truth can be 
found, but on the very nature of truth itself. For Misak, making an assertion 
entails first, making a truth claim and second, making commitments to 
providing evidence and arguments in support of the claim. 
When one makes assertions, according to Misak, one is claiming 
that the assertion is true. To use her example, when I say, "Marta is 
generous," I am saying that it is true that Marta is generous. My assertion, 
then, according to Misak, is a truth claim. She points out that even if I 
choose to lie, I would have no hope of deceiving others unless the 
assumption on the part of my listeners is that assertions are claims about 
what one believes to be true. (Misak, 2000: 60) If I say that Marta is 
generous, I assert that she is generous and I commit myself to providing 
evidence for this claim and considering evidence against it (e.g., Marta 
gives a good deal to charities, friends and family, she never expects 
anything in return for her gifts, etc.). 
When we inquire about a claim, we aim to arrive at beliefs that are 
supported by all available evidence and are sensitive to the experiences 
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of ourselves and others. Additionally, when we ask a question, we assume 
that there is an answer, one which we suppose will be the best it can be 
given the available evidence and arguments. As Misak puts it, our inquiry 
is "regulated" by truth; that is, the manner and aim of inquiry is to get at 
beliefs that would be supported by all relevant experience at the end of 
the day. Truth is, she says, a regulative ideal. 
Misak explains that a "regulative ideal" is quite distinct from, say, a 
blueprint. She notes that a blueprint is realizable whereas a regulative 
ideal is not. The purpose of a regulative ideal, then, is not" to realize fully 
that which is outlined in the ideal. Rather it is to "set direction and provide 
a focus of criticism for actual arrangements" (Misak, 2000: 98). Thus, for 
Misak, truth is the light which helps illuminate the manner and direction in 
which all inquiry should move even while knowing one can never reach 
that light. Put another way, formulating true beliefs requires that we be 
sensitive to experience such that when a belief is supported by available 
evidence and reasons by a community of inquirers, such a belief should 
prevail. When it meets with recalcitrant experiences, the belief should be 
questioned, dropped or exchanged for an alternative belief that is better 
supported by all the evidence. 
Before we can fully comprehend this particular pragmatic notion of 
"truth" developed by Misak, we need to discuss her view of "experience" 
because, for pragmatists, experience plays a central role in the concept 
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of truth. According to the pragmatic notion advanced by Misak, truth 
derives from the continual testing and refinement of beliefs through 
experience. For Misak, experience includes that which we find 
"compelling, surprising, brute, unchosen, or impinging" (Misak, 2000:80). 
She contends that an experience is anything that makes an impression on 
our senses, our thoughts, and our feelings. Many experiences, she 
explains, are not rational or even cognitive. When my body touches a hot 
stove, for example, I experience burning heat without having to think 
about or even understand heat. I need some level of understanding to 
know that the sensation I experienced is colled heat and to know what 
effect that heat can have on my body, but to actually perceive or 
experience the heat, thought is not required. 
Misak notes that experiences can move us to either affirm or 
question our beliefs; it is the nature of experiences that we are moved by 
them. To develop true beliefs we must allow them to be affected by 
experience. We have a myriad of ideas in our minds and experience can 
have the effect of casting out the false ones and "letting the truth flow 
on" (Peirce, 1997/1903: 144). Yet, not all persons are equally sensitive to 
experience. Some persons are more likely than others to pay attention to, 
reflect on, and cognitively engage with a wide range of experiences. 
Such persons are, in a sense, open to being "surprised" by experiences 
which do not fit with their beliefs and are, therefore, quite likely to be 
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moved by these experiences to question or perhaps even alter their 
beliefs. Others, however, are not as receptive. They are more apt to shut 
out, ignore, or immediately discount experiences which do not support of 
fit with their beliefs. For example, if a person believes that all poems 
rhyme and he reads a book of poems, many of which do not rhyme, he 
may discount the non-rhyming poems and tell himself that they are some 
other form of writing and refuse to think on it any further. Similarly, a 
person who believes that the U.S. was justified in declaring war in Iraq in 
2003 because Saddam Hussein held weapons of mass destruction may 
hold firmly to her belief despite learning that there were never any such 
weapons found in Iraq. 
Being sensitive to experience, then, is not a given. In other words, 
persons are not necessarily going to be moved by their experiences to 
reflect on or question their beliefs. However, to seek true beliefs, on 
Misak's account, persons must work toward becoming more open and 
receptive to experiences, to ponder them and allow them to move us to 
question or even change our beliefs. Indeed, being sensitive to 
experiences is being open to allowing our experiences and the 
experiences of others to influence our reflections on and our thinking 
about our beliefs. To reiterate then, a true belief, according to this 
account, is one that would be supported by all relevant evidence and 
would not be opposed by recalcitrant experiences at the end of inquiry. 
151 
Because the end of inquiry is unrealizable, Misak claims that our task 
is to develop beliefs which are well grounded by available evidence and 
are sensitive to all our experiences to date. According to Misak, the "fact 
that [on this account] there can be no proof that any belief is absolutely 
true is something to be taken for granted and should not cause anxiety" 
(Misak, 2004: 51). Thus, although we may not have absolute certainty 
about a belief, practically speaking, there are some beliefs about which 
we can be "substantially certain" (Misak, 2004: 54). If a belief is supported 
by all available evidence, experiences and reasons, and we can 
reasonably assume it will continue to do so, we can be "substantially 
certain" that such a belief is true. In other words, our practical goal or the 
goal which we can achieve in our lifetime is to arrive at "the settlement of 
belief" (Misak, 2004: 57). 
For Misak, the "settlement of belief" means arriving at beliefs about 
which we have no doubt and which are based on critical reflections of 
the available evidence, experiences, and arguments by a community of 
inquiry. Settled beliefs, however, are not necessarily true beliefs. In other 
words, just because one does not doubt that a belief p is true does not 
mean that p, in fact, is true. In addition, it is important to note the 
distinction between "settled" beliefs which are based on deliberation over 
all available evidence, and beliefs which one does not doubt due to 
brainwashing, indoctrination, or a stubborn and closed-minded 
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adherence to a belief. Misak illustrates her point with an example of a 
totalitarian regime that successfully fixes a set of beliefs in their citizens. 
Such beliefs, she argues, would not be pragmatically settled because 
they are not "sensitive to evidence or experience, broadly construed" 
(Misak, 2004: 59). A stubborn commitment to a belief, or a belief formed 
from a restricted pool of reasons and evidence and one that is not 
sensitive to experience cannot be a settled belief (and, therefore, can not 
be true) in the pragmatic sense. Furthermore, while belief p may be 
settled for me, others may not consider it settled because they have 
doubts about the truth of p. 
Inquiry into the truth of p requires that we openly consider opposing 
views and counter arguments. Even if persons continue to dispute p -
that is, no agreement has been reached regarding the truth of p - it does 
not mean that some person cannot or should not consider it settled. For 
example, I do not harbor any doubts that women are of equal worth to 
men even though there are many persons who doubt the truth of such a 
belief. My belief, however, is settled because I have considered the 
opposing arguments and found them to be unconvincing. Settled beliefs, 
then, are not the same as beliefs universally accepted. In addition, they 
are not true in the Misakian pragmatic sense. Yet, we aim for settled 
beliefs because that is the way toward truth and it is the best we can 
hope to achieve in our lifetimes. 
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Many of us have a good number of settled beliefs. I believe that I 
am alive, that I love my children, that the world is round, and that my 
living room walls are green. I also believe that pornography is oppressive 
and that women are equal in worth to men. These beliefs are settled. 
They are supported by the available evidence and I do not harbor any 
doubts about these beliefs nor do I anticipate that evidence or 
experiences will cause me to question them. Thus, for all intents and 
purposes, I consider these beliefs to be true. However, just because I have 
beliefs which I do not doubt does not mean that I could not doubt them 
or would not doubt them if new and opposing evidence should arise. 
The important point to take from Misak's notion of truth is that when 
we make a truth-apt assertion, we recognize our responsibility to support 
the claim with evidence and reasons. Thus, in schools, when students 
make truth-apt assertions, they learn of their responsibility to be able to 
support their claims with evidence, reasons, and arguments and to be 
open to counter evidence arising from the experiences of others. 
Similarly, when others make assertions, students learn to question the truth 
of these assertions by considering the available evidence both in support 
of and in opposition to them. Putting such responsibility on students may 
seem unrealistic as time does not allow for the ongoing process of 
dialogic and critical inquiry into all truth-apt assertions raised in class. It is 
important to note, however, that there is a definite distinction between 
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being willing, open to and able to question and analyze truth-apt views 
and being required to always do so. 
Although students cannot possibly thoroughly analyze and discuss 
all truth-apt assertions raised in class, Misak's epistemological framework 
only requires that persons be prepared to defend their beliefs with reasons 
and evidence and be ever open to questioning these beliefs in the face 
of opposing arguments and evidence. Her analysis, in short, requires not 
only that students hold beliefs in a manner where the beliefs are 
supported by reasons and evidence but that students be ever willing and 
able to engage in future inquiry with a community of inquirers regarding 
the truth of their beliefs when they are truth-apt. 
It seems, then, that adopting a Misakian framework addresses one 
of the central concerns we have about indoctrination: it is an endeavor 
which seeks to get students to stubbornly hold beliefs based on insufficient 
evidence. Further, Misak's framework puts truth-seeking at the center of 
our focus in helping teachers (who accept the importance of a 
democratic exchange of ideas in pursuit of true beliefs) reflect on and 
understand what their aims are and what the likely outcomes will be of 
their efforts. By making truth the aim of inquiry, and defining truth in terms 
of the method employed to achieve this aim, we teach students that their 
goal is to work toward beliefs that would forever meet the challenge of 
evidence, reasons, arguments, and experience at the hypothetical end 
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of the day. Defining truth in this way discourages teachers from instructing 
their students to uncritically accept beliefs as true and to discount or be 
closed to future inquiry regarding those beliefs. 
Some Further Reflections on Misak's Work as it Relates to Issues of 
Indoctrination 
There are two critical issues regarding Misak's analysis that need 
further scrutiny. The first is whether there are any claims that can be 
excluded from inquiry and the second is whether there are any persons or 
perspectives that can be excluded. Put another way, it is important to 
look at precisely what counts as "truth-apt" beliefs and just who it is that 
belongs in the "community of inquiry." These issues have epistemological 
importance. Given how truth is defined here, we need to determine if 
there are any kinds of claims which can be excluded from inquiry of the 
sort we have described. Moreover, given that our notion of truth urges us 
to be ever wary of bias, we must pay attention to how a community of 
inquiry can be a source of bias in the process of truth-seeking inquiry. 
Truth-seeking, as defined in this dissertation, is characterized by an open-
minded assessment of any given belief based on a critical appraisal of all 
relevant and available evidence. What is not clear, however, is whether 
we must subject all beliefs and assertions, in principle, to such scrutiny to 
avoid indoctrination. In what immediately follows, I examine what 
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constitutes truth-aptness by looking at whether there are any claims that 
are not truth-apt or do not require students to inquire into their truth such 
as, for example, claims considered a priori true and those generally 
understood to be true by definition. I then raise an important relevant 
moral issue. I look at whether there are any truth-apt claims which, by the 
nature of the content of the claim, raise questions about whether they 
ought to be discussed in class. For example, should the following claims 
be discussed in our classrooms: Women are equal to men; A democratic 
style of governance is worth fighting for, and; The Nazi-led Holocaust truly 
did occur. Determining which claims we ought to open for student 
discussion, then, not only requires that we decide what counts as a "truth-
apt" belief, it also urges us to reflect on the moral concern of what sorts of 
beliefs (even if we agree they are truth-apt) ought to be open to inquiry. 
In short, are there moral considerations which could and perhaps should 
restrict our guidance of student inquiry in schools? 
Following the section of truth-apt beliefs, I more closely examine the 
notion of a "community of inquiry." The concern here is that excluding 
persons from a community of inquiry may unduly limit and narrow our 
conversations about and understandings of the issue at hand. The chief 
epistemological questions thus engaged in what follows are: "Are there 
any beliefs we should not treat as truth apt?" And "Can the community 
of inquiry itself be a source of bias?" 
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Truth-Apt Beliefs and Assertions 
Misak calls an assertion "truth-apt" when it is inherently responsive to 
experience. For Misak, virtually all claims are, to some degree, reliant 
upon experience. Yet, there are some claims Misak herself argues which 
should not be considered truth-apt. An example she gives of a claim that 
is not truth-apt is: "[M]y colour spectrum might be inverted from yours" 
(Misak, 2000: 51). Because there cannot be any experience which can 
speak for or against this claim, inquiry into its truth "would be misplaced" 
(Misak, 2000: 52). The role of experience and evidence is paramount in 
Misak's notion of truth-apt beliefs. Thus, if no experience can shed light on 
the truth of a claim or if no evidence exists that is relevant to a particular 
assertion, inquiry into such claims would be fruitless and these sorts of 
claims and assertions are therefore, according to Misak, not truth-apt. 
There are some claims that may arguably be considered true prior 
to experience and therefore experience, one may argue, plays no role in 
determining their truth. Consider the following assertion: If A is greater 
than B and B is greater than C, then we know that it is true that A is 
greater than C. Such an assertion, some say, is true prior to experience; its 
truth is dependent simply upon the meaning of "greater than" and, thus, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that its truth is not responsive to 
experience. For Misak, to make the point absolutely clear, truth-apt 
propositions are those with respect to which experience can speak either 
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for or against its truth. Claims that are a priori true and those that are true 
by definition would seem not to be truth-apt because there does not exist 
any relevant evidence and inquiry into its truth would be fruitless. Yet, 
Misak argues that claims which appear to be a priori true, such as the one 
about A being greater than C, do, in fact, rely upon experience to 
support them even if it is just experience of a diagrammatic nature. To 
understand why 2 + 2 = 4, for example, we would need to see some sort of 
visual representation (or, diagram) illustrating that when two 2s come 
together, their sum is 4. Additionally, experience within a diagrammatic 
context is needed to understand the relational nature of the term 
"greater than" so we can know that A is greater than C given that it is 
greater than B and B is greater than C. 
As further proof of the necessity for diagrammatic experience in 
helping students understand the truth of claims that are considered 
logically true, below are two examples of logical argument forms of 
affirming the consequence which are not as easy for students to 
understand as the claim about A being greater than B and C. Many of 
my students do see the error in the following fairly simple argument: 
If all grandfathers are men, and 
John is a man, then 
John is a grandfather. 
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They do not. however, all see the (logical) error in the following: 
If all good citizens follow the dictates of their government, and 
Jill follows the dictates of her government, then 
Jill is a good citizen. 
It's possible that my students see the error in the former argument 
because their experience informs them that not all men are grandfathers. 
In the latter argument, however, they have to be shown diagrammatically 
why the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises (putting 
aside the dispute about the truth of the initial claim about all good citizens 
following the dictates of their government). Claims that are considered 
true prior to experience, then, such as mathematical assertions, claims 
considered true by definition, and logical deductions, according to Misak, 
are truth-apt because experience, even if it is diagrammatic in nature, 
informs them of the truth or falsity of such claims. 
I adopt Misak's notion of "truth-apt" here because it is useful for the 
purposes of this dissertation: to develop a conception of indoctrination 
that helps educators identify it when it occurs and aids educators in their 
attempts to develop programs that avoid it. Claiming that mathematical 
assertions, even those considered a priori true, are truth-apt reinforces my 
argument in chapter 3 that students can be indoctrinated into the math 
tables; they can, in other words, be taught to hold the belief that 2 + 3 = 5 
without understanding the concept of addition. This does not often 
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happen, however, as most students are taught the addition tables along 
with the concept of addition. Yet, the alternative notion of indoctrination 
I propose supports the view that even logical claims such as 
mathematical statements ought to be taught "mindfully" as Ellen Longer 
puts it. (Teaching "mindfully," we remember, means keeping students 
aware that there are or may be alternative solutions to the one they hold 
or the one being taught.) Teaching mathematics mindfully prepares 
students with the understandings necessary to diagrammatically support 
the claim that three times two is six and defend such a claim with 
evidence against someone who comes along and tells them that three 2s 
is not 6 but, in fact, 7. 
Let us consider an example of how students sometimes need 
diagrammatic evidence and a mindful approach to help them 
understand a mathematical assertion. A teacher is trying to instruct her 
class of simple addition. She asks her class what the answer is to 1 + 1. A 
little girl confidently answers " 1 . " The teacher, being somewhat 
thoughtful, instead of simply telling her that the answer is wrong asks her 
why she thinks the answer is 1. The girl replies: "One bale of hay added to 
another bale of hay equals one (big) bale of hay." In the little girl's 
experience, 1 + 1 is not always 2. Thus, for the teacher in this case to 
demonstrate that, mathematically, 1 + 1 = 2 , she would need to show her 
students diagrammatically why this assertion is correct. 
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In addition to math statements, it is important for our purposes here 
to define such assertions as A being greater than C as truth-apt because 
doing so encourages teachers to help their students learn such assertions 
mindfully. Students need to learn that in order for this kind of assertion to 
be true, there must be a very specific and consistently used meaning of 
the term "greater than." It is not accurate to say that A is "greater than" 
B, meaning A takes up more physical space than B, and B is "greater 
than" C because B is taller than C, therefore A is greater than C in terms of 
either physical space or height. When constructing and understanding 
assertions that are true by definition, students need to learn how to attend 
to the central concept being used, which in this case is "greater than." By 
examining these types of statements mindfully, students have the 
opportunity to learn how to be precise in their use of language. It also 
aids them in their understandings of such claims, helps students to 
challenge them effectively and to construct them accurately. Students 
do not simply accept the argument that because A is greater than B and 
B is greater than C, therefore A is greater than C with respect to 
everything. Rather, they believe it to be true based on the available 
evidence. 
Defining all assertions as truth-apt for which experience (even 
diagrammatic experience) can speak for or against them helps teachers 
avoid indoctrination by making it clear that it is to the point to help 
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students adopt a critically deliberative view toward the truth of the beliefs 
and statements made in class. Students will not simply accept a given 
belief or claim as true if they are taught that it is always appropriate to 
inquire about what makes the belief true and what evidence and 
experiences could speak against it. Thus, even such assertions as 
mathematical statements and claims that are considered by many to be 
true by definition should be considered as truth-apt, not just so students 
are able and willing to re-asses their truth if counter evidence should arise, 
but it is also important that students hold such assertions in a manner 
whereby they have an understanding of why they are considered true. In 
short, teaching students to hold all beliefs to which experience can speak 
in a truth-seeking manner helps avoid indoctrination as it equips students 
to formulate beliefs based on evidentiary grounds rather than because of 
other forces of persuasion, rhetoric, propaganda, and demagoguery. 
Thus we see how our epistemological investigations bring us to the 
view that (a) all truth-apt assertions (i.e., all assertions that are 
constitutively responsive to experience), if they are to be true or known to 
be true, must be open to inquiry and therefore (b) it is always appropriate 
to inquire about what experience leads us to think an assertion is true and 
what evidence and experiences could speak against it. From my 
discussion, it has also become evident that, following Misak and Peirce, I 
regard as truth-apt many sorts of assertions that others might not (e.g., a 
163 
priori claims and statements that are true by definition). Following Misak 
(2000), I also regard moral assertions as truth-apt. So, for example, I 
regard the moral claims "Abortion is wrong" and "All persons are equal" 
as truth-apt. According to Misak, a "moral belief and assertion, like any 
other, must be responsive to experience and to reasons" (Misak, 2000: 
102). When persons make moral claims, they mean to have such claims 
taken seriously by others because they believe them to be true and have 
reasons for believing so. The truth of their moral beliefs, then, can be 
deliberated on by considering the relevant reasons, evidence and 
experience upon which they are based. Misak states that "if you want to 
have your beliefs governed by reasons, then you will have to expose 
yourself to different reasons, different perspectives, different arguments. 
You will have to engage in debate and deliberation" (Misak, 2000: 106). 
Thus, moral assertions must be held to standards of inquiry similar to those 
to which we old other types of assertions. 
Misak (2000) admits that moral claims, unlike some other sorts of 
claims, may not allow, even in principle, for persons to come to some kind 
of agreement over them. She claims that, like other questions, some 
moral questions may have more than one right answer. (Misak, 2000: 136) 
Yet, she argues that irreconcilable differences and ongoing 
disagreements does not mean that we should not continue to seek out 
beliefs that are better and better able to stand up to all experience and 
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evidence at the end of inquiry. Granted, one person's experiences are 
unique and no two persons share the very same perspectives, feelings, 
and sensitivities to a given situation or incident. While it is true, Misak says, 
that I cannot get inside another to experience something completely 
from the other's perspective, there is enough that I can understand 
about, say, your experiences to be able to "talk about them, interpret 
what you say or write about them, and learn something about what it is 
that you feel" (Misak, 2000: 134). One person's experiences are not so 
alien to another that one cannot relate to nor have any understanding of 
what the other has experienced. 
I take moral claims to be truth-apt because, as Misak argues, they 
are claims to which our experiences can speak and upon which we gain 
valuable insights by hearing from others whose experiences are similar 
enough that they shed light on our own understandings, thoughts, and 
feelings. We may never come to any consensus on such assertions as 
"War is an unjust and immoral way to achieve peace." We may agree 
that there are different right answers given different circumstances or we 
may never come to any agreement on this view regarding the morality of 
war. Regardless of our disagreements, however, I take Misak's position 
that moral assertions, like all other truth-apt assertions discussed thus far, 
are inherently sensitive and responsive to experience and, like these other 
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sorts of assertions, moral claims ought to be open to inquiry regarding their 
truth. 
Taking moral assertions to be truth-apt, as well as assertions that are 
considered by many to be a priori true and true by definition, means that I 
take a much wider range of assertions to be truth-apt than is sometimes 
conventionally acknowledged. And this brings me to a central issue that 
arises in almost all discussions of indoctrination: Are there some truth-apt 
assertions that ought not to be questioned or inquired about? Some 
moral statements in particular, for moral reasons, it is"often thought ought 
to be out of bounds for inquiry. It is frequently argued that some, often 
moral, assertions are so (morally) important for students to accep t as true 
that it is unethical to have students inquire into their truth because of the 
harm such inquiry risks. Different sorts of harm are envisioned. Sometimes 
it is harm to the student engaged in the inquiry because they may not, in 
the end , believe what is true about what is morally right. Sometimes, it is 
harm to others, both those engaged in the inquiry and those not 
engaged in the inquiry that are of concern. So, I turn our attention to a 
test case of this sort, a case that for me severely tests the analysis of 
indoctrination underwritten by the epistemological framework I employ. 
Let us consider, for example, allowing students to discuss the claim 
that women are equally worthy to men. Such an assertion carries with it 
the assumption that men's worth is unquestioned and women must prove 
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their worth. This puts women in the position of having to defend their 
worth as persons, and this can cause undue harm to women or girls as it 
legitimizes putting their worth into question. Such discussions can make it 
seem that the following similar kinds of claims: "Whites are superior to 
blacks," and "Those who engage in gay or lesbian sex are immoral" are, 
in fact, possibly true and are legitimately debatable positions. Yet, many 
say, the truth of such claims is not debatable and should not be up for 
discussion. In short, there is great concern for students who are forced to 
sit in a classroom where their worth as human beings is up for debate. 
It may be argued, however, that if we don't allow such questions to 
be raised or discussed in our classrooms then we will have lost a valuable 
opportunity for such sexist, racist, homophobic and otherwise oppressive 
views to be systematically, rationally, and thoughtfully challenged. To put 
if more crudely: Unless we provide space for such claims to be critiqued 
in the light of rational inquiry, there is little hope such beliefs will be 
alterable even when there is adequate evidence against them. Although 
the thought of persons holding such views which question the worth of 
persons is repugnant to many, they are views that, unfortunately, millions 
of persons hold as true. Refusing to allow students to voice their doubts 
about, say, the equality of women, may teach them that such doubts are 
unwanted and undesirable. It does not, however, teach them that the 
views leading to their doubts can and ought to be questioned or, even 
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more, can and perhaps ought to be altered. Airing oppressive beliefs in 
the open space of the classroom where they are subject to rational 
scrutiny may help diminish oppressive beliefs that are held in a close-
minded way. 
It may be further argued that we could begin descent down a 
slippery slope if we allow teachers to forbid any discussion of questions 
that challenge a person's worth. It is not clear what such questions may 
look like. The best example, to take some conventional instances in this 
culture, is when students directly ask whether, say, women are truly equal 
to men, or blacks to whites, etc. Such questions appear to directly attack 
the worth of a group of persons. Yet, what of questions that challenge 
persons' religious or political beliefs, their music tastes and their sports 
affiliations? It is a common enough feeling for persons to hold such beliefs 
in a way that questioning the beliefs is experienced as questioning their 
worth as persons. 
Richard Paul (1994) asserts that holding beliefs as "part of one's 
identity" is characterized by the holding of beliefs in a manner where any 
challenge to the beliefs is experienced as a challenge to the worth of the 
person who holds them. He distinguishes three ways that persons can 
hold their beliefs; they can hold them "loosely," "firmly," or "as part of their 
identity." To hold a belief loosely, according to Paul, is to have very little 
reason for one's belief or to have barely reflected at all on the truth of 
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said belief. A loosely held belief, then, is one easily altered or readily 
questioned. Holding a belief firmly, on the other hand, is to hold it based 
on a good deal of thought and consideration of the available evidence 
and arguments both for and against it. A firmly held belief is not easily 
overturned, yet it can be questioned and even altered in the face of new 
and opposing evidence. Finally, beliefs held as part of one's identity are 
held much more firmly. When one holds a belief as part of his identity, he 
defines, at least in part, who he is by this belief. Such beliefs are quite 
resistant to change and, when and if they do change, their alteration 
results in altering the identity of the person in some significant way. For 
example, if a person holds the belief that war is immoral as part of her 
identity, she would, in a sense, become a different person if she started to 
believe otherwise. Undoubtedly the person herself believes this too. 
Paul (2003) claims that a critical thinker is not characterized by the 
beliefs she holds but rather by how she holds her beliefs. For Paul, to 
achieve what he calls "rational confidence" in our beliefs (2003), we must 
be ever open to re-assessing the epistemic worth of our beliefs from 
various perspectives and worldviews and in light of all available evidence 
and arguments. Indeed, he recommends that we seek out and consider 
the best objection to our view. Like Peirce, Paul seems to advocate that 
nothing should stand in the way of inquiry; that all our beliefs, he claims, 
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should be held in a manner where they are subject to inquiry, particularly 
if new evidence presents itself. 
The point here is not to argue for Paul's notion of critical thinking. 
Rather, it is to use his characterization of holding beliefs as part of one's 
identity to suggest that it may not always be clear what sorts of questions 
will challenge a person's worth. Different persons hold different kinds of 
views as part of their identity. Some persons are very committed to their 
particular political, religious and moral beliefs and some are quite 
attached to their views regarding the best baseball or hockey team, or 
the best school. If we tell teachers that they should not allow students to 
engage in classroom conversations that put into question a person's 
worth, we run the risk of teachers disallowing any discussion about moral, 
religious and political beliefs, but also any other beliefs the students hold 
as part of their identity. 
The slippery slope problem, however, may not be as troublesome as 
it first appears. There seems to be an important distinction between 
questions about, say, women's equality to men and assertions about 
whether this or that team is superior, whether a particular decision by the 
U.S. government is justifiable, and whether God is or is not omnipotent. 
The former question regarding the equality of women risks violating the 
conditions of inquiry within a participatory democracy, the framework 
assumed in this dissertation, whereas the latter questions do not. Within 
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the framework of participatory democracy, at least the version (s) of it I 
would want to defend, we are committed to bringing in and valuing 
perspectives from marginalized groups as well as from dominant groups. 
If we allow students to question whether or not women are of equal worth 
to men, we may be allowing students to consider that the male voices 
and perspectives in the room ought to be given more weight than the 
views and arguments offered by the females in class. Such questions in 
themselves could be taken as a legitimization of the structural oppression 
of women by privileging the patriarchal view that women are subordinate 
to men and therefore they must prove their worth if they wish to be 
considered a man's equal and so, perhaps, have any or an equal say in 
inquiry about the matter. 
Although we do not ensure that girls' views will be valued equally to 
boys' by prohibiting questions concerning women's worth to be raised in 
schools because, as liberal democratic and critical theorists argue, 
schools often mirror structural inequalities found in society that unfairly 
privilege male over female voices (Fletcher, 2000:50-57), nevertheless, 
allowing such questions to be raised in class would appear to further 
entrench this unjust privileging. In short, if we encourage or even consent 
to having our students question women's worth, we may help perpetuate 
the unjust silencing of women's voices and thus help to maintain their 
oppression in schools and society. 
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By examining the context in which inquiry occurs we see that 
allowing students to pose the question ot females' worth relative to males' 
risks entrenching an inequality that already works to keep women from 
participating fully in the process of inquiry. Yet, questioning one's beliefs 
about sports, say, or other beliefs one holds as "part of one's identity" 
does not necessarily violate the conditions of inquiry because there are 
no structural inequalities that mirror one's own privately and individually 
constructed identity. Even if a particular belief is held as part of one's 
identity, the belief does not necessarily violate the conditions of inquiry 
because of these structural issues. There is a distinction, then, between 
claims that speak to existent structural inequalities from those that do not. 
This distinction is important because it could be argued that students 
should not be allowed to inquire into the former type of claim but they 
should be encouraged to inquire into the latter type. 
On the other hand, taking questions about a person's worth out of 
the domain of school discussions does not permit sexist, racist, 
homophobic, and otherwise prejudiced views to be challenged. What is 
needed, it seems, is a way to allow students to engage in inquiry about, 
say, sex equality, without putting women in the position of having to 
defend their worth as human beings. It may be helpful to note at this 
point that the question "Are women equal in worth to men" presupposes 
that men's worth is unquestioned but women's worth is very much up for 
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debate. Asking "Are women and men equal?" however, does not make 
any such presuppositions. If we permit students to talk about sexism, 
gender oppression, and the worth of persons, we do not necessarily put 
women's worth into question. Indeed, women's studies courses engage 
students in such conversations every day. Inquiring into beliefs about 
men's superiority over women, if done skillfully, does not have to cause 
the further entrenchment of women's oppression. Educators must be sure 
to set up class discussion in such a way that students can deliberate over 
the equality between women and men without starting from the 
assumption that women's worth is up for debate. In any dialectic inquiry 
about sex equality, teachers need to ensure that their female students' 
contributions are considered as valuable as the contributions made by 
the male students. The skillful handling of classroom conversations about 
equality (whether it be sex, race, etc.), then, does not unduly jeopardize 
the value and worth of any student's contributions to the class discussion. 
Thus, truth-apt questions about equality and other contextually sensitive 
matters may be discussed in schools without harm of the sort feared if 
done mindfully and skillfully. 
To summarize: In this section I have argued that students should be 
taught to inquire into all truth-apt claims. In accordance with Misak, I 
understand truth-apt assertions to include any statement to which 
experience can speak. Thus, claims such as: "Mr. Gladstone sneezed 10 
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times in 1867," and "My color spectrum is a direct inversion of yours" are 
not truth-apt because no evidence exists that can speak for or against 
either of them. Further, I have argued that all beliefs ought to be open to 
inquiry, including the belief that all beliefs ought to be open to inquiry. 
Even statements that deal with issues of equality and the worth of 
humans, about which some democratic educators may have doubts, 
can be dealt with skillfully to ensure that no student is unjustly excluded 
from full participation. Thus they too, in principle, must be allowed to be 
part of the inquiry process in our schools. 
Allowing inquiry into all truth-apt assertions clearly communicates to 
students that true beliefs are those which lie at the hypothetical end of 
inquiry and that to seek the truth of a given belief, students must be 
taught to engage in critical inquiry about that belief. Refusing to allow 
students to discuss particular assertions implies that such assertions cannot 
be reasoned about and implies that there may be some infallible source 
of truth somehow beyond them which can easily be thought to be the 
text, the teacher, or the state, probably whoever has the power to insist 
on them learning such beliefs as truths. It risks undermining students' 
capacities to engage in open-minded and critically deliberative inquiry 
about all truth-apt beliefs. Thus, although there are some issues that need 
to be handled with great skill and care, to cultivate the sort of truth-
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seeking habits of mind discussed here, students should be permitted and 
even encouraged to be open to inquiry into all truth-apt beliefs. 
Community of Inquiry: Who Belongs and Whom Can We Exclude? 
Remembering that our concern here is in helping educators avoid 
indoctrination within a pluralistic, democratic society, we have 
considered how excluding certain types of claims from classroom 
discussions can jeopardize truth-seeking inquiry. I have argued that 
teachers risk indoctrination by deciding for their students which claims 
they ought to question and deliberate over and which ones they ought to 
accept as true without question. One way in which teachers can do this 
is by excluding certain assertions and beliefs from student scrutiny, by 
teaching certain beliefs as if they are irrefutably true and not permitting 
students to discuss them in class. Another way to prevent the truth of 
particular beliefs from being challenged is to limit the persons who 
participate in a given inquiry. 
As stated at the beginning of this section, we need to not only look 
at whaf ought to be included in truth-seeking inquiry; we must also look at 
who we ought to include in our inquiry of true beliefs. Because the 
question of who belongs in such a community is epistemologically 
important, in this section I examine more closely Misak's notion of a 
"community of inquiry." Given how truth is defined here, we must 
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ascertain how the community of inquiry itself may be a source of bias. 
More specifically, in regards to indoctrination, gaining clarity on who 
belongs in the "community of inquiry" helps us decide who, if anyone, 
can be excluded justifiably from a given discourse, excluded that is 
without running a serious risk of indoctrination. 
If we can see that keeping certain persons, perspectives, or views 
out of a conversation may jeopardize students' capacity to hold a given 
belief or set of beliefs in a truth-seeking manner, we can see that such 
exclusions run the risk of indoctrinating our students. Consider a teacher 
who disallows or discourages his students from looking at arguments 
made by advocates of non-violence regarding the justifiability and 
efficacy of the U.S. invading Iraq in 2003. This teacher impairs his students' 
abilities to engage in the sort of inquiry that critically examines all relevant 
evidence, arguments, and reasons. Similarly, if a teacher does not allow 
students to consider the views of supporters for the Iraqi war, she impedes 
her students from engaging in truth-seeing inquiry. 
Misak clearly argues that true beliefs cannot be arrived at by an 
individual sitting alone in a room. She states that a true belief "is more 
than belief which an individual finds that she cannot doubt." A true 
belief is a "belief which the community of inquirers, at the hypothetical 
end of the day, would find that they cannot doubt" (Misak, 2004:81, 
italics mine). Defining truth as a belief which would be found consistent 
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with the evidence by a community of inquirers instead of by an individual, 
it seems, allows for an individual's personal biases, prejudices, and limited 
perspectives to be, respectively, challenged and broadened. Also, if 
truth were simply defined as beliefs each individual would find confirmed 
at the end of her or his inquiry, one person's "truth" may be different from 
another's because each person's experiences are unique. In other words, 
while person A may undergo recalcitrant experiences to belief p, person B 
may not, thereby leading person B to accept p as true and person A to 
reject p. 
Defining truth as beliefs that would meet with all experiences, 
evidence, and reasons found by a community of inquirers indicates that 
no one person's or one group of persons' experiences, perspectives, 
assumptions, and biases will have a ruling influence on the direction and 
results of inquiry or at least not in principle. The concern with teaching 
students that true beliefs can be arrived at through their own individual 
and sole efforts is that it does not encourage them enough to test their 
own biases, narrow and contextually constrained assumptions, and 
erroneous conclusions against other perspectives, arguments, and 
evidence of which they may be unaware. Misak's notion of truth, then, is 
not subjective or relative even though it is based on experiences, reasons, 
and evidence of persons who are fallible and who come from particular 
backgrounds and have particular psychologies. Misak's notion of true 
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belief is objective in that truth lies at the hypothetical end of inquiry of a 
community of inquirers who bring to the table oil relevant experiences, 
evidence, reasons, and arguments. 
Because Misak says next to nothing about who belongs in a 
community of inquiry, it is important for our purposes here to be clear on 
what sort of community is needed to avoid indoctrination, particularly in 
contexts like schools which closely govern or regulate the community of 
inquiry and set its terms and purposes. Limiting who can be part of an 
inquiry may unduly limit what evidence is made available for 
consideration. If we only include experts as part of the community of 
inquiry, as is suggested by Maughn Rollins Gregory(2002), the question 
arises as to how we can determine who qualifies as an expert. 
Gregory (2002) claims that an expert in a given field or discipline is 
someone deemed by practitioners in that field to be knowledgeable and 
adept in the particular accepted procedures of inquiry. Thus, according 
to Gregory, the community of inquiry regarding an historical question 
consists of all persons versant in and relatively adept in the procedures of 
inquiry adopted by historians. An historical claim is subject to scrutiny from 
historians and must answer criticisms raised regarding rules of evidence 
and procedures of inquiry that are accepted and practiced by historians. 
The historical claim that wars have gotten increasingly destructive in the 
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last one hundred years, for example, must answer any criticisms and 
questions posed by other historians. 
What is not entirely clear from Gregory's analysis is whether anyone 
outside of the field of history can be considered an expert and thus should 
be included in the community of inquiry. To use the example from above 
about wars' increasing destructiveness, it seems that we ought to also 
include views from, say, philosophers who take up the issue of what, 
precisely, constitutes "destructiveness." Perhaps, then, the question about 
wars' increasing destructiveness should be open to "experts" not just from 
the discipline of history but from various fields. Yet, Gregory has not made 
it clear how we determine which disciplines can contribute meaningfully 
to a particular inquiry. Moreover, it would seem that there are times when 
persons who are not experts should be included in the inquiry process. 
Soldiers and victims of war, for example, may have something meaningful 
to say about this issue even though I doubt they would be considered 
"experts" as Gregory has defined it. 
Gregory does not fully address the limitations of this notion of a 
community of inquiry. Yet, he does admit that there are problems with his 
analysis, particularly when applied to a classroom setting. There, he 
claims, a community of inquiry operates with the teacher as 
representative of the expert community who acts as facilitator for students 
constructing understandings, meanings and hypothesis through 
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experimentation, consultation, and dialogue with experts (e.g., teachers 
and texts), and an active exchange of ideas with peers. The difficulty, as 
Gregory points out, is that outside the classroom, inquiry with an expert 
from a community of inquiry does not have a pre-determined end. That 
is, when a question is posed or a discussion takes place about a particular 
subject within a field of discourse, the process of inquiry is open-ended 
and any conclusions that may be reached are not known before they are 
reached. In schools, on the other hand, "the intent of pedagogy is to 
initiate students into knowledge, skills, and dispositions that are 
substantially predetermined by the practitioners of the disciplines and by 
society at large" (Gregory, 2002: 400). Thus, the teacher must, in a sense, 
construct students' experience of inquiry by directing their process and 
correcting any errors they make in their practice of inquiry. The 
community of inquiry within classrooms, according to Gregory, is not one 
in which students engage in the sort of truth-seeking dialogue and 
research that leads to unknown answers. Yet, Gregory argues, engaging 
in lines of inquiry adopted by the various academic disciplines taught in 
schools is important for the following reasons: 
(1) The knowledge acquired in a given field is valuable and should not 
be ignored; 
(2) Students will see the usefulness and meaning of the knowledge 
acquired; 
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(3) The standards of inquiry must be learned so they can be used and 
preserved; and 
(4) Students must be part of a discipline-in order to participate in it, 
benefit from its knowledge, and challenge its findings and even its 
standards of inquiry. 
While reason (2) runs the risk of coercing students to accept a body of 
knowledge without learning how to challenge any of the information and 
claims contained within that body of knowledge, and reason (4) runs the 
risk of coercing students to conform to an accepted set of norms and 
practices within a given discipline, each is defensible if we agree that one 
needs to know enough of the knowledge, methods and procedures of 
the discipline to even challenge them usefully and effectively. 
Gregory also states that students should learn to be "critical 
consumers of knowledge in the discipline, so that, for example, as they 
learn history passed down from experts they would also learn to examine 
how the historical arguments were made and what the evidence was for 
a given interpretation" (Gregory, 2002: 405). He is not clear whether he 
wishes students to adopt a critical stance toward, say, historical claims 
from within the field of history or whether he is advocating that students 
engage in a sort meta-level analysis that requires they step outside the 
discipline so they may assess the worth of the methods used to arrive at 
particular assertions within the discipline. It seems that he only argues for 
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the former as he states that the role of the teacher is to guide students "to 
inquire, read, think, dialogue, and experiment their way into the funded 
knowledge of the discipline" (Gregory, 2002: 407). That is, Gregory argues 
that students should be taught to be good historians by critically 
scrutinizing historical claims and looking closely at the evidence and 
arguments given in support of such claims. 
While I agree with Gregory that students ought to be taught to see 
the importance and value of knowledge gained within a given field and 
they should be taught to understand and utilize accepted practices of 
inquiry for that field, we need to be sure that students are motivated and 
able to seek out and receive all available opposing views with an open 
mind, even those that come from outside the discipline. What worries me 
about limiting the community of inquiry to only those who are versant in a 
given subject is that teachers may not encourage or instruct students to 
investigate a broad range of perspectives and views on any given 
subject. They may, in other words, be satisfied with teaching students only 
one perspective of a controversial and debated issue. When studying the 
destructiveness of war, for example, teachers may only inform students of 
the views adopted and articulated by historians. They may never 
acquaint their students with the perspective of those who suffered as 
civilians in war, those who were soldiers, peace activists, and human rights 
workers. Teachers may not inform students of these alternative views nor 
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encourage them to even consider that there exists views that lie outside 
those of historians. 
We cannot expect teachers to have a full and complete 
understanding of every issue raised in class. Further, we cannot hold them 
to moral account for unwittingly narrowing the range of perspectives 
about a given issue that their students learn. However, if educators teach 
students to hold a particular view in such a way that they are closed to 
considering the truth of the view in the face of opposing evidence and 
alternative perspectives, then such teachers are, at the very least, at risk 
of indoctrinating their students. To avoid indoctrination, then, students 
should be instructed to hold oil beliefs in a way that they are open to 
considering the worth of counterviews and are able and eager to seek 
out all available evidence regarding such a belief. Thus, while I agree 
with Gregory that it is important for students to be taught to intelligently 
participate in the processes of inquiry within particular fields of expertise, I 
worry that limiting the community of inquiry to only those deemed 
"experts" within a given field will not encourage students to seek out and 
be receptive to arguments and evidence offered by persons outside a 
given discipline. 
According to Misak (2004), for a person to hold beliefs in a truth-
seeking manner, she must hold them open to the experiences of all 
persons. If she doesn't hold her beliefs in such a way, then she is not 
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genuinely interested in arriving at a belief which would not be met with 
any recalcitrant experiences at the end of inquiry. Aiming to get the right 
answer - the answer that we would not doubt at the hypothetical end of 
the day - means not excluding anyone's experiences that speaks to a 
given belief. (Misak, 2004:81) As Misak notes, "the open-endedness of 
inquiry and the commitment to taking other perspectives seriously must be 
preserved if we are to have any hope of reaching beliefs which really do 
account for all experiences and argument" (Misak, 2000: 97). She goes 
on to say that the standards of inquiry we employ are those that we find 
to be the most valuable at the present time. However, we must always 
be prepared to re-evaluate these standards when criticized, even by 
persons (or experts) outside the particular group or discipline. (Misak, 2000: 
21) 
But precisely who should be allowed to participate in the process of 
inquiry regarding a particular belief or set of beliefs? Do we include 
everyone, even persons who have no relevant information or who are 
severely cognitively challenged, or whom we know to be close-minded 
on the issue? If we are to accept Misak's analysis, the community of 
inquiry, it seems, must include any and all persons who have experiences 
that speak to the issue at hand. Yet, it is not clear how we determine 
whose experiences are relevant. 
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Harvey Siegel (1995, 1997) argues that, on epistemological grounds, 
we can justifiably exclude anyone from the community of inquiry who 
does not have anything "meaningful" to contribute. He argues that "[f]or 
some discourses, not everyone is qualified or competent to participate" 
(Siegel, 1995: 11). He uses examples of conversations about 
postmodernist theories and "the methodological details of an attempt to 
detect solar neutrinos" in which he claims his grandparents are 
unqualified to participate. Thus, Siegel argues, their lack of qualifications 
in these areas means that their exclusion from the conversation is an 
epistemologically "justified exclusion" (Siegel, 1995: 11). 
Kathryn Pauly Morgan (1995) challenges Siegel's claim that we can 
justifiably exclude persons from a given discussion on epistemological 
grounds. Morgan (1995), in her response to Siegel, questions his decision 
to exclude his grandparents from discussions about postmodernism. 
Morgan claims that before excluding them, she would like to hear what 
they have to say because, she points out, Siegel's grandparents may very 
well have valuable contributions to make in such a discussion. Siegel has 
not elucidated his reasons for predetermining that his grandparents would 
fail to offer anything meaningful. Settling on whom to exclude from a 
given discussion, according to Morgan, requires that someone makes 
such a determination and, as a result, the reasons for exclusion will be 
based on the epistemological framework adopted by that someone. Yet, 
185 
as Morgan points out, Siegel has not adequately justified his 
epistemological framework. Additionally, Morgan argues that Siegel has 
not made it sufficiently clear what the grounds for exclusion are. 
Ignoring or disregarding certain persons and their views without first 
considering the worth of these views risks excluding perspectives and 
beliefs that may meaningfully contribute to one's understanding of a 
given subject. For example, Sandra Harding (1991) argues that women 
have historically been excluded from scientific communities because it 
was predominantly believed by male scientists that women had little to 
nothing of importance to contribute. Siegel (1995) admits that we must 
be careful not to ignore perspectives that historically have been 
excluded. Truth-seeking inquiry, Siegel seems to agree, requires that 
students consider beliefs based on all relevant evidence including 
evidence from marginalized and largely ignored voices. 
Morgan (1995) points out, keeping persons from participating in a 
given inquiry may be a way of disregarding a particular set of beliefs. Yet 
Siegel (1995, 1997) argues that such exclusions can be justified by showing 
that certain persons do not possess the pertinent knowledge and/or 
adequate cognitive capacities necessary for meaningful participation. 
What he does not adequately explain, however, is how we can 
determine whether one's knowledge and/or cognitive capacities are 
inadequate. In other words, we need to decide on what grounds we can 
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decide that a person or group of persons does or does not possess 
relevant and sufficient knowledge and capacities for meaningful 
participation in a given discourse. We must be careful to clearly 
articulate our reasons for disregarding and ignoring certain groups and 
perspectives from the community of inquiry. 
In addition, we must decide if there are levels of participation that 
should be allowed. That is, we must settle on whether some people 
should be allowed to participate more fully than others. For example, in a 
discussion about what subjects a teacher should cover in her first grade 
class, we need to decide who is qualified to participate and at what level 
they are qualified to participate in such an inquiry. Although it is certainly 
true that the students are greatly affected by this discussion, first graders 
are not competent enough (i.e., they do not have the necessary 
information and reasoning capacities) to participate fully. While it may be 
very important to hear from them about the sorts of subjects they want to 
study and perhaps even learn from them what they have already studied, 
it is not likely that they would be able to have a meaningful conversation 
about cognitive development, learning styles, and educational theory, all 
of which could very well be part of such a discussion. The students could 
participate in this inquiry, then, to a certain degree, but not fully. 
Moreover, if a particular group does not possess the necessary 
information to be able to participate or participate fully in a discussion, 
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we need to decide whether they should be taught the necessary 
information. For example, if teachers of a particular school district do not 
have enough information about their school's budget to make wise 
financial decisions for the school, should they be provided such 
information? In other words, when is excluding persons because of their 
lack of requisite information and knowledge a case of justified exclusion? 
What may help address these questions of inclusion is remembering 
that teaching students to engage in truth-seeking inquiry serves two 
important educational goals. The first goal is to help students aim toward 
arriving at true beliefs. Siegel may or may not be correct in arguing that 
there are epistemologically justifiable grounds for excluding some persons 
from the process of a given inquiry. Yet, there is a second goal to truth-
seeking in an educational context that we must also consider. 
The second educational goal of inquiry is to develop in students the 
necessary capacities for engaging in such inquiry. Teaching students to 
hold beliefs in a truth-seeking manner means getting them to inquire into 
a multiplicity of views from a wide range of perspectives so they may 
acquire as broad an understanding of a given issue as is reasonably 
possible. To avoid indoctrination, students should be encouraged to seek 
out ideas and arguments that both support and oppose their beliefs so 
they may further refine their understandings and insights. As one cannot 
know the relevance of a particular contribution without first hearing it, 
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students should be taught to approach all evidence and beliefs with an 
open mind, setting aside or rejecting evidence only after examining its 
relevance as well as its other attributes of epistemic worthiness. 
Teaching students the process of truth-seeking inquiry requires that 
we develop in them the capacities to determine for themselves what 
evidence is relevant. If we discourage them from considering the views of 
groups x and y in regards to a certain belief, we risk teaching them to rely 
on those in positions of authority to decide for them what views are worth 
their consideration. If we teach students to limit their analysis of a given 
belief to only those perspectives deemed worthy by the established 
experts, students may not develop the necessary capacities for effectively 
challenging accepted ways of thinking and questioning mainstream 
norms, attitudes, and beliefs. In short, teaching students to hold beliefs in 
a truth-seeking manner requires that we teach and encourage them to 
welcome oil contributions to a given issue and reject those they deem 
irrelevant only after critically assessing their epistemic worth. 
Peirce's dictum, then, Let nothing stand in the way of inquiry, seems 
to offer a way out of this debate about who ought to be included in a 
community of inquiry. For every question asked or issue raised, the 
important thing to remember is not who should or should not be part of 
the inquiry process. Rather, in keeping within the pragmatic framework 
adopted in this dissertation, what is of key importance is that nothing, not 
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personal biases, predetermined inquiry guidelines, or even currently 
accepted standards of inquiry, should prevent the questioning of a 
particular claim or belief. If we are to develop students who hold beliefs in 
a truth-seeking manner, we need to teach them that the process of 
inquiry should not be hampered, constrained, narrowed, or prevented 
regarding any belief, assertion, or question one may have. 
A community of inquirers, then, if we are to stay within this Misakian 
framework, includes any and all persons who wish to participate in a 
given discourse. It also includes all persons whose views and experiences 
an inquirer seeks out in an attempt to gain a full and diverse 
understanding of the issue at hand. While it may certainly be the case 
that all views will not be meaningful or relevant and, as was argued 
earlier, some views must be handled skillfully so as not to cause anyone 
undue harm, no person, perspective, or group should be excluded from 
the community of inquiry prior to hearing the offered contribution. 
Summary 
Misak offers us one particular epistemology among many. I adopt 
her analysis of truth and her epistemological framework because it 
presents a clear and useful structure for articulating notions at the heart of 
the concept of indoctrination when it is taken as a pejorative notion. 
Moreover, as I have argued in this chapter and will further demonstrate in 
a later chapter, employing her framework affords us an account of 
indoctrination which is useful, one that has practical functionality: it can 
aid us in identifying indoctrination and assist us in developing educational 
methods that avoid it. 
The alternative definition defended here reads as follows: A 
teacher indoctrinates p when she intends to get students to hold p in a 
non-truth-seeking manner. In this analysis, p denotes any and all truth-apt 
claims, that is, any claim which is constitutively responsive to experience. 
Thus, assertions that are conventionally considered to be a priori true and 
those that are true by definition are included as truth-apt. Claims to 
which no evidence or experience can speak, on the other hand, such as 
"My color spectrum is different than yours," are not considered truth-apt 
on this analysis. Holding p in a non-truth-seeking manner occurs when 
students are discouraged from critically assessing all available evidence 
regarding p. This can occur when oppositional voices and views are 
excluded from students' scrutiny by narrowly delimiting the community 
within which the students are encouraged to inquire. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EXAMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SCHOOL CONTEXT IN IDENTIFYING 
AND AVOIDING INDOCTRINATION 
Indoctrination, as I have characterized it in this dissertation, involves 
teachers seeking to get their students to hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking 
manner. I have argued that a teacher's intention is revealed by what 
s/he desires, foresees, and/or ought to foresee as a likely outcome of 
her/his efforts. Yet, what remains to be understood is how teachers can 
better foresee the likely student outcomes of their educational endeavors. 
Prior analyses of indoctrination focused almost exclusively on the 
methods, intentions, and content taught by individual instructors. The 
assumption seemed to be that indoctrination can be identified by looking 
only at what occurs inside the walls of the classrooms. Such a narrow 
focus, however, is inadequate for meeting the purpose set forth here of 
helping educators foresee when their endeavors are likely to lead to 
students holding beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner. 
The issue of foreseeability is a multifaceted one. Indoctrination, like 
education, is many-sided and complex and, therefore, trying to 
determine how one's students will come to hold their beliefs requires 
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examination of a myriad of factors that influence student outcomes. 
Teaching does not occur within a vacuum. The manner in which students 
come to hold their beliefs is affected by not only the classroom endeavors 
of any given teacher but also by a wide range of factors including: the 
teaching methods employed by other instructors, the policies adopted by 
administrators, the decision-making structures of the school, the 
educational goals and expectations adopted in the school, and the 
beliefs, attitudes, traditions, and values of the students' home, community, 
and the larger social-political culture. 
Teachers cannot possibly look into everything that affects how 
students will come to hold the beliefs taught them. They cannot, for 
example, acquire a thorough and detailed understanding of students' 
home experiences nor even their personal goals or fears if students 
choose not to express them. In addition, teachers cannot learn about all 
of the daily experiences a student has with friends and community 
members. What teachers can do, however, is observe and reflect on 
their own classroom practices, their educational aims, the content they 
teach, and their students' outcomes. Additionally, we can reasonably 
expect them to be mindful of the context in which their teaching occurs. 
In other words, they can and should, to a certain extent, examine what 
goes on in the school and, to a lesser extent, what goes on in the local 
community and larger social-political culture. I hope to illustrate the sorts 
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of contextual clues we can reasonably expect teachers to inspect and 
think about to help them decide how they can best avoid indoctrination. 
One purpose of this dissertation is to help educators, wherever 
possible, avoid indoctrination by directing them to scrutinize and reflect 
on their intentions. My purpose in conceptualizing indoctrination in terms 
of intention is not to assign moral blame. I do not wish to engage in finger 
pointing. Rather, the aim here is to develop a conception of 
indoctrination that directs educators to look carefully at what they hope 
to achieve (i.e., their desired outcomes) and what they are likely to 
achieve by their efforts given a particular context (i.e., the foreseen and 
the foreseeable outcomes). The intentional analysis I offer is useful in 
helping educators avert and prevent indoctrination because it recognizes 
that educators are professionals who undertake teaching and the 
direction of learning deliberately and therefore they can be held to 
certain professional standards. 
If we wish to stop indoctrination, it is not enough to assign blame. 
We must address the problem by helping educators identify indoctrination 
when it occurs and aid them in finding ways to avoid it. Thus, in the first 
section of this chapter, I look at how a close and careful examination of 
one's methods, content, and student outcomes can help one determine 
when one is likely to lead students to holding beliefs in a non-truth-seeking 
fashion and how one can best circumvent such consequences - in short. 
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how to become better aware of one's own intentions. In the subsequent, 
final section, I show how teachers can better understand what sort of 
student outcomes their endeavors are likely to effect by having them look 
closely at the context in which their teaching occurs. I show that by 
examining the policies, practices, traditions, attitudes, beliefs, and 
educational goals of the school, teachers can make better decisions 
about the sort of educational endeavors they ought to employ to 
educate without indoctrinating. Again, indicating all I see as crucial to 
fully understanding one's intentions in the moral sense, i.e., in the full sense 
required for responsibility. 
Taking Another Look at the Role that Content, Method, and Consequences 
Play in Indoctrination 
Although I have found the several considered conceptions of 
indoctrination defined in terms of content, method, and consequences 
inadequate for the purposes stated here, there is much to be learned 
from them. These conceptions provide some useful indications of what 
educators can look for in their attempts to avoid indoctrinating their 
students. I argue that teaching certain content and employing particular 
instructional methods may put one more at risk of indoctrinating than 
when other types of content and methods are used. Further, some 
student outcomes are more indicative of indoctrination than others. 
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Examining one's content, teaching methods, and one's student 
outcomes, as I shall show, helps teacher reflect on their practice and 
develop educational endeavors that avoid indoctrination. 
Content 
When a teacher looks at whether she is likely to get her students to 
hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner, it is helpful for her to examine 
the content she is teaching. Although any truth-apt beliefs can be 
indoctrinated, the concern over indoctrination is typically most prominent 
when the claims being taught are of the sort that express a worldview (i.e. 
a belief that has a powerful influence over one's other beliefs and 
behavior). Such claims are referred to in the indoctrination literature as 
"doctrines" and, as argued earlier, it has not been clearly shown what 
demarcates doctrines from other sorts of propositions. It is important to 
note, however, that content analyses do get at a commonly held 
concern about indoctrination, viz that students will be inculcated in the 
sort of ideas and propositions which constitute a general outlook on life 
and whose truth is dubious or, at the least, highly controversial. 
Persons are generally more concerned about students being taught 
to uncritically accept a belief such as, "Humans are a privileged species 
who have the right to rule over all other animals" than a claim like, 
"Whales are a species of fish." From content analyses we see why inquiry 
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into the truth of the former type of claim is considered more important 
than inquiring into the truth of the latter sort of claim. The former 
statement directs persons to accept an entire network of beliefs about 
human's place on the earth and how we should treat animals. Such 
beliefs have a strong influence on a myriad of choices and actions one 
makes. Uncritical acceptance of this sort of claim would typically have a 
broader effect on students' beliefs, attitudes, and actions than believing 
without question that whales are a species of fish. Thus, when teaching 
the former type of claim, teachers need to pay particular attention to 
making sure students have the capacities needed to inquire into its truth 
so they do not passively accept it as true without question. 
There is a further reason why doctrine-like beliefs are of more 
concern in connection with indoctrination than material that is generally 
held to be uncontestedly true. Recall that the notion of indoctrination 
defended here is that it involves the intention to get students to hold a 
belief p in a non-truth-seeking manner (where the notion of "intention" is 
defined as the desire to or the engagement in endeavors that are likely to 
lead students to be unable or unwilling to engage in any future inquiry 
regarding p). When the beliefs taught are virtually uncontested, there is 
little motivation for teachers to attempt to prevent students from inquiring 
about their truth. "Inquire all you want," a teacher may think, "there's 
nothing out there - no evidence, reasons, or arguments - that will cause 
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you to doubt the beliefs." On the other hand, when the beliefs taught are 
controversial, there is motivation to prevent students from inquiring into 
the truth of the beliefs if the teacher's aim, conscious or unconscious, is to 
get students to hold the beliefs as unquestionably true. 
Teachers, then, need to closely examine their motives and goals, 
particularly when teaching propositions whose truth is debated and which 
are likely to have a far reaching effect on other beliefs students hold if the 
claims are accepted as true. Although we don't want students to hold 
any beliefs in a manner where they are unable or resistant to questioning 
them in light of counter posing evidence, there is more at risk when 
teaching students to hold particular kinds of beliefs in this manner, such as, 
"Humans are a privileged species." Content analyses of indoctrination 
instruct us to pay attention to the type of content being taught. If the 
material being presented in class consists of controversial ideas, chiefly 
those that have the power to influence a person's network of beliefs, then 
teachers ought to look more closely at their aims as well as at the likely 
outcomes of their teaching so they may be best positioned to avoid 
indoctrination. I eschew the claim that teaching such ideas is inherently 
indoctrinary and embrace the claim that being mindful of the nature of 
the ideas we are teaching can assist us in doing it skillfully. Hardly a new 
thought, but one worth paying attention to in this context. 
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Method 
The teaching of certain content, however, is only one clue 
educators and others can use to help guide their efforts to steer clear of 
indoctrination. Teaching methods are another useful focus of attention. 
Although indoctrination can occur using a wide range of methods, 
looking carefully at how one teaches can lend insight into the manner in 
which students will come to hold their beliefs. For example, if a teacher 
expects his students to sit quietly and take in the information given by 
lectures, repeat the information on exams, and not question or discuss any 
of the complexities of the ideas given them, the students are put more at 
risk of holding the beliefs taught them in a non-truth-seeking way than if 
they are taught and encouraged to critically appraise the epistemic 
merits of the propositions raised in class. 
This is not to say that we can necessarily conclude that a teacher is 
indoctrinating if she does not take the time to allow critical discussion in 
her class when instructing her students about a given set of ideas. It could 
be, for example, that she recognizes that her students, regardless of what 
methods she adopts, w/7/ be critically deliberative about what they are 
told in class and thus she does not need to encourage or instruct them to 
do so. The aim is not to get teachers to adopt any particular set of 
methods. Rather, if they are to avoid indoctrination, teachers need to 
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carefully reflect on how their methods are likely to affect the manner in 
which students come to hold their beliefs. 
No one set of teaching methods, then, necessarily indicates the 
presence or absence of indoctrination. As I've suggested, if a teacher 
sees that his students are mot ivated and adep t truth-seekers, then he 
need not spend a great deal of time encouraging such capacit ies in 
them. However, if he sees that his students have little to no inclination or 
ability to critically examine the ideas professed in class, he needs to 
provide students with the opportunity and" encourage them to learn to do 
so. Rather than rejecting them outright, we c a n utilize analyses that 
define indoctrination in terms of methods to help us see that the 
instructional methods adop ted can affect how students come to hold the 
beliefs taught them and alert us to the need for developing appropriate 
modes of teaching for preventing indoctrination. 
Consequences 
Just as with method and content, examining the consequences of 
teaching, or looking at student outcomes, can also help educators avert 
indoctrination. If a teacher finds that many or most of her students come 
to hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner, then she ought to look more 
closely at her own educat ional practices and endeavors. Reflecting on 
pract ice is a professional standard to which w e hold all teachers. We 
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expect that professional educators will reflect seriously on not only what 
they hope to achieve and how they hope to reach their goals. We also 
expect them to look closely at what exactly it is that they hove achieved; 
that is, we generally require that teachers scrutinize their educational 
outcomes to better determine the approaches they will adopt in the 
future. 
One of the benefits of the alternative analysis offered here is that it 
instructs educators to look for very particular outcomes. Educators should 
look to see that students are sensitive to experience and its significance " 
for their beliefs. As Misak (2000, 2004) argues, persons who do not hold 
their beliefs open to experience are not genuinely interested in finding 
true beliefs. Thus, if a teacher finds that his students come to be closed to 
any future inquiry regarding the truth of their beliefs, he ought to examine 
whether his students need more encouragement or perhaps more direct 
instruction in effectively challenging, inquiring into, and supporting 
assertions made in class. 
Looking at and reflecting on student outcomes are activities that 
need not necessarily be used to point to a blameworthy agent. We 
cannot be sure in any given case whether or not students come to hold 
their views in an uncritical manner because of the teacher's classroom 
endeavors. The teacher's activities are only one point in a causal nexus. 
However, examining teaching outcomes affords teachers important 
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information on how they might alter their instructional efforts so as to 
affect the desired student outcomes. Understanding the sorts of 
consequences one's teaching is likely to produce aids one in crafting 
instructional methods and creating educational environments that 
encourage students to hold beliefs in a truth-seeking manner. 
Thus we see that scrutinizing the content one teaches, the 
instructional methods one adopts, and the consequences of one's 
teaching can, taken separately and in combination with one another, 
lend valuable insights into what teachers are likely to achieve in their 
educational endeavors. By examining in this way what they are likely to 
achieve in conjunction with what they wish to achieve, teachers may be 
awakened to the myriad factors that influence student learning, both 
inside ond outside the classroom. We come to see that examining one's 
content and instructional methods provides only a partial view of how 
students will come to hold their beliefs. To gain more insight into how one 
can best teach without indoctrinating, educators need to examine the 
context in which their teaching occurs. 
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Contextual Considerations in Avoiding Indoctrination 
Critical theorists have shown us that a school's context, its 
pedagogy, curriculum, decision-making structures, teaching methods, 
and their policies all play a role in shaping and defining the beliefs 
students hold and the manner in which they hold them. While the aim of 
critical theorists is to show how these contextual forces can further 
entrench students in hegemonic and oppressive social-political structures, 
I draw on their work to illustrate how the school's context can either help 
or hinder students from holding beliefs in a truth-seeking manner. Put 
another way, I proceed to examine how we might better understand 
when schools are encouraging what Ira Shor calls "critical thought" and 
when they are encouraging "dependence on authority" (Shor, 1992:13). 
To help clarify our comprehension of the effects that various 
contextual elements have on student learning, I consider the context 
under three main headings: pedagogical, ideological, and structural 
contexts. I undertake an explanation of what I mean by each of these 
terms then show how examining each can aid teachers in averting 
indoctrination. 
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The Pedagogical Context 
I define the pedagogical context as the teaching methods 
practiced by all the instructors in a school district. If each teacher adopts 
a variety of methods, for example, then the pedagogical context may be 
characterized as richly varied. If, on the other hand, all or even most of 
the teachers adopt a more traditional, authoritarian mode, then the 
pedagogical context may be described as teacher-centered and 
authoritarian. If, on the other hand, all or most teachers implement a 
Deweyan approach, then the pedagogical context may be described as 
student-centered or discovery-focused. Were most or all teachers to 
follow a Noddings' "caring" approach, the pedagogical context may 
best be described as caring, nurturing, or child-centered. There are a 
great variety of pedagogical contexts that a school may have. 
Understanding which one a particular school has requires that we look at 
the teaching methods utilized by the teachers working in the school. 
Understanding the pedagogical context is important in determining 
how students come to hold beliefs taught them. For example, if an 
instructor sees that she works in a teacher-centered pedagogical context 
where students are expected to listen quietly and passively accept as true 
the beliefs taught in class, she may reasonably guess that students are 
unlikely to have developed the capacities required to critically examine 
and question the beliefs raised in her classroom. The instructional methods 
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employed by teachers send students a host of implicit messages. As Scott 
Fletcher (2000) points out, the "banking model," as described by Paulo 
Friere (1973), implies to students that their experiences are "at best 
irrelevant and at worst an obstacle to learning" (Fletcher, 2000: 69). 
Friere (1973) uses the term "banking model" to refer to teaching 
methods where the instructor sees students as empty receptacles and 
their job as educators is to fill these empty heads full of information. There 
are certain epistemological assumptions behind this approach to 
teaching - one of which is that knowledge consists of a set of discreet 
pieces of information. More to the point for this discussion, however, is 
that the "banking model" assumes that the information being fed to 
students is unequivocally true and ought to be accepted without 
question. If the banking model is widely adopted by teachers in the 
school, an individual teacher may need to counter the style of learning 
that this teaching method fosters by making the effort needed to develop 
in her students critically deliberative capacities. She may need to spend 
time encouraging her students to make certain that the worth of the 
beliefs she professes are based on all available evidence rather than 
passively accepting these beliefs. 
Critical theorists, such as Friere (1970, 1973), have shown us that the 
methods used by teachers influences the manner in which students come 
to hold their beliefs. While the "banking model," according to Friere 
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(1973), encourages passive acceptance, adopting a more critically 
deliberative approach where students are taught to challenge current 
modes of thinking and commonly held beliefs encourages students to be 
more reflective and question the views they hold as well as those taught 
them in school. Friere argues that the capacity to formulate one's own 
beliefs based on a critical and unbiased evaluation of all evidence 
available "must grow out of a critical educational effort" (Friere, 1973:19). 
In other words, students must be allowed and encouraged to engage in 
"reflective participation" (Friere, 1970: 65) where they practice open 
"dialogue, reflection, and communication" with one another about 
beliefs they hold and views expressed in class (Friere, 1970: 66). 
Friere's pedagogy of the oppressed helps us see that the process of 
critical discussions and dialogue helps students arrive at beliefs based on 
"the testing of one's 'findings' and by openness to revision; by the 
attempt to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and to avoid 
preconceived notions when analyzing them ... by soundness of 
argumentation; [and] by the practice of dialogue rather than polemics" 
(Friere, 1973: 18). Providing students with opportunities to participate in 
such discussions aids them in holding beliefs in a truth-seeking fashion. 
Such teaching is valuable in a pluralistic democratic society regardless of 
the pedagogical context. Yet, when other teachers adopt more of a 
"banking model" approach, it is particularly important, for any given 
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teacher seeking to preclude indoctrination, to develop in her students the 
necessary capacities to think critically about the truth of beliefs professed 
in class. Although there is no definitive list of methods that one ought to 
adopt in any given pedagogical context, and there are no particular 
kinds of beliefs that one should teach in such a context, looking at the 
modes of teaching utilized by other instructors in the school provides 
teachers with valuable information that can guide them in making their 
own instructional choices, ones that will help them avoid indoctrination. 
The Structural Context 
In addition to assessing the pedagogical context, it is helpful for 
teachers to also look at the structural context. How decisions are made in 
a school district, what sorts of rules and practices are adopted, and how 
rules, policies, and practices are enforced comprises the structural 
context of that district. Fletcher (2000) argues, the policies and practices 
of a school impart to students what are considered normal and 
acceptable modes of decision-making. Friere (1970, 1973) argues that we 
must teach students how to effectively participate in decisions that affect 
their daily lives. Only through active participation, he contends, can we 
alter the existing structures of power. Friere's arguments illustrate how 
decision making structures help determine how persons hold their beliefs. 
He claims that if the oppressed are simply told what to do to emancipate 
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themselves, they will continue to be oppressed because they will not have 
gained the ability to formulate their own beliefs. 
Michael Apple (1996) also argues that the structural hierarchy of a 
school models the sort of decision-making processes considered 
acceptable and even desirable. The structural context, then, 
demonstrates to students how the rules are made and enforced and 
what role students ought to play in the decision-making processes. Some 
districts, for example, give teachers a fairly substantial amount of power in 
determining the curricular choices offered, the policies adopted by the 
school, and the methods used to enforce the rules and policies of the 
school. Some schools also allow students to play a meaningful role in 
these decisional processes. Other schools leave most of the decision 
making about policies and procedures as well as curriculum and rule 
enforcement to administrators. 
The decision-making structure of the school provides students with a 
powerful model for how and what sort of decisions ought to be made and 
how they ought to be enforced. Shor (1992) asserts that if students "do 
not practice democratic habits in co-governing their... schools ... they 
learn that unilateral authority is the normal way things are done in society" 
(Shor, 1992: 19). Thus, when students see that authority figures (who 
constitute the minority in number) have virtually complete say over the 
major decisions that affect students' educational experiences, many 
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students are likely to believe that the authoritarian model of decision 
making is "normal" or "typical" and, therefore, many may come to 
believe it is justified. There will, of course, be some students who do not 
believe that it is the best way to make decisions. They may, for example, 
test authority by verbally questioning the rules and/or disobeying them. 
Yet, when such students are punished (as they so often are when they 
break or defy rules), the message sent is that challenging authority will be 
penalized and will not prove effective. In other words, many students 
learn that there is a significant cost and very little, if any, benefit to defying 
those in authority. 
Teachers need to take the decision-making structure into 
consideration when formulating choices about how best to avoid 
indoctrination. For example, I found that when I taught in a school district 
with a very top-down authoritarian structure, students were reluctant to 
challenge not only the rules I had established for the classroom but also 
the ideas I professed in class. This was not true for all students, of course, 
but in general, students from this school were much less inclined to 
question my decisions and teaching than the students I taught in a school 
that had a far more liberal structure where they were given opportunities 
to effect changes in school policies and curriculum. 
In the more authoritarian school, I had to spend a good deal of 
time to get my students to develop classroom rules with me. I had to 
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explain why I thought it was important that they learn to part icipate 
respectfully and effectively in the decision making process and I took the 
time to show them how we might go about this process. I then had to 
take them step by step through the decision making. Further, I had to 
continually prod them into participating in ongoing choices that needed 
to be made such as what assessment methods to use, how much and 
what kind of homework to assign, and what sort of make-up or extra 
credit work to allow. Students in the more liberal school had far more 
experience in these matters. As a result, they felt more familiar and 
comfortable with the process. In addit ion, students, generally speaking, in 
the more liberal school felt more that it was their right to part icipate in the 
decision making whereas students in the more authoritarian school felt 
privileged in being al lowed to part icipate in the decisional processes. 
It is an empirical question, thus one I am not prepared to answer 
here, whether students are more reluctant to question their teacher's 
authority in a school that does not allow them the opportunity to make 
significant decisions about their educat ion. Yet, it is reasonable to assume 
that if students have never, or rarely ever, been given the opportunity to 
part icipate in decisional processes at school then they will be far less likely 
than students who have had a good deal of decision making experience 
to feel comfortable and adep t at participating in these processes and to 
think, in fact, that such participation is their right. 
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The structures of power implicitly express a particular set of beliefs, 
attitudes and values. As Apple (1996) asserts, the decision-making models 
enacted in schools often mirror the hierarchical power structures in society 
which keep certain groups in positions of privilege and disempower and 
subordinate others. If power is given to and exercised by only the few 
persons who hold top positions of authority, students learn that their 
contributions to the decision making process is unwanted. Thus, 
according to critical theorists such as Apple (1996, 1985), Shor (1992), and 
Friere (1970, 1973), if schools have top-down, authoritarian style power 
structures where students and even teachers play only a little, if any, role 
in meaningful decision making, students come to rely on those in power to 
tell them what is best for them. 
Understanding the structural context of a school provides teachers 
with some insight into the sort of experiences students have with 
questioning and critically deliberating over the dictates of authority. 
Teachers can use these insights to help them construct a methodology 
and learning environment that will aid students in holding beliefs in a truth-
seeking manner. To avoid indoctrination, then, it is helpful for teachers to 
work with their students by building on experiences and skills that teachers 
find their students already have and developing in them capacities they 
do not have which are needed to critically inquire into the truth of the 
beliefs discussed in class. 
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The Ideological Context 
In addition to the pedagogical and structural contexts, the 
ideological context also influences how students come to hold their 
beliefs. To understand this context, it is first important to take a look at the 
notion "ideology" as it is being used here. An ideology expresses the 
ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and perspectives held by those who have the 
power to influence the thinking and attitudes of others in their community 
and the power to exact a strong influence over the policies and decisions 
made in the community. According to Fletcher (2000), the" term 
"ideology" is used by critical theorists to "regulate the production of 
knowledge and help explain how schools reproduce the privilege of a 
dominant class" (Fletcher, 2000: 59). Ideology, if unquestioned or 
unchallenged, then, necessarily exacts a ruling influence over persons' 
beliefs. 
Apple (1985) argues that schools often support what he calls 
"dominant ideologies" - that is, sets of beliefs, attitudes, values, 
perspectives, and ideals that are taken to be the norm. He states that the 
"control of the cultural apparatus of a society, of both the knowledge 
preserving and producing institutions and the actors who work in them, is 
essential in the struggle over ideological hegemony" (Apple, 1985: 16). 
Schools, then, according to Apple, help maintain society's dominant 
ideologies by "winning consent" to mainstream beliefs, norms, 
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perspectives, attitudes, and practices. (Apple, 1996: 14-15) It is important 
to note here that ideological beliefs are not harmful because of any 
epistemological status they may hold: they are not necessarily wrong. The 
referent of the term "ideology," as used by critical theorists, is oppressive 
only when (or because) it exerts a dominating influence on those who do 
not have the power in society to challenge or oppose it. 
I agree with critical theorists that ideologies held as true by those in 
power are often oppressive because they can and frequently do inhibit 
the development and acceptance of beliefs that oppose or challenge 
the accepted ideology. However, it is important not to see this power 
struggle over what counts as legitimate knowledge as being overly 
deterministic. Schools can educate students to be critical consumers of 
information they receive from society, schools, and even their homes. Not 
all ideologies, then, are oppressive and harmful. Certain emancipatory 
ideologies, for example, that profess the value of truth-seeking and 
encourage students to formulate beliefs based on a thoughtful analysis of 
the relevant evidence, are not oppressive, at least not in the way that 
they impede students from holding views that lie outside mainstream 
notions. 
I adopt the general notion of "ideology" purported by critical 
theorists. Thus, when talking about the "ideology" of a society, I mean the 
ideas and beliefs held as true by the mainstream - or the cultural group(s) 
213 
who have the power to influence the thinking and attitudes of others and 
help dictate policy for others in society. Similarly, the ideology of a school 
refers to the beliefs adopted and maintained by official school policy and 
accepted school practice. If the school's ideology consists of a set of 
beliefs which are meant to be and, in fact, generally do go 
unchallenged, then such an ideology tends to be oppressive. If, on the 
other hand, the school's ideology consists of a set of beliefs which 
advocates and encourages careful scrutiny of the truth of the views 
professed in school, it is likely not to be oppressive. 
Richard Paul (1994) points out that some ideological beliefs are 
expressed explicitly while others are expressed implicitly. His point is 
helpful here as it shows that some sets of views can be believed, 
maintained, and advanced even if they are never explicitly articulated. 
He claims that our ideals, or what he refers to as "worldviews," are often 
"implicit in our activity and ... in how we describe our behavior" (Paul, 
1994: 187). Thus, schools can advance a particular ideology by the 
curriculum chosen, the policies set, and the structures of decision-making 
adopted. As Apple (1996) contends, what gets taught, the methods 
employed to teach the chosen curriculum, the rules created to govern 
both student and teacher behavior, and the hierarchy of power all can 
implicitly express a particular set of beliefs, attitudes, values, and 
perspectives. For example, in a school where I used to teach, some 
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implicitly expressed ideas were as follows: "Students' needs and interests 
will be considered when making policy but will not have any sort of ruling 
influence," "The U.S. is the best country in the world and to say or imply 
otherwise is to be unpatriotic and a trouble-maker," and "Students who 
obey rules with unquestioned and quiet deference are 'good' and those 
who consistently or often defy the rules are 'bad' or 'at risk' students." 
Such views, even when unarticulated, make up some of the ideological 
context of that school. 
Whether or not students will believe the claims professed by their 
teachers, particularly in an uncritical manner, is largely influenced by the 
ideological context in which they teach. Students tend to believe what 
they are told by those in authority, and students typically see their 
teachers as authority figures. Unless students are taught to thoughtfully 
consider those claims and assertions held as true by the ideology 
accepted and maintained in the school, particularly if those claims 
uphold the ideology adopted by dominant groups in society, students are 
likely to hold these beliefs taught them in an uncritical manner. Again, it is 
important not to adopt too much of a deterministic view here. While it is 
true that the manner in which students come to hold their beliefs is greatly 
influenced by the school's ideological context, students are not 
completely helpless to evaluate or question beliefs maintained by the 
school's ideology. Some students, regardless of the beliefs they are 
215 
taught and whether such beliefs correspond with or oppose the 
purported ideology of the school and society, are rebellious, feisty, and/or 
are adept, independent, and critically deliberative thinkers and will 
therefore be very unlikely to passively accept as true any beliefs taught 
them. 
One reason students may question, challenge, or even just quietly 
disagree with their teacher's assertions is that the teacher has proven he is 
untrustworthy by making several errors, showing a lack of knowledge in 
the area he teaches, and repeatedly contradicting himself. Another 
reason that students may question their teacher, and one which is more 
to the point here, is if students are taught a set of views that contradict 
beliefs held by their parents and local community members. Students are 
far more likely to question those assertions that oppose rather than 
coincide with beliefs commonly held as true by themselves, others in the 
school, and people in the community. 
This is not to say that students who are taught beliefs that lie outside 
the mainstream ideologies cannot be indoctrinated. If a teacher's desire 
is to get students to hold beliefs in a non-deliberative fashion, even if it is 
unlikely she will be able to do so, she still has the intent to get students to 
hold beliefs uncritically and therefore she is indoctrinating. Additionally, if 
she is a particularly charismatic and influential instructor, she may have a 
strong and even ruling influence over how her students come to hold their 
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beliefs. However, understanding and reflecting on the ideological 
context of a school helps teachers gain valuable insights into how many, if 
not most, of their students are likely to hold beliefs discussed in class. 
Examining the ideological context, then, allows teachers to think 
about how they may be able to interrupt or counteract the tendency that 
students have of uncritically accepting beliefs taught them that are rarely 
if ever challenged by their other teachers, by community members, and 
by persons in the larger society. Moreover, it allows those who teach 
marginalized content to better understand how students may react to the 
beliefs professed in class. Having a critical awareness of the ideological 
context helps instructors foresee likely outcomes of their educational 
efforts and develop programs that steer clear of indoctrination. 
Summary of Contextual Influences 
My definition of indoctrination is that a teacher indoctrinates p 
when she intends to get students to hold p in a non-truth-seeking manner. 
The notion of truth-seeking is taken from Misak's (2000, 2004) pragmatic 
conception of truth which argues that a true belief is one that would 
agree with all evidence and arguments from a community of inquiry at 
the hypothetical end of the day. The notion of intention used here 
expands upon Snook's (1972a, 1972b) definition: one intends students to 
hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner if one desires, foresees, or 
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ought to foresee that students will come to hold beliefs in such a manner 
as a result of one's educational endeavors and does nothing to try and 
prevent this. 
Defining intention, then, as involving the desired and the 
foreseeable as well as the foreseen will encourage teachers to examine 
their motives and practices as well as the context in which their teaching 
occurs so they may determine what sorts of outcomes they are hoping to 
achieve and what is likely to be the outcomes of their efforts. While no 
one can fully predict how students will react to a teacher's endeavors, it is 
important to remember that indoctrination does not occur, according to 
this analysis, unless students come to hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking 
manner as a direct result of something the teacher does or fails to do. 
Knowing that students will come to hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking 
manner regardless of what one does is not the same thing as knowing (or 
foreseeing) that students will hold beliefs uncritically as a direct result of 
something one has done. 
To help educators and others better understand what sorts of 
endeavors are likely to lead to students holding beliefs in a non-truth-
seeking fashion, I have laid out and discussed various educational factors 
that need to be examined. To reiterate these briefly, I argued that 
educators ought to look closely at their instructional methods, the content 
they are teaching, and the outcomes of their teaching. In addition, I 
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showed how useful and important it is for educators to examine the 
pedagogical, structural, and ideological contexts in which learning 
occurs. By engaging in this sort of reflective analysis, teachers can better 
determine how students will come to hold the beliefs taught them and 
thus be in a far better position to avoid indoctrination. 
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CHAPTER VII 
EXPLORING THE NOTION OF SCHOOLS AS AGENTS OF 
INDOCTRINATION 
Prior analyses of indoctrination focus exclusively on the individual 
teacher, discussing a teacher's methods, content, and the outcomes of 
an individual's teaching. Most of the discussion about intention and 
responsibility in this work has also been focused on the individual teacher. 
We readily talk about persons having intentions and finding persons 
responsible for actions taken intentionally. In this chapter, however, I 
depart from all other analyses. I take seriously that holding teachers 
responsible for indoctrination is not enough. We must recognize the 
important role that the school context plays in shaping student learning as 
well as teachers' intentions. I therefore open this analysis up to explore 
the possible value in characterizing indoctrination as something that not 
only individual teachers do but something that schools do as well. 
I suggest that it may be beneficial to alter the definition of 
indoctrination offered earlier in this paper so that schools as well as 
individual teachers are viewed as potential indoctrinators. This new 
definition, then, reads as follows: A school as well as a teacher 
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indoctrinates when either or both intends to get students to hold p in a 
non-truth-seeking manner. This alternative and expanded definition of 
indoctrination is, like the prior definition, an intentional notion; thus, it is 
important to look at how w e can make sense of schools and not just 
persons having intentions. This is a complex philosophical task and in this 
context I can only suggest a direction it might take and why it is important 
to do so. What I can do here, however, is make the best case for an 
analysis of indoctrination that recognizes schools as intentional agents. 
Remembering that one of our aims in this dissertation is to provide a 
concept ion of indoctrination that helps diminish its occurrence in our 
schools, and recognizing that the school context plays a significant, 
sometimes even decisive, role in shaping student learning, it is important 
that schools, as well as teachers, reflect on their educat ional goals and on 
how the ideological, pedagog ica l , and structural context of the school 
will likely influence the manner in which students come to hold their 
beliefs. While neither teachers nor schools can ensure that students will 
hold beliefs in a truth-seeking manner, there is much, however, that w e 
can do . As was argued earlier, indoctrination causes significant harm. It 
seems reasonable, therefore, to require that we do whatever possible to 
avoid such harm. While w e do not have an analysis that provides an 
unambiguous claim that schools can have intentions, given the nature of 
the risk of indoctrination, and given that there is much that we can do to 
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avoid it, we are best served by characterizing schools in such a way that 
they become recognizable agents of indoctrination. 
Exploring the Possibility of Schools as Indoctrinators 
Given my intentional analysis of indoctrination, it is imperative to 
show that it possible for schools to have intentions. One way to 
demonstrate that it is reasonable to attribute intentionality to schools is by 
showing the significant impact that the context has on, not only student 
learning, but oh teachers' intentions. If we can show that a school's 
context, whose influence lies largely outside the control of any individual 
teacher, can significantly thwart or shape teachers' intentions, we will 
have shown that schools play an important role in shaping the manner in 
which students are influenced by their teachers. 
In the first part of this chapter, then, I illustrate how the school 
context affects both teachers' intentions as well as student learning. This 
analysis allows us to look beyond the individual classrooms for 
environmental factors that make it either quite difficult or fairly easy for 
teachers to indoctrinate. Yet it still assumes that, while there exists outside 
influences, indoctrination occurs within classrooms and it therefore falls on 
the individual teachers to take full responsibility for opposing 
indoctrination. I argue that, while teachers should take responsibility for 
thwarting indoctrination whenever possible and in any way they can, it 
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may also make sense to require a more thorough change in the school 
context than teachers can effect to prevent indoctrination from occurring 
in the school. In the latter part of this chapter, I push the analysis further 
and make a case for claiming that schools themselves are agents of 
indoctrination. To do this, I provide examples of schools being 
characterized as intentional agents - such examples are provided by 
legal cases of harassment and discrimination against schools. My aim 
here is to illustrate how attributing intentionality to educational institutions 
allows us a broader look at how students come to hold beliefs in a non-
truth-seeking manner. 
Contextual Influences on Student Learning and Teachers' Intentions 
School policies, educational aims, traditions, and curricular options 
affect two crucial conditions of truth-seeking; they affect what assertions 
and beliefs are to be regarded as truth-apt and what constitutes the 
community of inquiry. So, even if schools cannot be said to have 
intentions, they (their policies, etc.) can seriously undermine and distort 
teachers' intentions to have students hold beliefs in a truth-seeking 
manner and thus determine much of what are the foreseeable 
consequences of their efforts. To appreciate the extent to which an 
institution's context shapes its workers' intentions, I look to the literature on 
corporate intentionality and moral accountability. Schools, like 
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corporations, are institutions with highly organized structures, practices, 
policies, and goals. Thus, looking at how corporations are said to be 
sometimes responsible for the actions and even intentions of its employees 
is instructive in our aim to ascertain how schools may be responsible for 
teachers intending to get students to hold beliefs in a non-truth-seeking 
manner. 
I draw primarily on Larry May (1987) and Peter French (1979) to 
illustrate the considerable impact an institution's context has on shaping 
and determining the workers' intentions and actions. Each argues that 
the corporation not only influences employee intentionality; they also 
contend that the corporate influence is so significant that it is appropriate 
and reasonable to sometimes attribute a worker's intentions to the 
corporation rather than the individual person who committed the given 
act. While I find both May's and French's analyses valuable for their 
insights into the degree to which a corporation - and in our case, schools -
can shape its members' intentions, I argue that schools can only influence 
but cannot take away or replace teachers' intentions. 
Larry May (1987), in his work on corporate responsibility, suggests 
how we may understand the effect that the school's context has on 
teaching and learning. He describes an intersectional point between the 
individual and the institution: 
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the organizational structure has facilitated behavior which would 
not have occurred if the individuals had acted on their own intent-
ions in the absence of the corporate decision-making structure, 
and which cannot be fully understood apart from this structure. 
(May, 1987:70). 
A school's organizational structure - the rules and practices of the school, 
the way the rules are created, and the manner in which they are 
enforced - not only shapes what teachers do in their classrooms, but it 
also influences the aims they set for their students. May shows us that we 
can best comprehend a teacher's actions when considering how her 
intentions are influenced by the context in which she works. We must, in 
other words, look at those intentions within the structural context in which 
they are developed. 
When a teacher sets out to meet the demands and expectations 
placed upon her by the policies of the school, her individual intentions are 
molded by such policies. Her educational aims are largely determined by 
the rules with which she must comply. For May, when an employee's 
intentions are significantly shaped by the corporation's rules and 
procedures, it is reasonable to attribute such intentions to the corporation 
rather than the employee. Peter French (1979) would describe such 
intentions as "corporate-intentional." I proceed here to lay out French's 
argument for ascribing corporations with intentionality as it is instructive in 
highlighting the major impact that the school context has on student 
learning and teachers' intentions. I argue, however, that French has 
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failed to adequately show that when a corporation exerts even a 
dominating influence over a worker's intentions, the worker no longer acts 
in accordance with his own intentions. While his intentions may have 
altered due to what may be very coercive conditions, I argue that he still 
acts intentionally. 
French, like May, argues that institutions such as the corporation 
can act intentionally. He asserts that corporations possess a highly 
structured hierarchy, clearly defined roles for each corporate position, 
and a set of explicitly stated policies, procedures, and goals. This 
"Corporate Internal Decision (CID)" structure, as French calls it, "is the 
requisite redescriptive device that licenses the predication of corporate 
intentionality" (French, 1979: 141). He argues that the CID structure, in 
effect, subordinates individual intentions and actions to those that meet 
with accepted standards of behavior, corporate policy, and are in line 
with the expectations of her/his particular place in the power hierarchy. 
When an individual's actions comply with corporate policies and 
meet with corporate standards, French claims that the individual can be 
said to have acted "for corporate reasons, as corporate belief and so, in 
other words, as corporate intentional" (French, 1979: 145). Because 
employees must comply with corporate policies and work to meet 
corporate goals, an employee's intentions are altered and shaped by the 
CID structure. French provides the following example to illustrate how the 
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CID structure acts to "redescribe" employees' actions as corporate-
intentional. 
Employees X, Y, and Z vote on whether the Gulf Oil Corporation will 
join a world uranium cartel. By the position that X, Y, and Z hold in the 
company, their votes will be the deciding factor in determining whether 
or not Gulf Oil joins the cartel. The employees are expected to read 
carefully the reports given them by various other employees and base 
their decision on all the information at their disposal. In this example, 
French seems to imply that X, Y, and Z are expected to act in the best 
interests of the corporation's stated goals. He claims that even if one of 
them has reasons for voting in favor of the merger that are "inconsistent 
with established corporate policy" (French, 1979: 146), the vote is still a 
corporate decision because voting is consistent with stated policies and 
joining the cartel meets the goals of Gulf Oil. In short, X, Y, and Z's voting is 
not best described as individual actions based on individual intentions. 
Rather, according to French, their voting is "redescribable" as a corporate 
decision because it meets with corporate policy and thus is done for 
corporate reasons and initiated by a corporate desire (and, I ought to 
add, is done with the foreseen and foreseeable outcome of meeting 
corporate goals). In other words, the decision was "corporate-
intentional." 
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There are some obvious parallels between French's characterization 
of corporations and our generally accepted views of schools. Like 
corporations, schools have clearly articulated policies, goals, and 
expectations as well as a firmly established and organized hierarchy of 
power where each person's role is well defined. Moreover, like 
corporations, individual employees in a school are expected to comply 
with the rules and procedures laid out in school policy, and they are 
expected to work toward meeting the prescribed educational goals. In 
fact, as with corporate employees, teachers are evaluated based on 
their ability to achieve pre-determined educational objectives and goals. 
If they fail to meet such goals and show no progress over time, they are 
often fired or seriously reprimanded in some other way. In other words, if 
teachers do not mold their intentions to comply with school demands and 
desires, their employment is likely to be terminated. 
As with corporate employees, teachers cannot be said to act 
entirely of their own agency. Their intentions are, at least to some degree, 
subverted by the intentions (goals/desires and policies) of the school. For 
example, consider a teacher who wishes to delve into the assertion stated 
in the assigned textbook and supported by the school administration, 
other teachers, and many community members that the current U.S. 
foreign policy in Latin America benefits the working masses who reside in 
that part of the world. She desires to instruct her students to look into the 
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theory that the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia promotes 
the inhumane treatment of the landless poor in Latin America. Let us 
imagine that she is discouraged from pursuing her plans, perhaps by time 
constraints coupled with requirements to cover a long list of proscribed 
subject areas. She is therefore not afforded the opportunity to allow her 
students to discuss and critically assess the worth of the views professed in 
class. In this case, the teacher's intention of creating a thoughtful analysis 
and understanding of U.S. - Latin American relations is subverted by the 
school's curricular requirements and these requirements end up having a 
significant impact on not only what students come to believe about U.S. -
Latin American relations, but how they hold these beliefs. 
It seems, then, that employees of an institution do not always have 
the power to act as independent, autonomous agents - that is, as agents 
who are free to carry out their own intentions. Rather, often times, 
employees must carry out the intentions of the institution which are 
established and revealed in the rules, requirements, goals, and 
organizational power hierarchy of a company. As employees, teachers' 
individual intentions are necessarily influenced or circumvented by the 
pedagogical, structural, and ideological contexts of the school which 
largely determine what assertions are to be considered truth-apt and who 
belongs as part of the community of inquiry. The school context, then, if 
we adopt French's analysis, can be said to act in the same way as that 
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which French calls the CID structure of a corporation - which, to reiterate, 
is the "requisite redescriptive device that licenses the predication of 
corporate [or school] intentionality" (French, 1979:141). If we accept 
French's argument, a teacher's intentions can be "redescribed" as the 
school's intention because a teacher's desires are formulated based on 
meeting school expectations, and the foreseeable student outcomes are, 
at least, significantly influenced by the context in which s/he works. 
French's argument indicates that the corporation and not the 
teachers should be held morally responsible when the teachers' individual 
intentions are subverted by the school's intentions. David Silver (2006) also 
contends that corporations are blameworthy when employees' actions 
meet corporate demands. He states that "corporations can bear moral 
responsibility for their actions even if we grant that they lack bodies, 
minds, intentional states (such as beliefs and desires), and free wills" (Silver, 
2006:271). These arguments have merit as it does not seem reasonable to 
hold someone to account for actions that were, to a significant degree, 
coerced. However, showing that teachers are not blameworthy in certain 
circumstances does not necessarily demonstrate that their actions were 
not intentional. The school context certainly influences, it may even exact 
a dominating influence, on teachers' intentions. Yet, this only shows that 
the context alters their intentions so that they comply with the demands 
and policies of the school. It does not show that the school has removed 
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or replaced individual intentionality. I argue that teachers intend to follow 
or intend to depart from the rules, practices, traditions and goals of the 
school. Their actions are therefore intentional and are not better 
described as what French might call "school-intentional." 
Consider for example a teacher who is no longer al lowed, in 
accordance with a new school policy, to have her first grade students 
read any books that illustrate accep tance of homosexuality. This teacher 
has taught When Grown-Ups Foil in Love by Barbara Lynn and Illustrated 
by Matthew Daniele, a book that shows some children with a mommy 
and daddy, some with two mommies, and some with two daddies. The 
teacher's intention was to help students who have gay parents feel 
a c c e p t e d and to make any of her students who may later find that they 
are gay feel they are accep ted . Because of the new school rule, 
however, the teacher has taken the book off her syllabus to avoid being 
reprimanded or even fired. 
Although the teacher in this case had no intention of removing the 
book from her syllabus prior to the policy change, the new rule altered her 
intentions. French (1979) helps us see that the teacher should not be 
b lamed, at least entirely, for her act ion because she was, to a certain 
extent, coerced. As Margaret Gilbert (2006) argues, "the less free an 
act ion is, the less blameworthy it is... An intentionol act ion need not be 
free or voluntary" (Gilbert, 2006: 97). French shows us that employees of a 
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school, who act in accordance with mandates and regulations, should 
not be, at least wholly, blamed for their actions. Yet, French fails to 
provide a strong enough case for showing that the teacher did not act 
intentionally, or that her intentionality was replaced by the intentions of 
the school. 
French's analysis (1979) is useful, however, in that it highlights the 
importance of considering the school context when looking to 
understand how teachers' intentions and student learning is affected by 
school policies, procedures, the curriculum, decision-making structures, 
and educational goals and objectives. His work shows that, to identify 
indoctrination and develop programs that avert it, we must direct our 
attention not only to individual teachers' intentions but to the goals, 
practices, policies, and structures of the school. Teaching and learning, 
after all, do not occur in sealed off environments unaffected by outside 
influences. Each is strongly affected by the multiplicity of contextual 
factors in which they occur. If we are to avoid indoctrination, we must be 
willing to examine all the factors that nurture, sustain, and cause 
indoctrination as it is reasonable to consider. Recognizing that the 
pedagogical, structural, and ideological contexts of schools play a 
significant role in determining whether or not teachers indoctrinate 
provides us with more enriched insights into how we can best circumvent 
it. 
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Thus far, I have argued that, to avoid indoctrination, teachers must 
develop classroom practices that help interrupt or oppose any 
indoctrinary influences that occur in the school context. Their 
responsibility, as I have described it, lies within the confines of their 
classroom. In other words, I have not yet argued that teachers, or anyone 
else for that matter, ought to work toward altering the school context. 
However, if we are serious about averting indoctrination, we are best 
served by addressing all sources of indoctrination. Allowing a school's 
context to continue to nurture and sustain indoctrination, al though 
teachers may be doing what they can to oppose the contextual impact 
on their students inside their classrooms, does not do a thorough enough 
job of rooting out or diminishing indoctrinary endeavors in our schools. If 
w e c a n show that the school (i.e., the policies, traditions, curriculum, 
decision-making structures, etc.) prompts students to hold certain beliefs 
in a non-truth-seeking manner, we need to expand our notion of 
indoctrination to include the school, and not just individual teachers, as 
an agent of indoctrination. 
Because I have adop ted an intentional analysis of indoctrination 
here, claiming that the school indoctrinates implies that the school can 
act as an intentional agent. As w e have already seen, this has some 
complex theoretical implications; I explore these further in the next 
section. Specifically, I look at the work of Peter Velasquez (1983) to 
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illustrate some major objections raised in regards to ascribing institutions 
with intentionality. I address these objections by referring to some well 
documented legal cases to show the usefulness and theoretical strength 
in attributing educat ional institutions with intentionality. Finally, I draw 
upon Iris Marion Young's "Social Connect ion Model of Responsibility" 
(2004) and Barbara Applebaum's (2007)analysis of this theory to argue 
that we can and should hold persons responsible for altering the school 
context so as to diminish as best we can any existing indoctrinary 
elements. 
Theoretical Implications of Ascribing Schools with Intentionality 
Ascribing intentionality to schools has some serious theoretical 
implications. When we say that a school intends to get students to hold 
beliefs in a non-truth-seeking manner, it is not clear to whom or what, 
precisely, w e are attributing the intentionality. Common sense seems to 
indicate that persons and not schools intend actions. After all, what do 
we mean by a school intending something? Surely, as stated previously, 
w e do not mean the school building. If we follow French (1979), we would 
mean the CID structure, or in our case, the multiple factors that make up 
the school context. Yet, how can structures or contexts have intentions? 
They can influence actions; they can even cause actions, but it is not 
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readily apparent how they can, themselves, act, let alone act 
intentionally. 
Assigning intentionality to institutions, according to Velasquez 
(1983), is simply a way of "elliptically referring to those people in the 
corporation [or in our case, schools] who intentionally brought the act 
about through their direct bodily movements or who knowingly 
contributed to the act" (Velasquez, 1983: 126). Instead of blaming the 
school context or the school itself, then, Velasquez would have us say that 
those persons who knowingly contributed to the context, or failed to 
prevent it when they had the power to do so, intended students to hold 
beliefs uncritically. He claims that corporations "do not themselves 
originate intentions and because they do not themselves carry out 
intentions, corporate policies and procedures cannot be said to originate 
actions" (Velasquez, 1983: 121). Members of the corporation and not the 
corporation itself, according to Velasquez, both originate and carry out 
intentional actions. Thus, he asserts, only the individual members of the 
corporation can rightly be ascribed intentionality. 
Velasquez makes a convincing argument. It is difficult to locate 
where exactly the intentions lie if we don't attribute the intentionality to 
persons. It is true, as Velasquez claims, that schools do not have a mind or 
body that itself can act intentionally. Yet the analogy between 
corporations and schools is not perfect and so we may not be able to 
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hold particular individuals accountable, as we may be able to with 
corporations, for actions that occur as a result of established policies, 
procedures, traditions, and expectations within schools. Granted, school 
administrators, like corporate CEOs, have tremendous say in establishing 
school policies. However, unlike CEOs, school administrators are often far 
more answerable to (and thus their intentions and actions are strongly 
influenced by the wishes, expectations and dictates of) school board 
members, community leaders, parents, and state and federal 
educational mandates. Thus, identifying a particular person or group of 
persons to which we can ascribe intentionality for the educational 
context created and maintained in a school is not as easily done as 
Velasquez suggests is possible for corporations. 
While it is true that schools do not have minds, it may still be 
reasonable to talk about them acting intentionally in regards to 
indoctrination. As we have seen in the last section, the school policies, 
curriculum, decision-making structure, power hierarchy, norms, goals, and 
traditions often play an important role in deciding upon two crucial 
determinants of truth seeking: which beliefs ought to be considered truth-
apt and who ought to belong in the community of inquiry. Further, the 
school context is made and continually influenced by a complex network 
of demands made by a wide range of groups and individuals including: 
parents, business owners, community members, local and national 
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mandates, as well as the various professional and support staff of the 
school. Although it is true that administrators have the authority to create 
policy and set curriculum, they are, to reiterate, answerable to, and thus 
their decisions are importantly shaped by, the school board, state and 
federal requirements, and even, to some degree, the interests and needs 
of their students and teachers. It is difficult, then, to point to any particular 
individual or group as the cause of indoctrinary endeavors that originate 
from the school context. Because we cannot identify any one person or 
group of persons for creating and sustaining an indoctrinary school 
context, it seems reasonable to point to the context itself - or, rather, to 
the school itself. 
There has been a good deal of philosophical analysis on moral 
agency of persons and of collectives. Very little, however, is written on 
institutional agency or institutional intentionality. While Velasquez (1983) 
and some others (see Denis G. Arnold 2006; Larry May 1987; Peter A. 
French 1979) discus corporate intentionality there is nothing in the 
philosophical literature on school intentionality and , as we have just seen, 
schools are distinct from corporations in some significant ways. It is for this 
reason that I turn to the literature on school law where w e do find 
examples of the law attributing intentionality to schools. More specifically, 
I examine legal cases of harassment brought against schools as they 
illustrate how ascribing intentionality to schools rather than to particular 
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individuals is both possible and of practical use. I do not mean to appeal 
to the law as proof that we can and should ascribe intentionality to 
schools. Rather, my use of legal examples is meant to illustrate how we 
can and do sometimes hold schools responsible for what we deem bad 
outcomes even when we cannot attribute intentionality and responsibility 
to individual persons within the school context for these "outcomes". 
Schools have been held liable for harassment under both Title IX 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. The latter of these two, however, 
provides us with a clearer illustration of how we can and sometimes do 
attribute intentionality to schools. In the cases of Adickes v. S.H. Dress and 
Co., Randle v. City of Aurora, and Lankford v. City of Hobart (Youth and 
Schools, 2003), a school district (or municipality) can be charged with 
harassment under the Fourteenth Amendment if the harassment proves to 
be "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' 
with the force of law" (Youth and Schools, 2003: 32). These last cases 
indicate that a school is liable if the context nurtures and encourages 
harassment to the extent that it plays a very significant role in causing and 
sustaining harassment. Thus, if there is a long history of students displaying 
photographs from the Victoria Secret magazine on their lockers, for 
example, or persons displaying in common areas posters of scantily 
dressed women in sexual poses, or sexually inappropriate illustrations in 
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some of the teachers and secretaries' offices, this may constitute 
harassment to such an extent that it becomes normalized. 
In such cases, the school context itself is seen as the agent of 
harassment. Holding responsible each individual who displays 
inappropriate images does not get at either the problem of the school 
policies that allow such displays or the attitudes of all personnel 
responsible for intervening or opposing the displayed material. Moreover, 
holding each individual responsible does not recognize the influence that 
such a coVitext has on any given individual's intentions. For example, if 
person A has no intention to offend and would never consider affixing 
such images to his locker, after seeing that such practice is pervasive and 
considered normal, he may alter his original intentions and join in with 
what his friends and many of the others are doing so he feels that he fits 
in. Thus, if there is a consistent and known history of ignoring harassment 
to the extent that such behavior is not only tolerated but even 
encouraged, then an individual teacher or student, say, would be seen as 
acting in accordance with the unstated custom of the school. 
While it may be argued that such practices would appear to be 
unlikely in today's schools in regards to sexual harassment, it does not 
seem so unlikely in regards to indoctrination. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the ideological, pedagogical, and structural contexts of a 
school can and do nurture and sustain indoctrination. It would seem 
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reasonable, therefore, to ascribe responsibility to a school if it can be 
shown that indoctrinary endeavors are so prevalent and customary as to 
constitute tradition or "the force of law." 
The law on sexual harassment as it is applied under the Fourteenth 
Amendment illustrates for us how in cases where indoctrination is 
occurring and there are no identifiable persons responsible, we can 
sensibly hold the school responsible. If we claim that the school context is 
responsible for indoctrination, we are, on my analysis, claiming that it is 
likely that the outcome of its influence is'that students will hold beliefs in a 
non-truth-seeking manner. Through seeing that indoctrination is a likely 
outcome of the school context and the school could have acted to 
prevent such an outcome and did not, we are implying that the school 
acted intentionally. Ascribing intentionality to the school encourages 
those persons who play a role in developing and maintaining the school 
context to reflect on their desired educational goals and on the likely 
effects the contextual influences will have on how students will come to 
hold their beliefs. In short, although the law may hesitate to identify any 
particular person or group of persons associated with the school as 
responsible for overseeing the implications of providing one sort of context 
versus another, as with sexual harassment, holding the school responsible 
or liable, effectively directs attention to the foreseeable and preventable 
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consequences of cultivating one sort of context vs another within the 
school. 
Even if we cannot say that schools have intentions in a full blown 
sense, I believe I have made enough of a case to show that, because 
schools are significantly involved in determining how students come to 
hold beliefs, we need to bring their role into the picture. Teachers act in 
accordance with school policies and procedures; their actions, in other 
words, are done for reasons that these policies and procedures provide. 
Additionally, the pedagogical, structural, and ideological contexts 
substantially influence student learning and teachers are not always in a 
position to counter this influence. Teacher's intentions, then, are 
significantly subverted by what I've argued we can usefully call the 
intentionality of the school which exists in the school context. Further, 
making teachers aware of the contextual influences on their students' 
learning outcomes aids teachers in developing the best way to avoid 
indoctrination. Finally, indoctrinary influences can and do exist within the 
school context itself and are outside the control of any one person. Thus, 
even on an intentional analysis of indoctrination such as I am proposing, 
attributing responsibility for indoctrination, in some cases, to schools rather 
than individuals makes sense because there is legal precedent illustrating 
it is possible to attribute intentions to institutions such as schools. Further, it 
seems to me, doing so may be required if we are to recognize the 
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considerable role that the school plays in affecting how students come to 
hold beliefs. 
Altering our notion of indoctrination to include schools as sources of 
indoctrination requires that we offer a new definition. Thus, I propose that 
a revised definition of indoctrination reads as follows: A teacher or a 
school indoctrinates when s/he or it intends to get students to hold beliefs 
in a non-truth-seeking manner. Thus, just as we would hold teachers 
responsible for opposing indoctrinary influences and altering any 
indoctrinary endeavors that exist within their classrooms, we must hold all 
persons who are responsible for and who have the power and authority to 
effect changes in the pedagogical, structural, and ideological contexts of 
a school responsible for making appropriate changes to the school 
context to help diminish indoctrinary influences. 
Claiming that schools themselves indoctrinate leads to an 
interesting and important query. Given that I've argued that all beliefs 
are, in principle, open to inquiry, i.e. many more beliefs are truth-apt than 
is generally acknowledged, we must consider whether schools 
indoctrinate if they exclude or omit particular views and beliefs from the 
curriculum. In this query there is an acknowledgement that the school 
curriculum can strongly influence truth seeking activity in two ways: (1) It 
can exclude particular views from being considered truth-apt, i.e. declare 
them or treat them as the sorts of beliefs that are not open to inquiry and, 
242 
(2) It can altogether exclude certain perspectives from the community of 
inquiry. Because schools cannot possibly inquire into all views or teach all 
views and perspectives, there must be a way for them to exclude some 
without putting themselves at serious risk of indoctrination according to 
the alternative analysis offered and defended here; at least if this analysis 
is to be considered seriously plausible and useful. 
It may be helpful to clarify how the proposed analysis can meet the 
challenge by first addressing what it means to say that beliefs are in 
principle open to inquiry. It means, simply, that all beliefs are regarded as 
fallible; and this characterization does not enfa/7 that all beliefs need to be 
inquired into because it does not entail that all beliefs are epistemically 
equal in all respects. They are not. All beliefs may, in principle, be open 
to inquiry but some beliefs are considered "settled" by the relevant 
community of experts, meaning they have been subjected to and have 
withstood extensive inquiry into their truth. Others are "unsettled," 
meaning they continue to be debated among scholars and members of 
the relevant community of inquiry. Others still are considered false, 
erroneous, or without sufficient supporting evidence by the relevant 
community of inquirers. In short, different beliefs have quite varied 
epistemological status. To put the point succinctly, the fact that all beliefs 
are in principle open to inquiry does not entail that any challenge to a 
settled belief is an epistemologically good or worthy challenge, one worth 
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inquiring into. Thus, to avoid indoctrination, schools do not have to admit 
each and every belief into the curriculum. 
Which beliefs are admitted to the curriculum for teaching and for 
investigation will be determined by many factors as schools have a variety 
of purposes and educational goals they seek to achieve. Given that we 
regard schools as institutions charged with the responsibility of initiating 
students into different forms of knowledge, students, it will be obvious, 
should learn enough settled beliefs and the reasons for their settledness to 
be knowledgeable in the various disciplines or subjects they study; they 
should also know what methods are employed to develop knowledge 
within that sort of discipline. Further, by the time they graduate, schools 
should ensure that students should probably know the best most serious 
criticisms of certain well established tenets within the discipline as well as 
critiques of the discipline itself so that they know how to inquire 
knowledgably about the subjects under study. 
I do not here mean to take a side in the debates about whether 
there are distinct forms of knowledge or how many there may be, or 
whether or not the disciplines generally taught in liberal education 
represent them. Nor do I mean to express a position on the question of 
whether schools should teach disciplines or subjects. The point I make 
about the epistemological criterion for inclusion and exclusion can be 
made without taking sides in either of these debates. My point is that one 
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of the criteria for making curricular choices, if we are to avoid 
indoctrination, needs to be epistemological. However, schools often 
have competing purposes - for example, along with wanting to cultivate-
knowledge and understanding, they also want to make children morally 
good, to create a work force of a certain sort for the state, to develop 
citizens suited to take on the responsibilities and obligations of citizenship 
in a pluralistic democracy, and so forth. Thus, school districts may want to 
employ criteria other than epistemological ones to determine not only the 
curriculum but also who should determine the curriculum. 
Teaching truth-seeking is only one of many goals and purposes 
schools have and it is not my intention here to argue that it ought to be 
the only goal or purpose they should have. However, what I do argue, 
given the moral harm associated with indoctrination, is that the 
avoidance of indoctrination is a moral side constraint operating on 
schools in their pursuit of other goals. Whatever else teachers and schools 
are doing to educate students, whatever other tasks they may be 
engaged in, they are not to intend in the strong sense that students hold 
beliefs in a non-truth-seeking fashion. 
There is no simple answer for what schools need to include and 
exclude in the curriculum to reduce their risk of indoctrination. The 
particularities of the situation and social context are relevant, including 
what students do believe in a non-truth-seeking manner or are inclined to 
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or most likely to believe in a non-truth-seeking manner; and this analysis 
cannot, in the abstract, provide a blueprint for every case. It even may be 
that it is not possible for school districts to entirely avoid indoctrination, 
given other aims or purposes they choose to adopt. No analysis of 
indoctrination can guarantee its non-occurrence. However, what 
analyses can do, and what this intentional analysis of indoctrination 
formulated as it is in terms of truth-seeking does do, is provide clearer 
guidelines for determining the occurrence of indoctrination, the costs of it, 
and how to make curricular choices that reduce the risk of it. 
If we are serious about averting indoctrination, we are best served 
by addressing all sources of indoctrination. Allowing a school's context to 
continue to nurture and sustain indoctrination, although teachers may be 
doing what they can to oppose the contextual impact on their students 
inside their classrooms, does not do a thorough enough job of rooting out 
or diminishing indoctrinary endeavors in our schools. We have shown that 
the school (i.e., the policies, traditions, curriculum, decision-making 
structures, etc.) prompts students to hold certain beliefs in a non-truth-
seeking manner by its major role in determining what counts as truth-apt 
assertions and who belongs in the community of inquiry. Arguing that we 
cannot hold any particular person or persons responsible for influences 
that arise outside of the school context and therefore lay outside any 
given individual's control leaves us to determine how we can hold 
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anyone morally responsible for addressing and opposing such influences. 
We need a theory of moral responsibility that will compel all persons who 
have a significant impact on the nature of the school context to work 
toward altering indoctrinary contextual elements. 
We must be careful here. It is important to develop a moral theory 
that holds persons responsible for averting and avoiding indoctrination but 
does not hold individuals morally culpable for cases of indoctrination 
which occur for reasons that lie outside the control of any individual 
person or group of persons - cases, that is, in which indoctrination occurs 
due to contextual conditions. Iris Marion Young (2004) offers such a 
theory. Her "social connection model" holds persons of privilege 
responsible but not morally culpable for racist and oppressive structures. 
According to Young, we need a theory of moral responsibility that 
accounts for persons' participation in oppressive structures "in which 
individual contributions are impossible to disentangle" (Young, 2004). 
Young's alternative model of moral responsibility is meant to be useful in 
cases where, she claims, the consequences of any given individual's 
behavior are unintentional. Her notion of "intentional," however, is 
different than the one used in this dissertation. Young seems to define an 
intentional outcome as that which occurs as a result of what one desires. 
Thus, one only intends to push poor black families out of their homes due 
to increased rents when one's behavior is motivated by the desire to 
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effect such an outcome. Because most privileged whites do not act out 
of such desires, and because their actions are part of a structural system 
that encourages them purchasing property in certain areas that can and 
often does economically force the working class poor out of their homes, 
she does not want to hold the privileged in these sorts of cases morally 
accountable for their actions. She does, however, want to hold them 
morally responsible. In other words, she wants to morally compel them to 
take what actions they can to try and alter the oppressive structures. 
Barbara Applebaum's (2007) analysis of Young's theory is instructive 
here as it provides a clear illustration of how we can apply Young's model 
to students. Applebaum shows that well-meaning white students can, 
and often do, further entrench racist attitudes and engage in racially 
oppressive behavior by acting in accordance with culturally accepted 
norms, practices, and traditions. She asserts that racism is, to a significant 
extent, a product of structural processes that are played out, in part, in 
our culture's institutions. To help alleviate the problem of racism, 
Applebaum employs Young's model to develop an emancipatory 
pedagogy whose goal is not, in Young's word, to "blame, punish, or seek 
redress from those who did it, but rather to enjoin those who participate 
by their actions in the process of collective action to change it" 
(Applebaum, 2007: 464). For Applebaum, finding a moral theory of 
responsibility that does not seek to assign blame but compels persons to 
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take action against the problem of racism suits her aim of finding a model 
that supports her notion of white complicity as being characterized by 
behavior that results largely from acting out long established cultural 
traditions, habits, norms and expectations. In other words, she claims that 
there are often no particular persons to whom we can assign blame for 
white complicity when whites are merely conforming to standard and 
accepted norms. Yet, to stop or help diminish racism, she argues, we 
need to compel persons to alter these oppressive structures and modes of 
accepted behavior. 
Indoctrination, like white complicity in racism, can also occur due to 
reasons that lie beyond the control of any individual person or group of 
persons. It can occur due to the structural, pedagogical, and ideological 
contexts of a school which are the result of a complex set of factors to 
which no person or persons can be blamed. Yet, similar to Applebaum's 
aims for diminishing racism, if we wish to reduce and work toward 
abolishing indoctrination in our schools, we need to encourage and 
morally compel all persons who have a role in formulating and 
maintaining a school's context to work toward opposing those contextual 
elements that encourage and help sustain indoctrination. Thus, an 
analysis of responsibility which avoids assignation of blame yet illuminates 
possibilities of action in opposing racist structures, is helpful in motivating 
whites to take action against racism. 
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Concluding Remarks 
To be able to foresee likely student outcomes and to address 
indoctrinary elements of a school's context, educators must not only 
recognize the part that the school context plays in indoctrination, they 
must also take responsibility for working toward opposing and averting it 
both inside classrooms and in the school context itself. Defining 
indoctrination as something that both schools as well as teachers do is a 
reasonable theoretical claim. It is adequately (if not thoroughly) 
supported by legal cases of attributing intentionality to schools. It is also 
an importantly useful notion as it allows for more refined judgments within 
the nexus of causes that both promote and enable indoctrination thus 
equipping educators with an enriched understanding of how they can 
best avoid it. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE PAYOFF: ILLUSTRATING THE PRACTICAL USEFULNESS OF THE 
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF INDOCTRINATION 
I have thus far in this dissertation laid out what I take to be a better 
alternative analysis of indoctrination. To gain a better understanding of 
how this alternative conception can be of practical use, in this chapter I 
provide detailed examples of two different teachers, Mr. Dubois and Ms. 
Sandora. Both teachers work in the same school and both teach the 
same course. Peace Studies. I keep the school and course the same to 
illustrate how this alternative conception is able to distinguish between 
even subtle differences in teaching. I select a course in peace studies in 
order to return to and address one of the concerns that first prompted this 
work- that peace educators are particularly vulnerable to the charge of 
indoctrination although, when it is levied, it is not clear precisely what this 
charge entails and how best to answer it. 
The first teacher, Mr. Dubois, for the most part, is an excellent 
teacher. Yet, in regards to a particular set of beliefs (i.e., about the 
superiority of non-violent action over war), he does not do enough to 
diminish the chance that his students will come to hold these beliefs in a 
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non-truth-seeking manner. His is an interesting case because for the most 
part, he encourages his students to hold their beliefs in a rationally 
deliberative and thoughtfully reflective manner. Further, because he is 
such a likeable and engaging teacher, his students tend to accept the 
beliefs he professes, particularly if he professes them as if they were 
settled. The second teacher, Ms. Sandora, whose teaching is very similar 
to Mr. Dubois's, takes steps to avoid indoctrination even when teaching 
beliefs she too wants her students to accept as true. Hers is an interesting 
case because she illustrates the skillful means of teaching students to hold 
beliefs that she herself advocates in a truth-seeking way. To set the stage 
and characterize somewhat the situation of their teaching, I first provide 
details of the school's ideological, pedagogical, and structural contexts. I 
then describe both teachers' educational efforts, and analyze them 
employing the alternative conception of indoctrination I have developed. 
The School Context 
The high school where Mr. Dubois and Ms. Sandora teach, Johnson 
Memorial High School, is what some people might describe as "fairly 
progressive." A little more than half the Social Studies and English 
instructors make a concerted and sophisticated effort to teach from the 
perspectives of the disenfranchised and oppressed groups in societies 
throughout the world. In addition to the Peace Studies courses, for 
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example, the Social Studies department offers world cultures courses 
taught from the perspective of the oppressed native peoples; it also 
teaches an American Studies course that focuses on such issues as white 
privilege, gender and sex oppression, and U.S. ethnocentrism. The English 
department offers a course on Women's Literature, an ecology literature 
course, and an American Literature course that emphasizes a broad 
range of culturally diverse American authors. In addition, at least one of 
the biology courses is taught as a course on sustainability. More 
conventionally, the remaining courses in English, Social Studies, Science, 
and the courses taught in the World Language, Business, and Math 
departments are fairly traditional - teaching students beliefs widely 
accepted in mainstream society. 
The ideological context in this school, then, is fairly mixed. However, 
students can conceivably graduate without taking any courses, for 
example, that teach the less conventional perspectives. Teachers who 
profess more conventional notions versus those who espouse more 
marginalized views are readily identified by the students. Thus, students 
may, and often do, select courses based not only on subject matter but 
on the teacher as well. Peace Studies courses are largely made up of 
students who have "liberal" ideals and are at least somewhat familiar with 
the perspectives and values advanced in the class. Yet, there is always a 
handful or more of students who hold more conventional beliefs and 
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ideals but are in Peace Studies because their friend is taking it or because 
it is offered at a convenient time. Some even take the class to "straighten 
out" all the "liberal hippies" who are in the course. While both instructors 
teach the same particular content and both profess similar views about 
the morality of employing violent means to attain our ends, as we shall 
see, the content of what they teach is not what is at issue when we 
characterize only one of these teachers as indoctrinary on my analysis. 
In addition to a fairly diverse ideological context, the pedagogical 
context is also relatively diverse. Most of the teachers at Johnson 
Memorial employ a mix of instructional methods - some lecturing, some in-
class small and large group activities, some question and answer sessions, 
and some lively student discussions. In all these courses, teachers 
generally describe what they are doing as providing students with 
important information (what we might call teaching settled beliefs) that 
will allow students to better understand their cultural traditions, to succeed 
with their applications to higher education, and be prepared for the jobs 
they seek in the workforce, as well as, yes, to deliberate over the truth of 
the claims they teach. Whether they indoctrinate or not requires careful 
scrutiny of not only what they desire, but the manner in which their 
students are likely to hold their beliefs given the teacher's educational 
efforts within the particular context in which they work. Generally 
speaking, though, most teachers at Johnson Memorial encourage their 
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students to think carefully about the beliefs discussed in class so they may 
understand not only what claims they make about the world but what sort 
of evidence supports these beliefs. In short, most teachers want their 
students to hold beliefs based on good reasons and be open to 
questioning such beliefs if new and opposing evidence should arise. 
While the pedagogical and ideological contexts are fairly mixed 
and diverse, the structural context of Johnson Memorial is quite typical, it 
seems, for U.S. public high schools. Students are encouraged to 
participate in their Student Council and on various student committees. 
However, these groups are only permitted limited decision -making 
power: for example, they may decide when the next student dance will 
be, how to raise money for their class, which faculty member to honor in 
the yearbook, and what to select for their senior class gift. Students are 
discouraged by administrators and most of the faculty from expressing 
their views on educational matters such as curriculum choices, assessment 
methods, and on policy matters such as dress codes, rules of conduct for 
students, and discipline procedures. In this school, then, students do not 
have a venue for and are dissuaded from taking part in the sort of 
decision making processes that affect their daily educational experiences 
at school. In short, the structural context in this school operates in a top-
down, hierarchical manner affording students little to no opportunity to 
engage in meaningful decision making processes. 
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Mr. Dubois's Class 
Mr. Dubois has been teaching at Johnson Memorial High School for 
12 years. A well liked teacher by the students and respected among his 
colleagues, he is easily recognizable in his button down green or beige 
corduroy shirt adorned with one of the many striped ties he owns and a 
pair of faded and well worn blue jeans. In class, he sits casually and 
comfortably on his desk, one foot on the ground the other swinging easily 
just above the floor and smoothing down with one hand the few hairs 
remaining on his head. A smile plays on his lips as he welcomes his 
students to another day of Peace Studies, a course he is committed to as 
he believes it plays a small but important role in helping the world 
become a more just and peaceful place. 
Two of Mr. Dubois's major goals in this course are to teach his 
students about a side of history often overlooked or opposed in the more 
mainstream U.S. History courses, and to teach them about the history, 
theory, and techniques of peace movements. He works hard to create 
an engaging learning environment, and his enthusiasm for the subject is 
infectious as many of his students get caught up in his excitement about 
the information taught and the ideas they discuss. In addition, Mr. Dubois 
assigns many creative projects where students can show what they have 
learned in a manner that builds on their strengths. For example, artistic 
students develop projects that utilize their artistic talents such as poetry 
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books, murals, and illustrated songs. Mr. Dubois also brings in guest 
speakers, shows interesting videos, and engages students in group 
discussions about the issues raised in class. 
Students in this course are encouraged to discuss and debate 
many unsettled beliefs and assertions because Mr. Dubois feels it is an 
effective way to get students to think about the various arguments and 
perspectives regarding these views. So, for example, after seeing a video 
on the history of Jews in America, students debate over whether Jews 
should have been welcomed into the black U.S. Civil Rights movement in 
the 1960s. Some students argue that they should not have been allowed 
to participate because, at the time, many blacks wanted the movement 
to consist only of African-Americans so it maintained its focus on issues of 
oppression specific to blacks in the U.S. Other students argue that Jews 
were in a particularly good position as co-sufferers of oppression to 
empathize and thus fight with the blacks. 
Mr. Dubois sits on his perch at the front of the room and oversees 
these discussions, often staying silent so students have the opportunity to 
voice their own views. He occasionally interjects with a comment such as: 
"Ah, excellent point, Jessica. What do the rest of you think?" to get others 
involved in the conversation if no one seems to be ready to speak. On 
occasion, he intervenes to introduce a relevant perspective or idea if he 
feels it is being overlooked. Thus, students may argue over whether the 
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New York Times is predominantly liberal or conservative, and Mr. Dubois 
may suggest that it is neither - that it errs on the side of the current 
administration whether they are democrats or republicans. 
For many unsettled beliefs, then, Mr. Dubois encourages his students 
to engage in lively discussions and hopes and expects that his students will 
become so involved in the issues being discussed that they will think more 
deeply about their beliefs and those raised by others in class. If asked, Mr. 
Dubois would say that he wants his students to eventually adopt the view 
that is best supported by the evidence. For now, though, with many 
unsettled beliefs, he recognizes that there is much more for them to learn 
about these beliefs and thus, they ought to continue to think about them 
and look more into the evidence available regarding these beliefs. 
With settled beliefs, Mr. Dubois may allow some discussion, but he 
usually tells his students what the experts claim to be true and, time 
permitting, gives them the substantiating reasons. Thus, if students start to 
argue over whether France's economic condition played a significant 
causal role in the French Revolution, Mr. Dubois may allow for enough 
discussion to hear what a student may say in contrast to such a view. 
Typically, however, he tells his students that historians overwhelmingly 
agree that, while there are many factors that led to the Revolution, 
France's poor economic state and inequitable tax distribution was an 
important factor in the underclass revolt. 
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The classroom dialogue over settled beliefs is fairly limited as 
students are taught that they cannot discuss every idea raised in class 
and thus, while they may take up inquiry regarding settled beliefs on their 
own or in their other courses, for the sake of time, discussions will be 
encouraged only with beliefs generally considered to be unsettled. The 
classroom dialogue over unsettled beliefs, however, is lively and thought 
provoking with Mr. Dubois running up to the board to quickly write down a 
phrase, word, or idea that his students have raised, exclaiming, "Yes. 
Good. Keep going!" in order to keep the discussion both focused and 
moving along. Mr. Dubois, however, does not encourage such debate 
and independent thinking when it comes to assertions about the moral 
and practical superiority of non-violent action over the practice of war. 
For Mr. Dubois, such assertions are settled. He thus makes it implicitly clear 
to his students that there is no reasonable alternative to the view that war 
is morally and practically unjustifiable. He advocates a strict pacifist view 
and he provides many good reasons, arguments, and a great deal of 
evidence to support his view. 
Although Mr. Dubois provides good reasons for his beliefs about the 
viability of non-violence and its advantages over war, he does not teach 
his students to inquire into any of the counter arguments and reasons put 
forth by scholars and experts on these matters. Students in Mr. Dubois's 
class learn what Mr. Dubois believes and they learn the good reasons for 
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his beliefs. Because his students generally like him, trust that he speaks as 
an expert on his subject, and respect his commitment and love of his 
subject, they rarely question or challenge such beliefs. Thus, students do 
not typically learn to critically consider the beliefs raised in class about war 
and non-violence in light of the available evidence. In short, Mr. Dubois 
does not provide his students with the opportunity to settle these beliefs for 
themselves. So, a discussion about the Iraq war looks something like the 
following. 
When a student, Keon, says that the Iraq war is illegal and immoral, 
Mr. Dubois points to him, smiles and says, "Yes, very good, Keon! It's illegal 
because the U.S. and Britain's preemptive invasion in Iraq violated UN 
conventions, and it's immoral because we are killing thousands of 
innocent civilians in a war that never should have begun." When another 
student, Bryn, objects and says that the U.S. should have invaded Iraq 
because it got rid of the tyrant, Saddam Hussein, and will bring 
democracy and freedom to Iraq, Mr. Dubois says, "Well, that's a common 
enough belief, Bryn, but you should know that one of the major reasons 
that the U.S. invaded Iraq is to gain access to their oil as Iraq has one the 
largest oil reserves in the world and the U.S. did not have any rights to it 
before the invasion." Mr. Dubois does not lose the enthusiasm in these 
discussions that he shows in the student debates over what he considers 
unsettled beliefs. In fact, Mr. Dubois still smiles, still shows his love and 
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commitment to the subject, and still treats his students with kindness and 
respect. While he makes every effort to not have anyone feel badly for 
voicing their beliefs, he is careful to point out where they went wrong in 
their thinking when they express views that oppose or challenge the view 
that war is unjustified and immoral. Thus, though his students enjoy his 
class and are often encouraged to express their own views on many ideas 
and beliefs taught, they are, we might predict, subtlely discouraged from 
speaking as openly and freely about beliefs that challenge the view that 
war is immoral and unjustified. So, in this example, students do not learn 
that although there is some good reason to think one cause of the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq is control over the oil resources of that country, this is not 
incompatible with thinking the US also had interests in toppling a dictator 
and building a more sympathetic climate for democracy. Nor do 
students learn to inquire into the authoritative status of UN conventions. 
Mr. Dubois believes that his students are free to choose which views 
to adopt because they are exposed to differing and opposing beliefs 
from different teachers. He doesn't think he needs to spend the little time 
he has with his students discussing more conventional and generally 
accepted ideas about morally acceptable usages of war because 
students are taught these views in many of their other classes and are 
exposed to them in the mainstream media. He wants to spend what time 
he has with his students teaching them his alternative views and their 
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supporting reasons as well as the arguments against their opposing, more 
conventional notions. 
The alternative conception of indoctrination I've advanced focuses 
our attention on Mr. Dubois's intentions. To try to get an accurate reading 
of his intentions it is useful, helpful, to look at the content of his course, his 
instructional methods, and the consequences of his teaching all within the 
pedagogical, ideological and structural context of his school. His Peace 
Studies course teaches highly controversial claims - such as, there are 
realistic alternatives to war for settling national and international disputes 
and opposing even severe acts of injustice. It is not likely, therefore, that 
students will adopt his claims as unequivocally true given the marginalized 
nature of the views he teaches and given that they are continually 
exposed to counter arguments and opposing perspectives and beliefs 
throughout their lives. 
It may be worth noting here that if Mr. Dubois taught more 
conventional ideas and beliefs - such as the belief that the U.S. bombing 
of Japan during WWII was justified as it ended the war quickly and thus 
saved lives in the long run - and taught them as if they were settled, his 
students would be far less likely to question such views as they are beliefs 
that are rarely challenged in other courses or in mainstream thinking. 
Teachers of more conventional beliefs and ideas, then, need to take 
particular and deliberate steps in interfering in the natural tendency of 
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students to accept what their teachers tell them as true. Mr. Dubois is very 
aware that the subject he teaches is highly controversial and that he can 
reasonably expect that students will naturally question his views with the 
counter arguments they've grown up hearing and believing. He thus feels 
it unnecessary to spend time having students read and discuss opposing 
views in class. However, as I've argued elsewhere in this dissertation, 
students do not naturally acquire views with the good reasons that there 
may be for them, nor do they challenge views necessarily for good 
reasons; in short, unless students ore taught'and encouraged to engage in 
rational deliberation of various and opposing claims, they will be unlikely 
to do so. And so as for Mr. Dubois, however much he affords students the 
(good) reasons for some views and presents (good) arguments against 
other views, we can not yet be reassured that he is teaching his students, 
or that his students are learning in other classes, to engage in rational 
deliberation themselves over the truth of the views he professes as settled 
but which in fact are unsettled. Although we may feel confident that Mr. 
Dubois knows how to, we are not yet assured that his students know how 
to seek the truth about the matters under consideration and learn to settle 
such beliefs for themselves. Because Mr. Dubois's students are not taught 
to hold beliefs in a truth-seeking manner about war and non-violence that 
Mr. Dubois asserts in class, we can reasonably foresee that they are likely 
to choose what to believe about these assertions based on considerations 
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other than reasons, evidence, and arguments. They may, for example, 
make choices based on loyalty to their family's beliefs or based on their 
emotional attachment to a particular teacher, or indeed on their aversion 
to this particular teacher. 
Although Mr. Dubois's students can provide reasons for the beliefs 
they acquire in his class about war and non-violence, we cannot 
reasonably expect them to hold these beliefs because of the reasons, nor 
can we expect that they will likely question these beliefs in the face of 
new and opposing good evidence against them. Now, to be sure, this is " 
a hazard of the profession. Anyone undertaking to teach students beliefs 
knows the possibility, indeed the likelihood exists that students will hold 
beliefs based on all kinds of irrelevant considerations. The question is 
whether what the teacher does increases this likelihood or diminishes it. In 
regards to assertions he makes about war and non-violent action, Mr. 
Dubois does little to interfere with this probable consequence of teaching, 
although he does an excellent job interfering with this probable outcome 
in regards to the other beliefs he teaches. Thus, if he handles the beliefs 
about war and non-violence similarly to the way he handles other 
unsettled beliefs, Mr. Dubois could avoid indoctrinating his students into 
these beliefs. 
Mr. Dubois does many things well: he engages his students in 
interesting class discussions, provides meaningful readings from which the 
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students learn much and enjoy, and he provides a great deal of 
information of the sort that students may not be exposed to in mainstream 
society and in courses that teach more conventional notions and 
perspectives. My concern with Mr. Dubois is that, although he does not 
desire that his students hold views in a non-truth-seeking fashion, he is at 
risk of effecting such an outcome with respect to his assertions about war 
and non-violence. Thus, by the analysis of indoctrination I'm proposing in 
this work, we can say that it is likely that Mr. Dubois is indoctrinating the 
peace values and assertions he professes in class. I say likely because my 
analysis leaves it open for Mr. Dubois to respond appropriately by pointing 
to what he thinks he does to get students to both see the professed 
indoctrinary assertions as truth apt and to acquire the skills needed to 
inquire into their truth status, i.e. what he does to interrupt what he can 
foresee are likely outcomes of his teaching given his knowledge of the 
context and so forth. 
In Mr. Dubois's case the alternative analysis of indoctrination 
enables us to recognize even fairly subtle indications of possible 
indoctrination. Further, in the case of identifying and addressing 
indoctrination by an individual teacher, it shows that we need to examine 
the teacher's instructional methods, the student outcomes, and the 
pedagogical, ideological, and structural contexts to have a clear enough 
indication of the indoctrinary intent. In the case of Mr. Dubois we see 
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that, given the context in which he works, his students do not come to his 
class prepared to adopt a truth-seeking approach to the views he 
espouses, or at least not all his students do, and likely most do not. Thus, 
because he does not take the time to instruct them to do so in regard to 
the particular beliefs he cares so much about, it is quite likely that they will 
come to hold these beliefs in a non-truth-seeking way. This analysis really 
presses teachers (as well as teacher educators and pre-service teachers) 
to examine their intentions and attend to the school context. In other 
words, it prompts educators to look at what they hope to achieve and 
what it is they are likely to achieve given the particular context in which 
they work. 
Ms. Sandora's Class 
Ms. Sandora teaches in the same school and teaches the same 
course as Mr. Dubois. Thus, the ideological, pedagogical, and structural 
contexts in which she teaches are the same as with Mr. Dubois. What is 
different, as we shall see, are her intentions regarding how students hold 
beliefs about war and non-violence. Like Mr. Dubois, Ms. Sandora 
believes that teaching Peace Studies will help students adopt more 
peaceful attitudes and work toward creating a more just and non-violent 
world. She too provides her students with perspectives, values, attitudes 
and beliefs they have rarely if ever encountered in their more mainstream 
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courses. Furthermore, her students enjoy her class as they find the 
readings and lectures interesting, and they enjoy the discussions they 
have in class. Finally, like Mr. Dubois, Ms. Sandora spends very little time 
teaching students views and perspectives that oppose those advocated 
by peace scholars because she, like Mr. Dubois, reasons that students are 
exposed to such opposing views a great deal in their other courses and in 
the mainstream media. 
Unlike Mr. Dubois, however, Ms. Sandora treats assertions about war 
and non-violence as unsettled. Thus, in her class discussions, students are 
expected to not only express their thoughts and ideas about such beliefs, 
they are encouraged to inquire into the reasons supporting these beliefs 
as well as some of the best opposing arguments regarding them. I raise 
two similar examples to those discussed in Mr. Dubois's case and show 
how Ms. Sandora handles her students' comments in class about war and 
peace differently than does Mr. Dubois. 
Ms. Sandora, like Mr. Dubois, is a well liked teacher. Although her 
dress is more modern and stylish, she has a similarly casual yet enthusiastic 
demeanor with her students. The desks in her class are arranged in one 
big circle and she sits at a different student desk each day within the 
circle so she can, as she says, "Look at her students from a different 
perspective each day." She jokes with them that she likes to spread the 
joy by allowing each a turn to sit next to her. At first her students think it a 
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bit odd that she sits among them, but soon come to see that she 
genuinely wants to hear their ideas and give them the respect they 
deserve by being a member of the discussion and not, in her words, "an 
overpowering authoritarian leader." Although her manner is easy, she 
demands that her students take these discussions seriously, preparing fully 
for them the night before, listening attentively when others speak, and 
contributing with sincere and honest comments about what they truly 
think: that is, what they genuinely find confusing, disagreeable, interesting, 
mistaken, or right on the mark about the subject or issue at hand. For 
most discussions, Ms. Sandora's students act in a similar way to Mr. 
Dubois's. The difference occurs in the classroom dialogue about beliefs 
regarding the moral and practical superiority of non-violence over war. 
And this is where we see how Mr. Dubois can do a better job of engaging 
his students in such discussions so as to help ensure that his students adopt 
beliefs in a truth-seeking manner. 
On the first or second day of the course, Ms. Sandora engages her 
students in an activity that she hopes will get them to begin to see the 
beauty and importance of adopting an open-minded and truth-seeking 
attitude toward ideas and beliefs that will be raised in class. She hands 
out to each student a manila colored, card stock, 8/4x11 inch sheet of 
paper. She asks that her students cut out holes of varying sizes in the 
paper, some in the shape of triangles, some in circles, and some in 
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squares. She also asks that her students make sure that they leave over 
half the paper without any cut outs in it but that the holes are scattered 
across the paper. Some students take to the task with the utmost care, 
slowly sketching out the shapes with a pencil before taking up the scissors. 
Other students simply attack the paper with the scissors and start cutting 
rough approximations of the shapes asked for. When they are all done, 
Mr. Sandora puts her own paper with the shapes cut out at arms length in 
front of her face and asks the students to do the same. "Now, look 
around at the class through your paper template," she says. "I want you 
to not only notice what you are able to see through your cut outs, but I 
also want you to notice what you don't see." Students are silent while 
they look around the room through their templates - their silence, it seems, 
is more due to confusion than any sort of interest in what they're seeing as 
they occasionally steal a questioning look at a friend. "Okay," Ms. 
Sandora says. "Do you all notice the things you see and don't see?" 
Students nod in agreement. "Now hand your template to the person 
sitting on your left and look through their template." Students trade to the 
left and, once again, look through the templates at their class. "Do you 
notice different things through your neighbor's template that you didn't 
see through yours?" she asks. "And, are there different things that you 
don't see with this new template that you were able to see with yours?" 
Again, students nod in agreement. "You may now put down your 
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templates." When they do, Ms. Sandora explains the purpose of this 
activity. 
"The templates you created are a metaphor for how each of us 
sees the world. None of us is able to see everything all the time and so we 
only notice some things while others go unnoticed. Our templates are 
continually being formed and re-formed. The various shaped cut outs 
represent our particular perspectives, attitudes, beliefs, and habits of 
mind. Such things are formulated in our lives by the views and beliefs of 
our loved ones, our religion, the ideas professed in our local community 
and in the media; they are formulated by our fears and hopes, our desires 
and interests. In short, each of us has a different template because each 
of us has a unique set of experiences that shape who we are and what 
we see and don't see in the world. Yet, despite our individual differences, 
many of us in this classroom, but not all, have grown up in the same 
community, and are therefore affected by very similar cultural 
experiences. Thus, those raised in similar cultures tend to have many 
commonalities in their templates." 
"Imagine now," Ms. Sandora continues, "that you are talking with 
someone who has a completely different template than you do. You 
speak about things that you see quite clearly, your friends see, and you 
are accustomed to having people see and talk about. This other person 
has no idea what you are talking about and speaks to you about what he 
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sees and what he notices in the world. You each look at each other and, 
for a moment, think the other may be a bit crazy. 'What is he going on 
about?' you think because he is seeing things you never even knew 
existed. People who have vastly different life experiences often have very 
different templates from ours and therefore see the world quite differently 
than we do." 
Ms. Sandora stops and notices that her students seem to be 
following her, thus she continues. "What I want us to do in this class is 
begin to recognize that we see the world through a template and we are 
not typically aware that we do so. Instead, we think we have a clear 
picture of all of reality without any filters or interference. There are things, 
in other words, that we are not seeing and we are completely unaware 
that we're not seeing them; it never occurs to us that such things even 
exist. So, what I want is for us to learn two things: 1) I want us to learn that 
we all have different templates and we need to listen openly and 
carefully when someone else in class is describing something - an 
experience, an idea, or a belief - because they are describing something 
that they can see but we may not be able to or we do not see in the 
same way because our templates are different; 2) I want us to also 
become more aware that there are things we may be overlooking - some 
ideas that oppose what we always assumed to be correct, or some new 
perspective we have never before looked into. Doing these things," she 
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says, and pauses to look around with the utmost seriousness and wonder, 
as if she is describing an amazing and powerful journey, "will continually 
put new cut outs in your template and allow you to see more and more of 
the world." 
She raises a finger in warning. "Now," she says again, taking the 
time to look all the way around the circle, "just because we are able to 
see lots of new things, does not mean we have to agree with everything. 
What I want is for you to develop and grow in your understanding of 
different beliefs, ideas, attitudes, and perspectives so that you may test 
your own beliefs in light of these new insights. However, understanding 
doesn't always lead to agreeing. I'm not so much concerned with 
whether you believe this idea or that idea. Rather, I'm looking for you to 
change how you hold your beliefs. What I'm hoping for is that the beliefs 
you do hold will be based on a sincere and carefully considered 
understanding of all the evidence available to us and that you will 
continue to be open to re-considering your beliefs if something comes 
along and puts a new cut out in your template and you see something 
you had until then never noticed." 
Many students look back at their templates with new found respect. 
Some even take them back up and look through them again, noticing 
even more acutely what they are seeing and what they are not. To keep 
this lesson alive in their minds, Ms. Sandora brings up the metaphor of the 
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template occasionally throughout the course, reminding students to listen 
openly and attentively to other students and try and truly understand the 
ideas being professed in their readings. Thus, although Ms. Sandora, like 
Mr. Dubois, would like all her students to agree with her that non-violent 
action is a realistic and morally superior alternative to war, she is more 
concerned with her students learning to settle these beliefs for themselves 
through careful deliberation of all the available evidence regarding such 
beliefs. 
The concern, then, for Ms. Sandora is that she teach her students to 
be open to engaging in truth-seeking inquiry regarding all the beliefs 
raised in class. Not all forms of inquiry will do. As Misak (2000) points out, 
genuine inquiry involves asking questions and exploring issues with the aim 
of getting at the best understanding possible of the given issue or belief. 
Students who are trying to win a debate or merely show that they are 
clever enough to raise counter-posing claims are not truth-seeking. Ms. 
Sandora models the sort of inquiry she is looking for with her students. For 
example, a student, Abey, says in her class that she thinks the U.S. was 
right to invade Iraq because, as she puts it, "It's our duty as a powerful 
nation to bring freedom and democracy to the oppressed Iraqi citizens 
whose human rights were being violated by the violent and corrupt 
Saddam Hussein." Ms. Sandora first listens attentively to Abey by allowing 
her to have her say without interruption. Then, to be sure that she 
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understands her properly, Ms. Sandora repeats what she thinks Abey said. 
In this way, Abey feels heard and feels that her ideas are being treated 
with respect. Thus, Ms. Sandora asks Abey if she is saying that declaring 
war on a country is acceptable if one's aims are to help citizens who are 
powerless to help themselves escape from the violent and oppressive 
actions of a tyrannical ruler and to help them form a democratic 
government. If Abey agrees, then Ms. Sandora asks if anyone has a 
genuine question - that is, a question that one is truly curious about and 
wants to hear an answer to (Anthony Weston, 2001) - or has a comment 
in response to Abey's claim. One student, Miguel, asks how important it 
was to the U.S. to bring democracy and freedom to Iraq. Sheila asks if the 
war will be able to bring peace and democracy. "Has such a war ever 
ended in peace and the development of democracy?" she asks. 
Tyrone makes an opposing claim saying that he thinks the U.S. was 
wrong to invade Iraq because it broke international laws and he says, 
"The U.S. government doesn't care so much about helping Iraqi citizens as 
it does about gaining access to their oil." In response, Ms. Sandora asks 
him if he feels it is wrong to declare war on a nation when doing so 
violates conventions established by the United Nations and whether it is 
wrong to use military means to gain access to another nation's valuable 
resources. Tyrone agrees and Ms. Sandora asks if anyone has a genuine 
question for Tyrone. Billy asks Tyrone what laws were broken and if these 
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laws have ever been broken before. Ian asks how much oil Iraq has and 
why the U.S. would need to declare war on Iraq to get access to their oil. 
"Why doesn't the U.S. just buy the oil?" he asks. 
Students in Ms. Sandora's class did not start out knowing how to ask such 
questions. They had to be taught how to engage in truth-seeking inquiry. 
However, when a teacher like Ms. Sandora places such importance on 
inquiry and expects the learning lines to move from student to student 
and not only from teacher to student, the inquiry can go wrong in various 
ways because the students ore learning how to do it, they are not yet 
skillful at it. But such goings astray can be opportunities for inquiry about 
inquiry, rather than simply occasions for teacher correction. So, for 
example, invariably when students are given the liberty to inquire with one 
another, there are some students who think that the nature and point of 
inquiry is to challenge everything. Consider the student who challenges 
almost everything others say, regardless of what it is they say. 
In the beginning of Ms. Sandora's course, for example, whenever a 
student made a comment, another student, Theresa, argued for an 
opposing view, regardless of the perspective being raised. When Sean 
said that Hitler would have been a very difficult leader to effectively 
oppose non-violently, Theresa objected by asking if Sean really knows that 
Hitler was primarily responsible for the Holocaust and not someone in his 
administration. When another student, Kari, claimed that we ought to be 
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careful as consumers of diamonds so we do the best we can not to buy 
what some refer to as "blood" diamonds, Theresa said that there is no 
way we can know for sure as an individual purchaser whether they are 
"bloody" or not so we're better off not buying any diamonds. 
Theresa's points and comments are not necessarily irrelevant or 
unimportant; in fact, she often raises very good points. The problem is that 
Theresa has the wrong idea about truth-seeking inquiry. Asking no 
questions and offering no critical commentary is problematic. However, 
so too is having a mistaken notion of what constitutes inquiry. Ms. Sandora 
wants to encourage her students to hold the beliefs she professes in a 
critically deliberative manner. She is fully aware that her students like her 
and want to please her. She also recognizes that within our culture and 
schooling system, students will hold some beliefs in a non-truth-seeking 
manner- that this is quite foreseeable (perhaps even in part because it 
may be a psychological requirement that we hold some beliefs this way 
some times). Thus, Ms. Sandora acknowledges this "truth" and seeks to 
takes steps to ensure that her own students regard beliefs she deals with 
as truth apt by prompting them to hold the beliefs she teaches in a truth-
seeking manner and deliberately undertaking actions to interrupt what is 
foreseeable with respect to the beliefs she deals with. She does this by first 
respecting their contributions to class, then by encouraging them to look 
further into their beliefs. She reminds them sometimes that the questions 
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she asks them are to help them increase the number of cut outs in their 
templates so they are better positioned to see more of what there is to 
see which allows them a greater understanding of their beliefs. 
She also is aware, however, that students need to be taught to 
engage in a certain kind of inquiry - one which aims at truth. One way 
Ms. Sandora handles this is by laying out clear guidelines for class 
discussions at the beginning of the course, giving them to her students in 
writing, and reminding them about the guidelines periodically throughout 
the course. So, for example, she states that all students need to 
participate in class discussions in such a way that they encourage deeper 
and broader understandings of the issue at hand, and that they make all 
students feel comfortable participating in the discussion. No student, 
therefore, should dominate the discussion by speaking too often or 
speaking in a tone that disrespects the views of others. She asks her 
students to first be sure that they engage in attentive listening by allowing 
their classmates to speak without interruption. Then they need to seek to 
fully understand what is being said. "Try the belief on as if it were your 
own and think about what strengths such a belief might have and what 
reasons would support it," she says. "Then try to see what part of the 
belief you could agree with. Acknowledge that 'common ground' 
(Weston, 2001: 229) if there is some and look to build on that so the inquiry 
can proceed to deepen our understanding of the issue at hand." 
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The sort of questions and comments Theresa was making become 
more constructive as she and her classmates learn how to engage in the 
sort of inquiry whose aim is an ever developing understanding of the 
issues, claims, and beliefs being discussed. Ms. Sandora encourages such 
inquiry regarding assertions made about war and non-violence as much 
as she does regarding other sorts of beliefs. Thus, unlike Mr. Dubois, she 
does not simply agree with the student who supports peace values and 
correct the student who challenges them. Instead, by teaching her 
students to engage in truth-seeking inquiry, she prompts her students to 
settle these beliefs for themselves in a truth-seeking manner. 
Concluding Remarks 
In these examples, it is up to Mr. Dubois and Ms. Sandora to work 
with their students to ensure that they engage in truth-seeking inquiry 
regarding the beliefs raised in class. As we've seen in these examples, 
students do not typically come to their classes ready and able to inquire 
into the truth of the beliefs the teachers profess, particularly if they treat 
them as settled beliefs. If the pedagogical context were different, if many 
of the other instructors prepared students to critically deliberate over the 
epistemic worthiness of all beliefs taught in school, then Mr. Dubois and 
Ms. Sandora could perhaps expect that their students would be able and 
motivated to adopt the beliefs professed in their classes about war and 
non-violence in a truth-seeking manner. Additionally, if the ideological 
context was different in that they taught in a peace school within a 
peace community, both teachers would have to take some time to be 
sure that their students understood some of the best opposing reasons 
and arguments to those advanced by peace scholars. 
Although the examples here of Mr. Dubois and Ms. Sandora 
illustrate the important difference in the way each instructor handles 
inquiry into beliefs about war and non-violence, the alternative 
conception of indoctrination offered here shows us that we must look 
beyond the individual classroom. To best understand how teachers and 
schools can help reduce their risk of indoctrination, we need to look at a 
teacher's instructional methods, the context she teaches, the 
consequences of her educational efforts, and we must examine the 
pedagogical, ideological, and structural contexts in which such teaching 
occurs. 
The alternative analysis of indoctrination defended here is able to 
distinguish between the intentions of Mr. Dubois and Ms. Sandora by 
focusing our attention on what goes on inside their classrooms within the 
particular context in which they work. We see that, while Mr. Dubois does 
many things well, and his desires and goals as an educator may well be 
admirable, given the school's context, he would do better to treat his 
beliefs about non-violence and war in a manner similar to the way he 
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teaches other unsettled beliefs. If he did so, Mr. Dubois would be more 
likely to get students to hold these beliefs about war and peace in a truth 
seeking fashion and to settle them for themselves. Moreover, we see that 
because Ms. Sandora takes steps to help ensure that her students will be 
open to inquiring into the truth of her assertions about war and non-
violence (as well as all other beliefs and assertions raised in class), and 
also takes steps to ensure that they inquire about inquiry, it is foreseeable 
that her students will hold such beliefs in a truth-seeking manner. 
While Ms. Sandora uses the template metaphor as a prompt for 
encouraging truth-seeing inquiry, there are many other ways that 
teachers achieve similar results. Some teachers do not take a great deal 
of classroom time to allow students to inquire into the truth of beliefs raised 
in the course, but they require their students to write several smaller (say, 
3-5 pages) and one or two longer (8-12 pages) papers where students 
must not only research a particular idea or view (e.g., the self-immolation 
practiced by some Buddhist monks to protest the Vietnam War), take a 
stand (e.g., Self-immolation should not be considered an act of non-
violence), and defend it being sure to explore and address the best 
opposing argument(s) to the one they're defending. Other teachers 
encourage their students to continually consider the evidence they 
provide in their course and compare it with what they know to be 
opposing beliefs and evidence offered in one of their colleague's 
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courses, or they give their students the assignment of engaging others 
outside school in conversation about their questions, projects and views. 
In these ways teachers are encouraging students to engage in thoughtful 
and reflective analysis of differing views and perspectives so they may 
adopt beliefs based on an understanding of the evidence available. The 
point is that while there are many ways to indoctrinate, there are also 
many ways to avoid indoctrination; we needn't think that all teachers 
must do exactly what Ms. Sandora does in her classroom. 
One strength of this analysis of indoctrination is that it is practically 
useful in guiding teachers and schools in reflecting on their educational 
goals and on the likely effects their endeavors will have on how students 
come to hold their beliefs. Teachers who are concerned about 
indoctrinating their students are directed, on this analysis, to look carefully 
not just to what they want, but what might be the likely outcomes of their 
endeavors with their students, within their context, of teaching in the 
manner they do. Perhaps more significantly, for schools and school 
districts, they are less able to overlook indoctrinary outcomes or ignore the 
need to justify decisions which they claim render them unable to avoid 
indoctrination. 
Looking back at prior conceptions of indoctrination, we see that 
they are not able to provide an adequate characterization of 
indoctrination that allows teachers and schools to avoid indoctrination. A 
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content analysis, as we've seen, only alerts us to the fact that Mr. Dubois is 
teaching unsettled (and, perhaps, doctrinal) beliefs; it does not enable us, 
however, to make the distinction between Mr. Dubois's teaching and Ms. 
Sandora's. A method analysis of indoctrination may be able to distinguish 
between the instructional methods of Mr. Dubois and Ms. Sandora; 
however it is not clear even on a methods analysis how best to 
characterize indoctrinary methods in any sort of a general sense. Mr. 
Dubois, remember, provides only one example of an indoctrinary 
teaching method. Thus a conception of indoctrination defined in terms of 
method cannot provide adequate guidance to educators trying to teach 
without indoctrinating. A consequences analysis of indoctrination may 
show us that some or many of Mr. Dubois's students hold the beliefs he 
professes about war and non-violence in a non-truth-seeking way, but it 
does not help us understand what Mr. Dubois may be doing or not doing 
to create such consequences. Finally, prior conceptions of indoctrination 
do not consider the role that the school context plays in how students 
come to hold their beliefs and in shaping teachers' intentions. 
Thus, it is my contention that the analysis of indoctrination 
defended here is better able than other considered analyses to meet our 
purposes. It allows for a better understanding of indoctrination and so 
also the opportunity for a more intelligible and considered response to the 
charge of indoctrination. The analysis I've offered has the further virtue of 
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assisting us in knowing how to effectively guide teachers and schools in 
developing educational programs and efforts that avoid indoctrination. 
Indeed, this may be its chief virtue. 
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